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In order to shed some light on how religion affects the consolidating democracy 
in South Korea, this research focuses on the relationship between individual’s religiosity 
and their political attitudes, particularly: (1) political tolerance, which is considered a 
prerequisite for democratic consolidation, and (2) political ideology, which enables us to 
look at the impact of religion on people’s political behavior. 
 In terms of the research design, this research uses a quasi-experimental design, 
a survey design for hypothesis testing using statistical procedures (sample size = 994, 
sample frame = all adults over 20 years old who live in Seoul, the capital of South 
Korea). In order to analyze a numeric data, Generalized Least Estimation is applied with 
two types of data transformation (Orthogonalized Data Transformation and Univariate 
Missing Data Imputation).  
 In relation to the first dependent variable (people’s level of political tolerance), it 
is confirmed that Buddhists are more likely to be tolerant than Protestants in Korea, and 
Protestants have the lowest level of political tolerance among the three popular religious 
groups (Catholicism, Buddhism, and Protestantism). In terms of the culture wars thesis, 
it is confirmed that religious traditionalists have lower levels of political tolerance than 
 vi
religious modernists. Thus, religious traditionalists have a negative impact on 
democratic consolidation due to their low levels of political tolerance.  
 In relation to the second dependent variable (people’s political ideology), it is 
confirmed that Catholics are more likely to be liberal than other religious groups in 
Korea, and Protestants are more likely to be conservative than other religious groups 
due to the theological doctrines of Protestantism (evangelicalism and theological 
inerrancy). Moreover, the data analysis confirms that Buddhists in Korea are more likely 
to be conservatives than Catholics. Based on these findings, it is assumed that 
negotiating between religious groups’ political interests or policy preferences will be very 
difficult, and overcoming this difficulty will be a crucial factor in the process of Korean 
democratic consolidation. 
 Finally, in order to suggest a better model for investigating the relationship 
between religion and politics, this research develops a new model, which enables us to 
compare the explanatory powers of the two dominant theories (the ethnoreligious and 
the culture wars theses). Given this new model, we can examine the impact of dynamic 
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Chapter I: Introduction to Religion and Politics in South Korea 
 
Introduction. 
 Since the late of 1980s, South Korea has experienced a rapid process of 
democratization. After the successful transition from authoritarian-military regime to a 
democratic regime, South Korea entered the next stage of democratization – 
consolidating democracy. One of the vital prerequisites for consolidating democracy is 
people’s high level of political tolerance (Stepan 2000; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 
1982).  
 During the democratic transition period of the 1990s, most Western media 
focused on the violent pictures showing that many union laborers and college students 
fought against armed policemen by using stones, metal-cosh, and flame-bottles in order 
to proclaim their political demands. Due to these violent pictures, for the eyes of people 
in Western countries, South Koreans seem not to have a high level of political tolerance. 
However, since the 2000s, such violent social movements have rarely happened and 
most social movements have followed more peaceful ways – picketing, on-line social 
movement via high-speed internet networks, or candle-demonstrations.  
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 Yet, the changes of demonstration methods does not imply that the level of 
political tolerance have been increased since the early 2000s in South Korea. Rather, 
many scholars point out that the intolerance of middle and lower class in South Korea is 
one main obstacle to further democratization (He 1999; Lee 1993; Mo 2001; Shin and 
Chung 2000). Based on the importance of political tolerance in consolidating Korean 
democracy, this research will examine not only a proper method for measuring Koreans’ 
tolerance levels but also the relationship between individuals’ religiosity and their 
political tolerance.  
 With respect to the cultural perspective on political tolerance, the most 
important variable impacting on individuals’ tolerance levels in East Asian countries 
(including South Korea) is Confucian tradition (Hood 1998; Kim, Helgesen, and Man 
2002; Swank 1996). Yet, according to survey data1, the percentage of people who follow 
Confucian tradition in their daily lives is less than 35% (by contrast, over 65% of survey 
respondents answered that they don’t follow Confucian tradition). By simply looking at 
such a percentage, one can recognize the existence of cultural diversity in Korean 
society. Moreover, one can avoid the oversimplification problem in analyzing cultural 
                                            
1 A survey was conducted in Seoul, Korea, in 2004. The survey sample was selected via Area 
Probability Sampling (a multistage sampling method) and a list-assisted approach to random-
digit dialing (for the detail of the sampling method, see Fowler 2002:18-25) 
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impact on political tolerance by focusing on diversity of religious culture in Korea.  
 Because religion provides fundamental foundation for both individuals’ world 
views and a unique culture of a certain society, focusing on the relationship between 
religiosity and political tolerance enables us to correctly investigate cultural impact on 
individual’s political tolerance in current Korean society. Therefore, the first research 
question is: how does individuals’ religiosity influence their levels of political tolerance? 
The answer of such question implies that the long-term influence of religion on 
consolidating Korean democracy. 
 However, we can understand the short-term influence of religion on Korean 
politics when we investigate the relationship between individual’s religiosity and political 
ideology. Political ideology, when defined as people’s ideas about the way society 
should be (Adams 2001; Mott 1993), plays an important role in shaping people’s political 
actions (e.g., policy preferences or voting behaviors). Therefore, analyzing the 
relationship between individual’s religiosity and political ideology enables us to 
investigate the short-term influence of religion in current Korean politics. The second 
research question is: How does individuals’ religiosity influence his/her political 
ideology?  
 4
 In order to answer these two research questions based on an empirical, 
systematic method, plausible hypotheses are generated based on the two dominant 
theories (the ethnoreligious and the culture wars theses) and tested using statistical 
analysis of a survey data. however, not only does this research provide empirical 
evidences of direct impacts of individual’s religiosity on political tolerance and ideology, 
but also it suggests a more appropriate method for investigating the relationship 
between religion and politics by comparing the explanatory power of two dominant 
theoretical models (the ethnoreligious and the culture wars theses). In short, this 
research argues that there is a statistically significant relationship between individuals’ 
religiosity and political attitudes (both political tolerance and ideology), and a middle 
range model (between the ethnoreligious and the culture wars models) is a better way 
of investigation such relationship. 
 
 
The Role of Religion in Korean Democratization. 
 Approximately two decades have passed since democratization began in 
earnest in South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea) in 1987. During these decades, 
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there have been a number of prominent changes in Korean politics. First of all, political 
contestation has become much more fair.2 Today, there are no longer undemocratic 
“gymnasium elections” (ch’eyukkwan son’go). Under the previous authoritarian regimes, 
the president was elected indirectly by members of the national electoral-college, who 
gathered in a large athletic gymnasium and voted nearly unanimously for the designated 
authoritarian ruler. Since 1987, however, opposition party candidates’ chances of getting 
elected have increased considerably, which explains in part the election of Kim Dae 
Jung, a longtime opposition leader who had run for the presidency four times, as 
president in 1997. The successor of Kim Dae Jung’s regime is President Noh Moo Hyun, 
elected in 2002; Noh’s regime has focused more on the distributional public policies and 
“the Sun Shine” policy toward North Korea than on economic developmental policies.  
 In addition to the changes from authoritarian to democratic regimes, civil 
liberties have been substantially expanded (for the emphasis of civil liberties for a 
democracy, see Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995:7). The basic Press Law (Ollon 
kibonbop), a sophisticated and comprehensive system of press censorship enacted in 
1980 by the Legislative Council for National Security, was abolished. A number of labor 
                                            
2 Holding relatively free, fair, and regular elections is a central element found in numerous 
definitions of democracy (Dahl 1971:3; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995:6). 
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laws, which had severely restricted the exercise of labor rights, were overhauled. The 
intelligence agency (National Intelligence Service, formerly known as the National 
Security Planning Agency and originally called the Korea Central Intelligence Agency), 
which had served the past authoritarian regimes by monitoring opposition politicians and 
suppressing dissident movements, pledged to end domestic surveillance and to shift its 
focus to intelligence operations related to counterterrorism and foreign criminals who 
threaten the national security of Korea. 
 In short, with increased fairness in political contestation and expanded civil 
liberties, Korea has successfully accomplished its transition from authoritarian rule to 
democracy and has now moved to the phase of democratic consolidation (Shin 
1999:91-94). In terms of consolidations democracy in Korea, many scholars focus on 
the role of civil society (Cumings 2002; Kim 2000f, 2000g, 2002h; Koo 2002; Shin 
1999).3 
 According to Kim, the concept of civil society has three dimensions: 
organizational, relational, and normative (Kim 2000f:12-15). In terms of the 
organizational dimension, civil society comprises diverse interacting human collectivities, 
                                            
3 Most analysts agree that civil society is crucial in promoting, protecting, and preserving 
democracy (Diamond 1992:7-14). 
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such as groups, organizations, associations, movements, and institutions. What defines 
civil society in the organizational dimension is the fact that civil society groups are self-
organized and operate within the public sphere (Schmitter 1997:240). To a great extent, 
individuals organize voluntarily or join civil society groups to express their needs and 
passions, articulate their concerns, and represent their interests. 
 The relational dimension, involves civil society’s external relations with the state, 
private units of production and reproduction (businesses, families, and clans), and 
political society. What defines civil society in terms of the relational dimension is civil 
society’s relative autonomy from these three societal spheres (Kim 2000f:12). For 
instance, in regards to relations with the state, civil society is “outside the state in an 
increasingly independent social sphere,” “engaged primarily in a complex of non-state 
activities,” and it is “not regulated, dominated, or controlled by the ruling regime,” often 
“resisting the incursions of the state” (Fatton 1991:84; Keane 1988:14; Ngo 19933). In 
other words, civil society is distinctly different from the state and largely autonomous of it. 
In terms of the relations with private units of production and reproduction in a society, 
civil society is independent of the profit-making enterprise of individual business forms 
(Diamond 1994:7). Civil society derives its membership, resources, and support from 
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the basic units of society – that is, families and clans – in return for representing, 
defending, and promoting their needs, concerns, and interests. Thus, civil society can 
be considered an intermediary sphere between the private sphere and the state. 
 Lastly, civil society is also autonomous from political society. Political society is 
“the arena where various political actors compete to gain control over public power and 
the state apparatus” (Stepan 1988:3) and is principally composed of political parties and 
their affiliated networks, organizations, and campaigns (Diamond 1999:223). Unlike 
political society, civil society does not seek to replace state agents. Instead, civil society 
seeks to engage and to influence the state (Schmitter 1997:240). Most scholars argue 
that this civil society plays a positive roles in democratizations in Southern Europe and 
Latin America (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), Asia (Choi 1993; Gold 1990; Jones 
1998), Eastern Europe (Frentzel-Zagorska 1990; Pelczynski 1988; Weigle and 
Butterfield 1992), and the Middle East (Bellin 1994).  
 When discussion the positive role of civil society in Korean democratization, it is 
important to note that religion is one of the important elements that constitute civil 
society in Korea. In other words, religion has played an important role in the democratic 
transition period and continues to influence current Korean politics. For instance, 
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Christian communities in Korea are outstanding examples of civil society. They have 
always drawn their inspiration and power from impulses that are essentially non-political, 
at least in the sense of being strongly resistant to state domination (Clark 2002). 
 During the years of military rule, a significant part of Korea’s Christian 
community, both Protestant and Catholic, began to oppose the undemocratic tactics of 
the Park regime. They criticized the government’s design for economic development, 
based as it was on a low-wage, export-driven development model that provided little for 
the human rights of workers and privileged the emerging business class. The 
emergence of the Catholic politician Kim Dae Jung and his run for the presidency 
against Park Chung-hee in 1971 identified Catholicism with the political opposition. The 
Catholic poet Kim Chiha became famous for his satirical attacks on the Park 
government and its cronies in the military and big business. Catholic clergymen like 
Bishop Daniel Chi Haksun and Cardinal Stephen Kim Suhwan helped protect 
demonstrators from the police and began to use their positions in society to speak 
openly against the military government’s use of secret police methods to silence critics 
(Clark 2002:194-196). 
 Certain Protestants likewise demanded an end to the government’s betrayal of 
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democracy. Their stand was in the finest tradition of civil society, articulating and 
insisting on limits for state power and using non-governmental organizations to uphold 
civil rights. While most of Korea’s Christians maintained their attitude of support for the 
anti-Communist state in Korea and remained preoccupied with the theological issues 
and controversies that dated back to the Korean War and the colonial period, a more 
progressive wing of the Protestant Church focused on the contemporary Korean scene. 
At the center of this group was a liberal sub-denomination of Presbyterians known as 
Kijang (short for Kidokkyo changnohoe, “Christian Presbyterians”). The Kijang 
Presbyterians, led by the Rev. Kim Chejun and headquatered at the Han’guk 
Theological Seminary in Suwon, had a long liberal tradition of social activism. Many 
fellows of Kijang - such as Mun Ikhwan and Mun Tonghwan, both of the Han’guk 
Seminary faculties, who spent time in prison for violating some of the Park regime’s 
national security laws for giving aid and comfort to the enemy (North Korea)- identified 
Christianity with the cause of social justice and kept alive the church’s civil society 
function as an institution that was fighting to remain free from state dictation (Clark 
2002:197). 
 During these dark years, the dilemmas of Christianity were especially apparent 
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in the divergence between two forms of Protestantism: the Pentecostal type that was 
displayed in the First Full Gospel Church on Youido Island in Seoul, and the Minjung 
Theology promoted by Christian intellectuals as they continued to identify with the 
working people in ways that flirted with the Marxist analyses so long forbidden in South 
Korea. 
 In the church on Youido (with over 600,000 members), Pastor Cho Yonggi 
offered an attractive package of success theology that emphasized Christian happiness 
and God’s rewards for the faithful, including material benefits. Anti-Communism was an 
important component of his message, with the North Korean Communist regime 
representing the ultimate evil to be conquered in God’s own time, by the faithful 
Christians of South Korea (Clark 1997:203-206). 
 By contrast, Minjung Theology sought roots in the Korean minjung, or “masses” 
and the Korean history of tribulation expressed in the emotion of han.4 In the 1970s and 
1980s, the followers of Minjung Theology responded to government oppression with a 
claim that the masses should be the subjects (not objects) of history and that Christians 
should be the instruments of God’s will to see justice done in the world. This was a call 
                                            
4 “Han” is an elusive term but is often translated as “bitter resentment,” something that smolders 
after generations of oppression by unjust systems and masters (Suh 1981:16-17). 
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to activism and involvement in changing the political system that greatly offended the 
South Korean state and invited trouble for its prophets and catcalls from the sidelines of 
conventional, conservative Protestantism (Clark 2002:200). These two roots of Korean 
Protestantism (one for conservative and conventional Protestantism, and the other for 
liberal Protestantism) are basic components of contemporary Korean Christianity 
(including pro-democratic Catholicism). In short, Korean Christianity had an important 
role in the democratic transition in Korea and continues to affect Korean politics.  
 In addition, the role of Buddhism as a civil society shouldn’t be underestimated. 
In particular, after the democratic transition of Korea in 1987, many Buddhistic orders 
and monks have influenced Korean politics, especially public policy making. For 
instance, due to Buddhists’ strong emphasis on natural life and environments, they often 
respond to the economic developmental policies driven by the governmental projects. 
The story of water-lizards in the Chungsung Mountain is a good example of Buddhism’s 
impact on public policy. In 2001, the Korean government began building a high-speed 
train railroad from Seoul to Pusan (about 250 miles). After two-thirds of the total project 
was completed, the project was stopped. In order to finish the project, the railroad must 
be built via a long tunnel under the Chungsung Mountain. But the Buddhist nun Jinul, 
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who belongs to a Buddhist temple in the Chungsung Mountain, protested to stop the 
project because if a long tunnel is built in the mountain, it will dry the water reservoir 
under the mountain and thus kill all water-lizards in the mountain. She accused the 
Department of Transport and Construction of violating environmental protection laws. 
Even though the Supreme Court decided to allow the government to complete the 
project, Jinul did not accept the court’s decision. Jinul started to perform a fast in front of 
Chungwhadae (the Blue House, the White House in Korea). After 30 days of fasting, 
many civil organizations and Buddhist leaders asked the government to stop the project. 
The Korean government finally stopped the project and is now seeking an alternative to 
the tunnel.  
The story of Jinul has an important implication for the democratic consolidation 
in Korea. For a democracy to function well as a democratic regime in the real world of 
politics, individual citizens should view themselves as participants, as well as subjects, 
in the political process. At the same time, they should be willing to accept other 
participants as political equals and tolerate competition and opposition from their 
opponents and rivals (Shin 1999:73). Therefore, one of the necessary conditions for 
democratic consolidation is the extent to which individual citizens embrace the two 
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fundamental procedural norms of liberal democracy: (1) the mass public able to take 
part in politics, and (2) political opponents able to freely compete and challenge the 
actions of government (Gibson and Duch 1993; Held 1987; Sullivan, Piereson, and 
Marcus 1982). Jinul’s participation in politics by challenging the government is a good 
example for further development of democracy in Korea.  
 Furthermore, one common element of political participation by both Christians 
and Buddhists in Korea is that actors of participation were driven by their religious 
teachings and beliefs: for instance, the anti-Communism and social justice doctrines of 
Christianity and the emphasis on natural lives of Buddhism. In other words, religion has 
been an important player in both the democratic transition and the consolidation of 
Korea as a good example of civil society. Based on the importance of the religious factor 
in Korean politics (in particular, democratic consolidation), I will shed some light on how 






Religious Factors in Micro-Level Analysis of Political Behavior. 
 Despite of the important role of religion in Korean democratization after 1945, 
only few systematic and empirical study of religion in Korean politics has been done 
(Clark 1997; Kim 2002b) because of the lack of empirical data. In order to study 
religious impact on Korean politics in a systematic and empirical way, micro-level 
analysis is suggested as an appropriate way of study (Goodchild and Janelle 2004; 
Ramsay 1998). How can we study religion in politics by using micro-level analysis 
method? The answer is to focus on individual’s religiosity and its impact on his/her 
political attitude/ideology. 
Let’s focus on individual religiosity as a factor in analyzing Korean politics. 
Citizens live simultaneously in a variety of social worlds, any and all of which might have 
important political consequences, but at the same time they are rooted socially: in 
neighborhoods, workplaces, churches, temples, clubs, and associations. Indeed, every 
citizen lives at the center of social experiences produced by a series of interesting, 
overlapping, and layered environments. Each of these environments has potentially 
important political consequences because each serves to modify and deflect the 
opportunities and constraints that circumscribe social interaction – social interaction that 
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in turn serves as a vehicle for most transmissions of political information and guidance 
(Huckfeldt 1993). Finding out which environments affect individual (or group) political 
attitudes and behaviors is a key issue for most political scientists. One such visible 
factor is religion.  
 Due to the particular characteristics of religion in a society, religion can be a 
strong influential factor in determining people’s political attitudes and behaviors. There 
are three characteristics of religion: (1) religion is established as a group phenomenon, 
(2) religion is concerned with the sacred and supernatural, and (3) religion involves a 
body of beliefs (Johnstone 2004:8-13). First, in terms of religion as a group 
phenomenon5, a certain religion in any society is composed of two or more people 
(members) who share certain common goals. Saying that a group has common goals 
implies that individuals who are confronted with common problems have made contact 
and have agreed to work together toward the goal of solving those problems. 
 The second characteristic of religion is its concern with the sacred and 
supernatural. There is a universal tendency for religion to express awe, reverence, and 
fear with regard to certain things, beings, or situations, and to distinguish them from the 
ordinary, the mundane – or, as Durkheim defines it, the “profane” (Durkheim 1961:52). 
                                            
5 The meaning of the Latin word Religare is the group or fellowship (Johnstone 2004:8). 
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For instance, Old Testament Jews removed their sandals upon entering the temple, 
many Christians make the sign of the cross when praying to God, Hindus give cows the 
right of way, Muslims undertake pilgrimages to Mecca, and American Indians avoided 
disturbing holy plots of ground. In each instance, people of a certain religion 
acknowledge being in the presence of something special – something above and 
beyond them that demands adopting special attitudes, performing certain actions, and 
perhaps articulating special words as well.  
 The third characteristic of religion is that religion involves a body of beliefs 
(Johnstone 2004:11-12). This characteristic proceeds from the foregoing consideration 
of the sacred and the supernatural. In order to justify these phenomena and 
experiences, religious groups develop explanations, work out rationales, and discover 
facts that are eventually systematized into a body of beliefs. A body of beliefs has two 
forms – written and unwritten. In terms of written forms, every major religion has its 
sacred book or books that provide the basis for the beliefs the group holds. In terms of 
unwritten forms, most religions have an oral tradition in the form of myths, sagas, and 
proverbs, handed down to each new generation by word of mouth. Without such a body 
of beliefs, a religion cannot be sustained for a long time. 
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 How do these three characteristics of religion contribute to religion as an 
important factor in analyzing peoples’ political attitudes and behaviors? In thinking about 
this puzzle, I like to draw an analogy from the way law enforcement officials attempt to 
solve crimes. As we have learned from watching countless television programs, police 
focus their investigation on suspects who have a motive for wrongdoing, the means to 
carry out the crime, and the opportunity to commit it (Wald 2003:26-27). According to 
Wald, translated into the language of politics, we can better understand why religion 
enters public life by examining the incentives for political activism by religiously 
committed people and groups, the resources that enable the religious to participate 
effectively, and their opportunities for political involvement (2003:27).  
 The incentives for religious people or groups to enter public life are related to 
the second and third characteristics of religion – a body of beliefs and the sacred (or 
supernatural). In particular, a body of beliefs (as a comprehensive system of belief) 
provides guidance for believers about appropriate behavior in secular realms, such as 
politics. The features of the sacred realm or supernatural beings’ expectations for 
peoples’ behavior dictate believers’ attitudes towards controversial issues in the secular 
realm, such as abortion rights, school prayer, equal rights between males and females, 
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pornography, and stem-cell research.  
 The first characteristic of religion (religion as a group phenomenon) provides a 
powerful means for religious people (or groups) to influencing public life. Because 
religion as a group provides a place for believers to share regular social interaction, a 
common status, and a distinctive way of life, there is a high possibility of shaping 
believers’ political values in a certain way. In other words, adherents of a certain religion 
may develop and share a similar way of looking at the world, what is sometimes called a 
“group mind” (Wald 2003:25). In a democratic society, such believers have a great 
opportunity to express their particular worldview by participating in elections, political 
campaigns, and street-demonstrations.  
 In fact, the World Value Survey 2000-20016 shows that the existence of group 
minds in different religions is very salient in the contemporary world. For instance, figure 
1-1 shows the variations among different religions’ believers’ opinions about social 
problems: “Do you agree or disagree to such statement as churches (or the religious  
                                            
6 The survey was designed to investigate the basic values and attitudes of the peoples (over 
120,000) of more than 80 societies around the world. The questionnaires focused on human 
values and goals concerning politics, economics, religion, sexual behavior, gender roles, family 
values, communal identities, civic engagement and ethical concerns, and such issues as 
environmental protection, scientific progress and technological development and human 

























bereligion catholics protestants muslims buddhists hindu jew
Religious groups
The religious authorities give answers to social problems?
 
Note: The horizontal line is the mean value of answers, “0” for No, “1” for Yes. 
“bereligion” : Do you belong to a religious denomination?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“catholics” : Is your religious denomination Catholic?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“protestants” : Is your religious denomination Protestantism?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“muslims” : Is your religious denomination Muslim?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“buddhists” : Is your religious denomination Buddhism?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“orthodoxch” : Is your religious denomination Orthodox Church?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“hindu” : Is your religious denomination Hinduism?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 







authorities for non-Christians) are giving adequate answers to social problems” 
(Inglehart et al. 2004:433). 
According to Figure 1-1, while Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and Jews tend 
to think that religious authorities do provide answers to social problems (including a high 
probability of intensive group mind), Buddhists and Hindus tend to think that religious 
authorities do not provide answers. This variation is rooted in the differences of belief 
systems among religious groups.  
For instance, according to the Buddhist doctrine, nothing is absolutely wrong or 
right because everything is connected in the form of predestination (or acts of 
providence). Because people cannot know what they were or did in their former 
existence (a former life), nobody has the freedom to blame other people in the present 
life. Therefore, unlike Christianity (including both Catholicism and Protestantism), Islam, 
and Judaism (all of which have sacred books which guide the believers’ way of life in the 
profane realm), Buddhism is concerned more with believers’ self-salvation than with the 
problems of the profane realm. Though there is some variation among Buddhism (for 
instance, Buddhists in Thailand tend to think that the king of the country must rule his 
country based on Buddhist doctrine), Buddhism, in general, does not provide solid 
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guidance for social problems. 
 Hinduism as the mother’s womb for Buddhism (Buddhism was established from 
one of Hinduist sects) also focuses on believers’ self-realization. However, Hinduism is 
not only a religion, but also a culture (a way of life). While many Hindu holy texts and 
practices are intended to provide devotees with spiritual paths to liberation from the 
repeated cycle of life and death, many other aspects of Hindu life and ritual do not lead 
directly to such transformation, but are perceived to enhance one’s quality of life on the 
Earth. Thus, such activities as tree-planting, singing, dancing, healing, archery, astrology, 
sculpture, architecture, and building a home might all be considered part of religious 
domain (Naraynan 2004). However, because Hinduism focuses on enhancing one’s 
quality of life (not social justice, equal rights, etc.), religious authorities of Hinduism do 
not pay attention to social problems. Rather, Hinduism leads devotees to obligate to 
hierarchical structure of community (Naraynan 2004:97). In order to enhance one’s 
quality of life on the earth, the stable structure of society is a necessary condition 
because people cannot concentrate on their quality of life in a chaotic society. This 
feature of Hinduism is distinctive one comparing other religions. 
 In short, the variations of religions (based on their particular belief systems and 
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organizational features) can make religion an important factor worth looking into by 
political scientists. Given that context, this research will focus on discovering some 
general patterns of religious influence on politics. In order to study the relationship 
between individual religiosity and political attitude (political tolerance)/ideology with 
micro-level analysis, this research uses a survey design and various statistical analyses 
(factor analysis, multiple regression, orthogonalized regression, and F-test for the 






Chapter II: Methods for Inquiry  
 
Individuals’ Religiosity and Politics in South Korea. 
 Despite the importance of religion as a visible factor in the field of political 
science, the study of the relationship between religion and politics has been done 
primarily in Western countries, such as the United States, Great Britain, and Canada 
(Bruce 2002; Dillon 1996; Greeley 1997; Guth 1996; Hertel and Hughes 1987; 
Huntington 1974; Jelen 1998; Kim 2005e; Kotler-berkowitz 2001; McDonald 1969; 
Nolan 1996; Rozell and Wilcox 1995; Wald 2003; Yamane 1996).1  Unfortunately, few 
scholars have devoted themselves to the study of this topic using cases other than 
Western countries (Forest and Johnson 2005; Karpov 1999; Kim 2005e; Levine and 
Mainwaring 1986; Naraynan 2004; Stepan 1988). 
 Scholars who do study the religious factor in politics in non-Western countries 
tend to focus on the institutional level, but non on the individual level. For instance, they 
focus on a specific religious group (or denomination) – its institutional characteristics 
and interaction with the state or society (Clark 1997; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; 
                                            
1 A small number of scholars began to study the relationship between religion and society in 
cross-national level (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart et al. 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004). 
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Mainwaring 1986); thus, they have methodological limitations in exploring the overall 
relationship between religion and politics in a given country. In order to contribute to 
developing a theoretical generalization about religion and politics, it is necessary to 
study this topic at the micro-levels of analysis, focusing on individuals (Sanders 2002).  
However, though micro-level analysis has some advantage in developing 
theoretical generalizations, it is not appropriate to use such analysis in studying every 
country. For instance, if a country has one dominant religion among the people, it is 
better to use macro-level analysis, investigating, for example, the features of the 
religious group (or denomination) and their impact on politics (Ramsay 1998; Shankland 
2003; Smock 2002; Weber 1930). Yet, if we focus only on a certain religion, it is difficult 
to generalize any result from such case study. 
Therefore, a country with religious pluralism (no single dominant religion) and a 
high percentage of religious believers is the best case for exploring the overall 
relationship between religion and politics. In this context, Korea provides a natural 
experimental setting for investigating the relationship between religion and politics in the 
modern democratic world. Thus, the primary focus of this research is how individuals’ 
religiosity relates to their political attitude (in particular, the level of political 
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tolerance) and political ideology. 
 In terms of the diversity of individuals’ religiosity in Korea, Korea has no “official” 
religion (like the Anglican Church in England), nor is there one dominant religion. 
Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism, as well as a whole spectrum of new 
religious movements, co-exist peacefully in one of the most religiously pluralistic 
countries in the world (Yun 2000). 
In the World Value Survey 2000-2001, about 63% of Korean people answered 
that they have a religious affiliation.2 Among those who have a religious affiliation, 13% 
are Catholic, 23% Protestant, 20% Buddhist, and 2% other religions.3  
 Based on such high levels of Koreans’ religiosity, the expansion of religious 
organizations in Korea is remarkable. For instance, Buddhism, which has made a 
spectacular comeback since the fall of the Choson Dynasty in 1910, shows every sign 
of dynamism: in Korea, there are 39 Buddhist orders, more than 11,000 temples, over 
                                            
2 The principal investigator of the survey is Professor Soo Young Auh, Department of Political 
Science, Ewha Women’s University; November 10 to 21, 2001. N=1200., Population 20 years old 
and over, representative of the Republic of Korea. Selection of 120 clusters with a sample of 10 
chosen from the household of each of the selected clusters. 
Confucianism is not categorized as a religion because it does not include the second 
characteristics of religion – the feature of the sacred and supernatural. According to Johnston, if 
we emphasize the existence of the supernatural in defining religion, several religious forms 
cannot be a religion, such as Jainism, Ethical Culture, early Buddhism, and Confucianism 
(2004:10). 
3 “Others” includes any religions other than Catholicism, Protestantism, and Buddhism. It 
consists of 1.75% Orthodoxy Church Members, 0.17% Muslims, and 0.08% Jews. 
 27
26,000 monks, and a large number of Buddhist-run media outlets, including cable 
television, a radio network, and newspapers (Kim 2002b:292). There are more than 160 
Protestant denominations and nearly 60,000 churches, as well as 1,100 Catholic 
churches, which supposedly makes Korea “the most Christianized” non-Western 
country in the world, with the obvious exception of the Philippines (Kim 2002b:293).  
By simply looking at the data, we recognize that Korean people have strong 
religious orientation in their lives. Such strong religious orientation in South Korea is not 
an abnormal phenomenon if we understand the long tradition of religion in Korean 
society – Buddhism came from China in AD 372 (Kyoguryu dynasty), and Christianity 
was introduced to the Chosun dynasty in the 18th century (Grayson 2002).  
 Not only does the diversity of Korean peoples’ religious affiliation make the 
Korea case a fine experimental setting, but also the high level of political interest of 
religious believers implies the importance of religious factors in Korean politics.  
According to the data, people who have a religious affiliation are more likely to 
be interested in political affairs than non-religious people (see figure 2-1). Moreover, 
most religious groups show a higher level of political interest than Buddhists, which 
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Religious Groups
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Note: The horizontal line shows the mean value of the level of political interest. The mean of “1” 
for Not at all, “2” for Not very, “3” for Somewhat, “4” for Very Interested. 
“bereligion” : Do you belong to a religious denomination?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“catholics” : Is your religious denomination Catholic?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“protestants” : Is your religious denomination Protestantism?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“muslims” : Is your religious denomination Muslim?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“buddhists” : Is your religious denomination Buddhism?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“orthodoxch” : Is your religious denomination Orthodox Church?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 
“hindu” : Is your religious denomination Hinduism?, “1” for Yes, “0” for No. 






political interest. This leads us to expect that an individual’s religiosity influences his/her 
political attitude and ideology. 
This research focuses on the relationship between individual religiosity and the 
level of political tolerance, which is one of the key cultural features in a democratic 
society. In order to increase the validity of the independent variable (individual 
religiosity), this research focuses on denominational differences among various religions 
as well as differences among believers’ religiosity (including religious commitment and 
belief). Because religion has two aspects at the same time – inner (inside the believer’s 
mind) and outer (outside the believer’s mind, such as religious organizations) - it is 
necessary to investigate the relationship between levels of political tolerance and these 
two aspects of individual religiosity. 
 In terms of political ideology, this research focuses on the relationship between 
believers’ (including seculars) religious ideology and their political ideology. By 
pinpointing believers’ religious ideological spectrum (religious traditionalism and 
modernism)4 and its relations to the conventional political ideological spectrum (political 
                                            
4 Some scholars focus on political division between as well as within religious traditions. In terms 
of division within a religious tradition, scholars develop new concepts, such as religious 
conservatism (or traditionalism, fundamentalism) and religious progressivism (or modernism, 
non-fundamentalism) (Kellstedt et al. 1996; Kellstedt and Smidt 1991; Layman 2001; Marsden 
1980; Miller and Wattenberg 1984). 
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conservatism and liberalism), this research will discover the visibility of religious factors 
in analyzing Korean peoples’ political behaviors.  
 
 
Two Models for Investigating the Relationship between Religiosity and Politics 
(“Ethnoreligious” versus “Culture Wars” Theses).  
 Over the past two decades, considerable evidence (relating to the U.S. case) 
has accumulated regarding the political relevance of three dimensions of religiosity – 
religious tradition (belonging), religious commitment (behaving), and doctrinal orthodoxy 
(believing) (Fowler, Hertzke, and Olson 1999). From this evidence, it is clear that, 
although conceptually distinct, belonging, behaving, and believing are closely related to 
one another. Religious traditions (belonging) are defined in part by distinct beliefs 
(believing) and practices (behaving); religious commitment (behaving) and doctrinal 
orthodoxy (believing) are defined within the context of particular religious traditions. So if 
these aspects of religion are related to politics and to each other, the question is, “How 
do they matter politically? Do they act independently of each other, or do they act in 
conjunction?” 
 In terms of the relationship between the three dimensions of religiosity 
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(behaving, believing, and belonging) and political attitudes, there are two primary 
models for investigation: the “ethnoreligious” model and the “culture wars” model. The 
first was developed by historians (McCormick 1986; Swierenga 1990), and applied in 
the works of political science (Lipset 1964). The ethnoreligious model emphasizes the 
effect of religious belonging on politics. In the context of the ethnoreligious model, 
religion is thought of primarily as a social phenomenon, with membership in a religious 
tradition being closely linked to other aspects of culture, such as ethnicity, race, and 
region. Here, religious behaving and believing reinforce belonging to produce distinctive 
group identifications and distinctive cultural and political values. 
 So the focus of the ethnoreligious model is on political differences between, and 
not within, religious traditions, and most analyses of political attitudes are based on the 
effects of religious tradition, not on the effects of religious commitment and doctrinal 
orthodoxy. However, religious commitment and doctrinal orthodoxy do matter in this 
model. They matter in the sense that the most committed and orthodox members of a 
tradition are the most attuned to the dominant values of the tradition. So they are more 
likely than the less committed and orthodox members of the tradition to possess the 
political perspectives characteristic of the tradition (Kleppner 1979), and their political 
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outlooks should be most different from those members of other traditions with different 
worldviews and values.  
 For example, in the United States, the communitarianism of the Jewish faith and 
the liberation themes prevalent in the African-American church should mean that the 
most orthodox and committed members of those traditions are the most likely to take 
liberal positions on social welfare issues and issues of civil rights and liberties and thus 
the most likely to identify with and vote for the Democratic party (Parenti 1967).  
 The ethonoreligious model appears to fit well with much of American political 
history, considering the sharp political differences that have existed between Protestants, 
Catholics, and Jews and the early work on political behavior that identified religious 
groups affiliation as a major factor driving voting decisions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and 
McPhee 1954). Even today, scholars recognize that white Protestant are more 
Republican and conservative than Catholics, black Protestant, Jews, and seculars (Guth 
and Green 1991; Miller and Shanks 1996).  
 However, other recent findings in the literature on religion and politics do not 
square with the ethonoreligious model. For example, Catholic and mainline Protestant 
clergy and institutions have tended to be committed in recent years to principles such as 
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economic and social justice, racial equality, and nonmilitary solutions to international 
conflicts. From the ethnoreligious model, we would expect the most committed 
members of those traditions to share those perspectives and thus be more likely than 
their less devout counterparts to support the Democratic party and its candidates. 
However, recent research shows that the most committed Catholics and mainline 
Protestants are, in fact, the members of their traditions who are least likely to have 
liberal political attitudes and to identify with and vote for the Democratic party (Kellstedt 
et al. 1996).  
 For these reasons, the ethnoreligious model has appeared to some scholars to 
be an outdated account of religious influence on politics. Thus, the second model has 
emerged, the “culture wars” model. This model was developed by sociologists (Hunter 
1991; Wuthnow 1988), and applied in the work of political science (Layman and 
Carmines 1997). The culture wars model emphasizes the relevant political divisions 
within, rather than between, religious traditions. Instead of reinforcing religious 
belonging, doctrinal orthodoxy (believing) and religious commitment (behaving) cut 
across the lines of traditions to create the same kinds of distinctive values among 
adherents in all religious traditions. Thus, the key political differences are no longer 
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between members of different faiths, but between religious “traditionalists,” or individuals 
with high levels of orthodoxy and commitment, and religious “modernists,” or individuals 
with low levels of orthodoxy and commitment, across the whole range of religious 
traditions (Layman 2001:66).  
 In other words, the political effects of believing and behaving are not tradition 
specific but are consistent across faith traditions. For example, in the U.S., the most 
orthodox and committed members of all traditions in the U.S. should be the most likely 
to partake of traditionalist values and thus to take conservative positions on cultural 
issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and pornography and to support the 
Republican Party. The least orthodox and committed members of those traditions should 
be the most likely to partake of modernist values and thus to have liberal cultural views 
and Democratic partisan loyalties. If the cultural wars model is correct, then commitment 
and doctrine should have independent effects apart from religious tradition, perhaps 





Statistical Models to Test both Ethnoreligious and Culture Wars Models. 
 In contemporary religion and politics, it is likely that the ethnoreligious and 
culture wars models are ideal types and the reality lies somewhere in between. In other 
words, doctrinal orthodoxy and religious commitment may be becoming more politically 
important, and their effects may be growing increasingly independent of religious 
tradition. But until the reshaping of political alignments along theological and behavioral 
lines is complete, the political impact of religious traditions will still be important.  
 There are two specific reasons to believe that the reality of contemporary 
religion and politics lies somewhere between the ethnoreligious and culture wars 
models. First, some of the recent research on the political influence of religion in the 
contemporary U.S. seems to fit with both perspectives. For instance, the strong 
attachments of committed evangelical Protestants to the Republican party do not run 
counter to the ethnoreligious viewpoints. However, those attachments are also 
highlighted in the work of culture wars proponents who see the support of the most 
orthodox Protestants for the conservative party as evidence of the strong connection 
between theological conservatism and political conservatism (Wuthnow 1989). In reality, 
evangelical Republicanism is probably indicative of both ethnoreligious and theological 
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influences on politics. It is certainly a case of traditionalist religious beliefs translating 
into conservative political attitudes and attachments, just as the culture wars model 
suggests (Kellstedt et al. 1994).  
 Second, the way that religion is connected to politics may depend on the nature 
of the political issue/agenda, or on the salience of particular issues to individuals or 
within the context of a campaign. Cultural issues such as abortion and homosexual 
rights are central to the culture wars thesis. The most orthodox members of all traditions 
tend to have conservative attitudes toward them, while the most progressive members 
of all traditions tend to have liberal views on them (Layman and Green 1998). Thus, 
these issues facilitate a consistent link between theological and political conservatism 
across a range of religious communities, and when they are salient, culture wars 
patterns should hold (for example, the strong connection between religious 
fundamentalist churches and political conservatism toward the abortion issue) 
(Ammerman 1987; Peshkin 1986).  
 However, on other issues, such as economic and social welfare issues, the 
connection between theological orthodoxy and conservative attitudes is not as clear, 
and the positions of religious people may depend more on the distinctive values and 
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worldviews of their religious traditions - for instance, evangelical Protestant individualism 
versus Jewish communitarianism - in addition to their socioeconomic, ethnic, and racial 
attributes. So when these issues are more salient, religious tradition may have more 
political impact than doctrinal orthodoxy and religious commitment (Layman and Green 
1998). 
 Therefore, it seems that the most appropriate model of contemporary religion 
and political attitudes is one that incorporates elements of both the ethnoreligious and 
culture wars model. In other words, the model, in this research, focuses on accounting 
for the possibility that religious commitment (behaving) and doctrinal orthodoxy 
(believing) have effects on political attitudes/ideology independent of religious traditions 
(belonging), just as the culture wars thesis suggests. However, it also should account for 
political differences between religious traditions and the possibility that the effects of 
beliefs (believing) and behaviors (behaving) are dependent on tradition (belonging), just 
as the ethnoreligious viewpoint contends (Layman 2001:68-69). 
 To test both the ethnoreligious and culture wars models simultaneously and to 
capture the possibility that contemporary Korean politics contains elements of both 
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 Model I is designed to test the ethnoreligious thesis that emphasizes the effect 
of belonging aspect on politics. Following the ethnoreligious perspective, this model 
allows religious tradition to exert an independent influence on political attitudes (political 
tolerance and ideology in this research) by including dummy variables for Catholics, 
Buddhists, Protestants, and Seculars.5 Model II is designed to test the culture wars 
thesis that emphasizes cultural division within religious traditions – religious 
traditionalism (or conservativism) and religious modernism (or liberalism). Also, in Model 
II-1, by including a new variable that is generated by combination between doctrinal 
orthodoxy and religious commitment (high value of this variable refers that a believer is 
close to religious traditionalist/conservativist), we can test the impact of believers’ 
religious cultural attitudes on their political attitudes. As suggested by the culture wars 
thesis, the model II and II-1 allow to test the impact of believers’ religiosity (the 
dimension of their religious traditionalism/modernism) on political attitudes.  
 Model III is designed to test both the ethnoreligious and culture wars theses 
simultaneously. Following the ethnoreligious assertion that the effects of orthodoxy and 
commitment are tradition specific, working to reinforce the dominant values within 
                                            
5 Due to the small percentage of total believers (less than 0.1%), Judaism, Islam, and other 
religious traditions are excluded from the independent variables. 
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religious traditions, the model allows their effects to vary by tradition. It does so by 
including a set of new variables that are generated by combinations between religious 
traditions (Catholics, Protestants, and Buddhists) and the cleavages of religious 
traditionalism/modernism. The model will investigate the differences both between 
religious tradition (for example, Catholics are more liberal than Protestants) and within 
religious tradition based on believers’ religious cultural attitudes (for example, more 
traditionalistic/fundamental Catholics are more conservative than modernistic/liberal 
Catholics). However, in order to reduce multicollinearity problem (especially, in Model III), 
some independent variables (based on their Variance Inflation Factors values) will be 
changed into a new variable by using the Orthogonalizing method and scoring after 
Factor Analysis. In particular, Model III is highly suspected to have the overspecification 
problem (due to the high level of multicollinearity among independent variables), 
Structural Equation Model (Kline 1998) may be used for highlighting some latent effects 
of independent variables. 
 All three Models include demographic variables as control variables. By 
including demographic variables (age, gender, income, education, and marital status), 
the models can avoid the misspecification problem in developing an unbiased statistical 
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model. Thus, statistical models for the above theoretical models are as follows: 
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Where Y is the political attitudes (political tolerance and ideology) to be explained and 
the controls are a set of sociodemographic variables. Because all three models will be 
analyzed by Multiple Regression (Ordinary Least Squares) method, e is Residuals for 
fitted values. iB are coefficients for each independent variable and will be tested via t-




 The primary of this research is how individual’s religiosity relates to their political 
attitude (in particular, the level of political tolerance) and political ideology. In order to 
investigating the relationship between religion and politics, this research uses two 
theoretical models – the ethnoreligious and the culture wars thesis. The focus of the 
ethnoreligious model is on political differences between religious traditions, and most 
analyses of political attitudes are based on the effects of religious tradition. In contrast, 
the culture wars model emphasizes the relevant political divisions within religious 
tradition. Thus, the key political differences are no longer between members of different 
faiths, but between religious “traditionalists,” or individuals with high levels of orthodoxy 
and commitment, and religious “modernists,” or individuals with low levels of orthodoxy 
and commitment, across the whole range of religious traditions.  
 Based on these two theses, this research develops four statistical models to 
shed some light on the relationship between individuals’ religiosity and their political 
attitudes (political tolerance and political ideology). In particular, Model III in Figure 2-2 is 
designed to compare the explanatory powers of two theses and suggest a better way of 
investigation.
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Chapter III: A Quasi-Experimental Design for the Inquiry  
 
Quantitative Method to Study Religion and Politics. 
 In order to shed some light on the relationship between individuals’ religiosity 
and their political attitude (their level of political tolerance) and political ideology, it is 
necessary to choose an appropriate framework for the inquiry the relationship. There 
are two dominant methods in the field of political science: qualitative and quantitative 
approaches (Creswell 1994; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). A researcher can choose 
one of three strategies of inquiry (i.e., experimental, ethnographic, and narrative design), 
a choice that is bounded by the researcher’s method of approach.  
A qualitative approach is one in which the inquirer often makes knowledge 
claims based primarily on constructivist perspectives (i.e., the multiple meanings of 
individual experiences, meanings socially and historically constructed, with the intent of 
developing a theory or pattern), or advocacy/participatory perspectives (i.e., political, 
issue-oriented, collaborative, or change oriented), or both (Creswell 1994:18). In terms 
of the constructivist perspective, the researcher seeks to establish the meaning of a 
phenomenon from the views of participants. This means that the researcher identifies a 
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culture-sharing group and studies how it developed shared patterns of behavior over 
time (i.e., ethnography). One of the key elements of collecting data is to observe 
participants’ behaviors by participating in their activities. However, for the participatory 
perspective, the inquirer seeks to examine an issue related to oppression of individuals. 
To study this, the researcher collects stories of individual oppression using a narrative 
approach. Individuals are interviewed at some length to determine how they have 
personally experienced oppression (Creswell 1994:21). 
 In terms of the quantitative approach based on a postpositivist perspective, the 
researcher tests a theory by specifying narrow hypotheses and collecting data to 
support or refute the hypotheses. An experimental design is used in which attitudes are 
assessed both before and after an experimental treatment. The data are collected on an 
instrument that measures attitudes, and the information collected is analyzed using 
statistical procedures and hypothesis testing (Creswell 1994:20). 
 Research focusing on the relationship between individuals’ religiosity and 
political attitude/ideology tends to be done by applying the qualitative approach (for 
instance, Alvis 2005; Armstrong 1993; Clark 2002; Dekmejian 1985; Dillon 1996; Ford 
2005; Lewis 1993; Mainwaring 1986; Moore 2000; Smock 2002; Weber 1930; Yun 
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2000). Though some recent researchers have applied the quantitative approach (for 
instance, Chaves and Gorski 2001; Jelen 1998; Karpov 1999; McDonald 1969), 
researchers focusing on religion are less likely to use the quantitative approach because 
of the difficulty in conceptualizing and operationalizing such obscure concepts, as 
religiosity, beliefs, faith, or religious creed. Moreover, because individuals’ religiosity (for 
instance, the degree of intensity in believing a certain religion) cannot be articulated to 
make a researchable condition, the experimental design is difficult to use.  
 However, in order to take advantage of the quantitative approach (which allows 
for generalization of the research results), this research will use a quasi-experimental 
design, or a survey design for hypothesis testing using statistical procedures.  
 
 
Principles and Practices for Designing a Survey. 
 To collect numeric data of individuals’ religiosity and political attitudes, a 
telephone survey (central-location interviewing) was conducted in Seoul, in June, 2004. 
In central-location interviewing, all interviews are conducted and supervised within one 
office or location, as opposed to decentralized interviewing, which allows each 
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interviewer to use a private telephone in the home or office. While central-location 
interviewing is slightly more expensive, it also has several advantages (Downs, Smeyak, 
and Martin 1980). For instance, highly trained, full-time interviewers can be used on 
every study. Interviewers can be briefed easily, and supervision is immediate and 
constant. Complete observation of any pre-testing can be achieved. Furthermore, all 
completed interviews are immediately available for supervisors to check for consistency, 
completeness, and neatness. Finally, with central-location interviewing, information can 
be quickly passed on to all interviewers doing the fieldwork (Downs, Smeyak, and 
Martin 1980:374-375).  
 In order to take advantage of central-location interviewing, 20 interviewers were 
hired and trained for two days. They are all college students majoring in political science 
at Kyung-Hee University, Seoul. The survey was conducted for three days, from 9:00AM 
to 9:00PM. The survey was conducted until 9:00PM in order to reach people who work 
outside the home (most people return home from work after 6:00PM).  
 During the training days,1 two basic objectives of training were completed: (1) 
to familiarize all interviewers with the questionnaire or interview outline and the sampling 
                                            
1 The two-day training program consisted of two parts: (1) a two-hour lecture on interviewing 
techniques and a demonstration interview, and (2) supervised practice interviewing (The training 
program was designed based on previous research about interviewing. Fowler and Mangione 
1990). 
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procedures, and (2) to motivate the interviewers by explaining the purpose of the project 
and by making them feel that what they were doing was very important (see the 
objectives of training interviewers in Downs, Smeyak, and Martin 1980:362-363). 
According to Fowler and Mangione, two-day training programs result in 78% of 
respondents providing “exact” answers, as opposed to only 70% in one-day training 
programs. Thus, putting interviewers through two days of training yields more precise 
and useful results (1990:116-117). 
In terms of the sample frame of the survey itself, the survey was conducted in 
Seoul (the capital of Korea). Seoul was selected in order to reduce the strong impact of 
regionalism in Korean politics. Regionalism refers to the impact of regional loyalty on 
individuals’ political behavior, especially voting behavior (Kollman, Lee, and Park 2003). 
For instance, the former president, Kim Dae Jung, won over 90% of the total votes in the 
Jula province, the southwestern part of Korea in which Kim’s hometown is located. 
Similarly, his opponent, Lee Heo Chang, whose hometown is in the Kyungnam province 
(the southeastern part of the country), won over 80% of the total votes in that area 
(Kollman, Lee, and Park 2003:4-5). Given the impact of regionalism, if one of two such 
provinces were selected as a sample frame, the probability of conducting a biased 
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survey would be high. However, Seoul, as the capital of Korea, with 25% of the total 
population in South Korea, is a good experimental setting for studying the relationship 
between religion and politics. Because the population of Seoul consists of people who 
have various regional origins (from all areas of South Korea, and even areas of North 
Korea), the impact of regionalism can be minimized (Cho 2000; Lee 1998; Moon 1984). 
Furthermore, in order to avoid systematic errors of sampling, the survey sample 
was selected via Area Probability Sampling (a multistage sampling method) and a list-
assisted approach to random-digit dialing (Fowler 2002:18-25). Area probability 
sampling is one of the most generally useful multistage strategies because of its wide 
applicability. It can be used to sample any population that can be defined geographically 
– for example, the people living in a neighborhood, a city, a state, or a country. The 
basic approach is to divide the total target land area into exhaustive, mutually exclusive 
sub-areas with identifiable boundaries. These sub-areas are then the clusters.2 A 
sample of sub-areas is drawn. A list is then made of housing units in selected sub-areas, 
and a sample of listed units is drawn. As a final stage, all people in selected housing 
                                            
2 In multistage sampling, a strategy is needed for linking population members to some kind of 
grouping that can be sampled. These groupings can be sampled as a first stage. Lists then are 
made of individual members of selected groups, with the possibly of further selection from the 
created list at the second (or later) stage of sampling. In sampling terminology, the groupings in 
the last stage of a sample design are usually referred to as “clusters” (Fowler 2002:19). 
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units may be included in the sample, or they may be listed and sampled as well. 
 Based on the strategy of area probability sampling, actual sampling was 
conducted via the following steps: 
 
1st Step: People in Seoul selected as a Population. 
2nd Step: Seoul has 25 sub-areas (Gu); calculate the percentage of Gu population. 
3rd Step: Calculate allocated sample number for each Gu (sample numbers for each cluster). 
4th Step: List telephone numbers via Random-digit Dialing method. 
 
In the fourth step, the telephone numbers were selected using random-digit dialing. In 
particular, a list-assisted approach to random-digit dialing were used to generate 
random telephone numbers for each Gu. In recent years, with the advancement of 
computer technology, a communication company (Korea Telecommuncation Company, 
called KT in Korea) has compiled computerized versions of telephone books. These 
computerized phone books are updated every three months. Once all of these books 
are in a computer file, a search can yield all clusters [area code (“2” for Seoul) – four 
digits (different numbers for each Gu) – four digits] that have at least one published 
residential telephone number. Thus, KT can produce a sample frame of all possible 
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telephone numbers in clusters (Gu) that have at least one published residential 
telephone number. The survey was conducted by using a sample frame that KT 
produced in 2004. 
 The target population for the study were people over 20 years old, the minimum 
age for voting. The total population of Seoul (over 20 years old) has 7,600,368, as of 
April, 2004 (Male: 3,774,576, Female: 3,825,792).3 Based on the population size of 
each Gu, the necessary sampling numbers were calculated for each Gu (2nd and 3rd 
steps above).4 For instance, the total population of Gongro-Gu (one of 25 Gu in Seoul) 
was 181,441, or 2% of the total population of Seoul in 2003. In order to get the desired 
sample size (1,037, which is the sample size with 99% confidence level for the total 
population, 7,600,368), a telephone interviewer stopped calling Gongro-Gu’s telephone 
numbers when he/she had 21 respondents (2% of 1,037 = 20.74).  
 The actual sample size of the survey data is 994 (3.1% error level with 95% 
confidence level). Although the actual sample size (994) is smaller than the designed 
sample size (1037), it is quite large enough to use for analysis because the sample size 
                                            
3 The data was collected from the Korean National Statistical Office in 2004. Available at 
website: http://kosis.nso.go.kr/cgi-bin/sws_999.cgi, and accessed in May 2003. 
4 The population of each Gu was provided by the Seoul Regional Statistical Office in 2004. 
Available at website http://webseoul.metro.seoul.kr:6600/cgi-bin/sws_999.cgi, and accessed in 
May 2004. 
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with 95% confidence for the total population, 7,600,368, is just over 600. In terms of the 
questionnaires, the survey consisted of three parts: (1) political attitudes/behaviors, (2) 
religious affiliation/behaving/believing, and (3) sociodemographic questions (see 
Appendix for the actual questionnaires).  
 To ensure that the questions are reliable measures, the questionnaire was 
drafted based on three principles: (1) the questions must be fully scripted, so that the 
questions as written fully prepare a respondent to provide the answer, (2) questions 
mean the same thing to every respondent, and (3) the kinds of answers that constitute 
an appropriate response to the questions are communicated to all respondents (Fowler 
and Mangione 1990:136-137). A closed-question format was used to reduce the 
disadvantages of open questions; for instance, open questions inevitably elicit a great 
deal of repetitious, irrelevant material, and there is significant interviewer variability in 
the handling of open questions (Sheatsley 1983:206-207).  
 In terms of response categories, a six-scale category was used for respondents 
to answer questions regarding their political attitudes or policy orientations: “Strongly 
Disagree, Quite Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, Somewhat Agree, Quite Agree, and 
Strongly Agree.” In order to reduce the effect of social desirability on answers, a middle 
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point was not included in the response categories. Studies of response accuracy 
suggest that respondents tend to distort answers in ways that will make them look better 
or will avoid making them look bad (Anderson, Silver, and Abramson 1988; Bradburn 
and Sudman 1979; Fowler 1995; Locander, Sudman, and Bradburn 1976). Due to the 
emphasis on “moderation (emphasizing balance and harmony by taking the-middle-of-
the-road)” in Confucian culture (Juntao 2003:81; Yao 2000), Koreans tend to select the 
middle point when they are asked about ideological spectrums or policy evaluations. In 
addition, without thinking what “the left” and “the right” represent (Shin and Jhee 2005), 
Koreans tend to choose the middle point when they are asked about their ideological 
position. Thus, a middle point was not included in the response categories in the survey.  
 
 
Validity and Reliability of the Survey Design. 
 In any survey design, validity and reliability are two key components for 
accuracy of measurement. First, reliability refers to measurement error in any survey 
research (Litwin 1995:5-6). In survey research, error comprises two components: 
random error and measurement error. Random error is unpredictable error that occurs 
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in all research; to lower the chance of random error, researchers can select a larger and 
more representative sample (Litwin 1995). Measurement error refers to how well or 
poorly a particular instrument (for instance, the interviewing method in survey research) 
performs in a given population. Thus, the lower the measurement error, the closer the 
data is to the truth. Reliability is a statistical measure of the reproducibility of the survey 
instrument’s data (Litwin 1995:6).  
 For assessing reliability of a survey, two forms of testing are commonly used: 
test-retest reliability and alternate-form reliability (Litwin 1995:8-31). Test-retest reliability 
is measured by having the same set of respondents complete a survey at two different 
points in time to see how stable the responses are. Correlations coefficients are then 
calculated to compare the two sets of responses (Fink 1995). In practice, such tests 
increase the cost of a study and are commonly used in medical or health science 
(because survey respondents – patients – can be controlled with the purpose of the 
survey), not in social science (because such tests increase the practice effect).5  
 Alternative-form reliability provides one way to escape the problem of the 
practice effect. It involves using differently worded items to measure the same attribute. 
                                            
5 When measuring test-retest reliability, you must consider that individuals may become familiar 
with the items and simply answer based on their memory of what they answered the last time. 
This is called the practice effect (Litwin 1995:13) 
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Questions and responses are reworded or their order changed to produce two items 
that are similar but not identical (Litwin 1995:13-21). Then, Cronbach’r is calculated 
between the two items’ responses to assess reliability (Cronbach 1951; Gliner and 
Morgan 2000:313-317).  
 In this survey, three similar but not identical questions were asked to measure 
individuals’ religiosity: (1) Do you believe that God (or any kind of god) exists, (2) Do you 
agree that God controls world affairs, including personal life, and (3) Do you agree that 
the Bible (or your religious book) is the word of God (or the god you believe in)? 
According to the result of the Cronbach Alpha test, the value of the scale reliability 







α ; here N is 
equal to the number of items, and r-bar is the average inter-item correlation among the 
items. By convention, alpha should be 0.70 or higher to retain an item in a scale. 
However, some researchers allow a lenient cut-off of 0.60, while other insist on a 
stringent cut-off of 0.80 (Ebel 1951 ; Litwin 1995; McGraw and Wong 1996). Because 
the Alpha of this survey is close to 0.70, the survey used in this research possesses an 
acceptable reliability scale. 
 In addition to determining a survey item’s or scale’s reliability, it is necessary to 
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assess its validity - how well it measures what it sets out to measure. There are two 
kinds of validity: theoretical and empirical. The former refers to the correlation between 
the underlying, latent construct and the observed measure, whereas the latter refers to 
a correlation between the observed measure and some other observed criterion 
(Bohrnstedt 1983:97-98).  
 In terms of empirical validity, concurrent validity is used for assessing a survey 
data’s empirical validity. Concurrent validity is assessed by correlating a measure and a 
criterion of interest at the same point in time (Bohrnstedt 1983:97). A measure of the 
concurrent validity of an attitude measure of religiosity with respect to church 
attendance could be assessed in a single interview, for example. It is important to note 
that there are as many concurrent validities as there are criteria one may want to 
explain; in other words, there is no single concurrent validity for any given measure. 
 According to Bohrnstedt, one can rather easily assess the concurrent validity of 
a measure of political conservatism by correlating it with reported voting behavior (e.g., 
the coefficient between political conservativeness and votes for the Republican Party) 
(1983:98). In a similar context, the concurrent validity of a measure of religious 
orthodoxy can be checked by correlating it with reported attendance at religious 
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services.  
 One type of concurrent validity uses the known group technique (Bohrnstedt 
1983). If one knows that certain groups vary on a variable of interest, then those groups 
can be used to validate a new measure of it. For example, one would expect those who 
report that they have no religious identification to score substantially lower on a 
measure of religious orthodoxy than those who belong to established religious groups. 
Based on the known group technique, a validity test of the survey data was conducted 
by calculating sensitivity and specificity values. (Reichenheim 2002). 
 To calculate sensitivity and specificity of two criteria in variables, the following 
formula was used (Byvad, Machiulskiene, and Baelum 2003; Christacapoulos 1972; 





















In order to test the survey data’s sensitivity and specificity,7 two groups of people were 
                                            
6 Where p-n1 is the proportion of positive subjects detected in the 1st stage of the study 
according to the NT (New Test), p-alpha is the proportion of positive subjects detected by the 
RT(Reference Test) among the NT +previously sampled, p-delta is the proportion of negative 
subjects detected by the RT among the NT –previously sampled. 
7 The calculation was conducted by using STATA 8.2 program. In STATA program, valides 
estimates sensitivity and specificity arising from a multi-stage design whereby a new test (NT) 
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selected (people who support a conservative party and people who believe in God’s [or 
god’s] existence). For the first group (supporting a conservative party in Korea), 
sensitivity and specificity tests were calculated based on their voting behaviors (they 
were predicted to vote for a conservative candidate in the 2002 presidential election). 
For the second group (believing in God’s existence), the same tests were calculated 
based on their religious orthodoxy (whether or not they believe that God controls world 
affairs, including their personal lives). Table 3-1 shows that the values of specificity for 
the two groups are over 90.0%, which confirms that the survey data has a high level of 
concurrent validity.  
 In terms of theoretical validity, a construct validity test is used to check data’s 
theoretical validity. The notion of a construct implies hypotheses of two types. First, it 
implies that items from one stratum within the domain of meaning correlate together 
because they all reflect the same underlying construct or “true” score. Second, while 
items from one domain may correlate with items from another domain, the implication is 
that they do so only because the constructs themselves are correlated  
 
                                                                                                                                 
under scrutiny for its concurrent validity is applied first to all subjects and the reference test (RT) 
thereafter on only a sub-sample of those. 
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Table 3-1. Validity Tests for a Survey Data. 
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Note: True D for 1st group is people who support a conservative party in Korea. 
True D for 2nd group is people who believe in God’s existence. 
 
(Bohrnstedt 1983:100-101).  
In other words, construct validation involves two types of validation. The first is 
theoretical validity – an assessment of the relationship between the items and an 
underlying latent unobserved construct. The second involves confirming that the latent 
variables themselves correlate as hypothesized (Bohrnstedt 1983:101). If either or both 
sets of hypotheses fail, then construct validation is absent. Factor analysis is commonly 
used for testing construct validity. Because factor analysis is used for generating two 
dependent variables (political tolerance and individual religiosity) in the following 
chapters, the test results are not presented here. For now, let it be known that according 
to the factor analysis, the survey data used in this research has construct validation. 
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Measuring Three Dimensions of Peoples’ Religiosity. 
 Scholars have long understood religion to be a multidimensional phenomenon 
(Stark and Glock 1968; Wilcox 1990). Thus, the starting point for determining how 
religion affects political tolerance/ideology (political attitudes hereafter) is to identify the 
major dimensions of individual religiosity. The literature identifies three major 
components of religion that are potentially important for politics: believing, behaving, 
and belonging (Layman 2001:55-94).  
 First, believing provides the substantive content of religion, capturing the basic 
worldview and values of religious people, and thus serves as the central motivation for 
religious belonging and behaving. Because believing (in other words, religious beliefs) 
provides the core of a certain religion – for instance, the sanctity of human life, the point 
at which life begins, the proper purposes of the sex act, and the appropriate ordering of 
familial relationships, believing serves as the central motivation to influence political 
attitudes. Particularly, when it comes to issues surrounding the cultural conflicts (for 
instance, abortion, women’s rights, and homosexual rights), beliefs give clear guideline 
for believers to judge such issues. In a similar context, Kellstedt and his colleagues 
argue, “At its core, religion is a set of beliefs about the divine, humankind’s relationship 
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to it, and the consequences of that relationship” (Kellstedt et al. 1996:175).  
 Although it certainly does not capture the whole range of relevant religious 
beliefs (believing), a common conceptualization of believing employed in studies of 
religion and politics is doctrinal orthodoxy: the combination of beliefs traditionally 
regarded as central to the acceptance of faith (Layman 2001:56). Considerable 
research has shown doctrine to be a potent source of political values and attitudes 
(Jelen 1991; Kellstedt and Green 1993; Wilcox 1990); doctrinal orthodoxy is typically 
defined as some combination of beliefs about the sources of religious authority (such as 
the authority of Scripture) and the appropriate relationship of individuals to the divine 
(such as the necessity of adult conversion experiences). 
 Therefore, in order to measure individual beliefs, respondents were asked to 
answer the following questions: Do you agree with the following statements: (1) God 
controls world affairs, including my personal life - about 28% of respondents agreed, 
and 69% disagreed; (2) The Bible (or your religious book) is the word of God - about 
46% of respondents agreed, and 44% disagreed. 
 In terms of the second dimension of religiosity, religious behaving refers to the 
actual practice of religious faith. In studies of political attitudes, religious behaving is 
 61
often viewed as a conditional variable, affecting the impact that religious beliefs and 
affiliations have on political attitudes and decisions. Individuals who are more active in 
the church are more likely to pick up political cues from clergy and fellow parishioners, 
thus providing a closer link between religious belonging and beliefs on the one hand and 
political behavior on the other hand (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 1990; Welch et al. 
1993). However, such a hypothesis (behaving as a conditional variable) is not quite 
applicable in the case of Korea. According to the survey data, only 38% of believers 
(who have a religious affiliation) answered that their religious leaders/clergies talk often 
about political/social issues in religious services. About 60% of believers answered that 
their religious leaders/clergies do not talk too much about political/social issues in 
religious services. One reason for such a result lies in Korean Buddhists. Because 
Buddhism in Korea does not have any regular religious services to attend (unlike 
Christians’ Sunday worship/service), Buddhists’ religious behaving is not quite related to 
the level of their religious believing.  
 However, numerous studies show that religious behavior does have a direct 
impact on political orientation, with religious individuals being more likely than their less 
religious counterparts to take conservative attitudes on political issues, particularly 
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cultural ones, and to support a conservative party (Republican Party in the U.S.) and its 
candidates (Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox 1992; Green, Guth, and Fraser 1991; Layman 
1997; Sherkat and Ellison 1997). In the case of Korea, Figure 3-1 shows that there is a 
negative relationship between believers’ religious behaving and their party identification 
(toward an extreme liberal party); in other words, individuals who are more active in 
religious activities are less likely to support an extreme liberal party (Democratic Labor 
Party in Korea). However, in the case of voting choice in the 2002 Presidential election, 
there is no variation based on believers’ religious behaving patterns.  
In terms of the conceptualization of religious behaving, scholars distinguish 
between two types of religious behaviors: ritual activity, such as attending worship 
services, and private devotionalism, such as personal prayer (Leege, Wald, and 
Kellstedt 1993). Because the concept of private devotionalism (or religious salience for 
other scholars) (Guth and Green 1993) is difficult to measure, a question was designed 
to measure the frequency of worship attendance as a religious behaving variable. In the 
survey, respondents were asked to answer the following question: How often do you 
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Note: - Y axis represents believers’ Party Identification (“1” for a Conservative Party, Hannara 
Party, “2” for a Liberal Party, Yulin Woori Party, “3” for a Extreme Liberal Party, Democratic and 
Labor Party) and believers’ voting choice in 2002 Presidential Election (“1” for a conservative 
candidate, Lee Heo Chang, “2” for a liberal candidate, Noh Moo Hyun, “3” for a extreme liberal 
candidate, Kwon Young Gil). 
- “Religious Behaving” for believers’ participation in religious activities: “1” for less than twice a 
year, “2” for several times a year, “3” once or twice a week, “4” for once a week, “5” for more than 
twice a week 






 The third dimension of religiosity is individuals’ religious belong. Religious 
belonging refers to an individual’s affiliation with a religious community (or group). There 
are, at least, two aspects of religious group membership that may act to facilitate the link 
between religious beliefs and political attitudes. The first is the influence of religious 
leaders. Messages delivered from the pulpit often have a profound effect not only on the 
religious outlooks of church members, but also on their political attitudes and actions 
(Welch et al. 1993). Furthermore, even if clerical discussions of politics and clerical 
political activism do not directly shape political orientations, they may play an important 
role in making faith relevant for political decisions (Guth and Green 1996; Welch et al. 
1993). Religious leaders also play a significant role in encouraging individuals of like 
religious beliefs to become involved in the political process (Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995). 
 The second influential aspect is the general importance of social context and 
group membership in filtering the flow of political information to individuals and in 
shaping individual political attitudes (Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1989; Huckfeldt 
and Sprague 1987). For many individuals, congregations and other religious group 
memberships are a major source of primary group friendships and social interactions 
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(Ammerman 1987; Huckfeldt 1993; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). Through this interaction 
and the resulting perceptions of shared interest, religious as well as political and social 
beliefs are shaped and reinforced (Huckfeldt 1993; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 1990). In 
order to measure individuals’ religious affiliation (belonging), respondents were asked to 
answer the following question: Which religious denominations are you affiliated with 
now? Circle one among Protestantism (about 32%), Catholic (about 13%), Buddhism 
(about 20%), Islam (about 0.1%), Chun Do Kyo (about 0.1%), Unified Church (Moon 




 This research uses a quasi-experimental design or a survey design for 
hypothesis testing using statistical procedures. A telephone survey (central-location 
interviewing) was conducted in Seoul, in June, 2004. Seoul (the capital of South Korea) 
was selected for the sample frame of the survey in order to reduce the strong impact of 
regionalism in Korean politics. Moreover, in order to avoid systematic errors of sampling, 
the survey sample was selected via Area Probability Sampling (a multistage sampling 
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method) and a list assisted approach to random-digit dialing. The survey questionnaire 
was designed to measure individual’s religiosity, the level of political tolerance, and 
political ideology. In particular, because of the unique characteristic of religion (a 
multidimensional phenomenon), the survey questionnaire was designed to measure 
three dimensions of religiosity (believing, behaving, and belonging). The sample size of 












Chapter IV: Hypotheses of Political Tolerance and Religiosity 
 
Political Tolerance and Democracy. 
 Democracy is an institutional arrangement for making political decisions that are 
based on allowing the people to decide the issues and elect those who will carry out 
their will (Schumpeter 1950). This political system requires competition among 
individuals and groups, participation in the form of regular elections, and civil liberties 
that guarantee political rights. Under a democratic institutional arrangement people are 
free to decide and pursue their own ideologies. Moreover, a democracy should not 
exclude any group from the rights to shape a country’s political life (Sorenson 1993). In 
this context, political tolerance is usually understood as the willingness to extend basic 
political rights to extreme groups holding ideologies and engaging in practices that the 
general public may oppose (Finkel, Singleman, and Humphries 1999). Thus, political 
tolerance is a necessary condition for establishing a democratic institutional 
arrangement in a society. 
 There are four main theoretical approaches that focus on different aspects of 
the role tolerance plays in a democracy. The democratic consensus approach (Cutler 
and Kaufman 1975; Stouffer 1955; Wilson 1994) deems mass support for civil liberties 
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indispensable for democratic stability (see Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982, for a 
critique of this approach). The elitist theory (McClosky and Brill 1983) suggests that 
tolerant elites rather than tolerant masses are crucial for protection of political freedom 
(see Sniderman et al. 1991, for a critique of this approach). According to the pluralistic 
intolerance thesis (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982), intolerance threatens 
democracy only if directed against some commonly disliked group(s), so as long as 
different segments of society are intolerant of different outgroups, democracy is safe 
(see Sniderman et al. 1989, for a critique of this approach). Finally, according to the 
cultural conformity approach (Gibson 1992), mass political intolerance shapes a culture 
of conformity that limits individual political liberty and consequently undermines 
democracy by delegitimizing political opposition. 
 For the purposes of exploring the influence of religion on mass political attitudes, 
the democratic consensus approach appears to be particularly relevant. In other words, 
individuals’ religiosity may have indirect impact on Korean democratic stability since the 
late 1980s. If this research discover some causal relationship between individuals’ 
religiosity and political tolerance, it will point to a future research agenda, that of religion 
and democratic development in Korea. 
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Political Tolerance and Individual’s Religiosity 
 Political tolerance is not an inherent human trait; rather, it is learned through 
political socialization (McClosky and Brill 1983). Political socialization operates, in part, 
through religion because every religious group develops its own distinctive orientations 
toward various aspects of life, including politics. Thus, religious beliefs become 
incorporated into individuals’ self-identity and can influence their political opinions and 
actions (Lenski 1963).  
 How does individuals’ religiosity influence their political tolerance? As discussed 
in Chapter II, studies dealing with this topic have focused on two aspects of religious 
influence. The first aspect is religious affiliation (the ethnoreligious model); in particular, 
researchers have tried to establish and explain the interdenominational differences in 
tolerance levels. The second aspect deals with the differential effects that various facets 
of religiosity (e.g., religious commitment and religious involvement) have on tolerance 
(the culture wars model). In this context, researchers tried to establish 
intradenominational differences [so called, differences between religious traditionalists 
(or conservativists, fundamentalists) and religious modernists (or progressivists, 
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liberals)]1 in tolerance levels. However, most studies have focused on the case of the 
United States because of the ease of accessing empirical data, as compared to other 
countries. 
 In terms of the ethnoreligious model, studies have shown that the effects of 
denominational affiliations (belonging aspect) on tolerance are complex and may fade if 
structural factors and general religious orientations are accounted for. Initially, Stouffer 
found that northern Protestants were more tolerant than Catholics, and that the latter 
were more tolerant than southern Protestants (1955:151). Nunn, Crocket, and Williams 
found Catholics to be less tolerant than Jews and nonbelievers but more tolerant than 
Protestants (1978). However, Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus later argued that when 
targets of intolerance are controlled, these interdenominational differences would 
disappear (1982:137-139). Beatty and Walter found that, regardless of the object of 
intolerance, Catholics were less tolerant than Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and 
Presbyterians, but far more tolerant than 10 other Protestant denominations (1984). In 
short, Figure 4-1 shows the tolerance levels of different religious denominations in 
previous study. 
                                            
1 In this research, I use “religious traditionalists” and “religious modernists” as the terms for two 
different groups within denominations. 
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Figure 4-1. Denominational Differences on the Tolerance Levels in the United States. 
 
 One reason for the higher level of political tolerance of Catholics than other 
religious denominations is the different doctrinal and ethical codes of each denomination. 
For instance, Catholics and Protestants view the world differently because of their 
different doctrinal codes and different church structures (Greeley 1989). In particular, 
Catholics are less individualistic than Protestants, and they value equality more highly.  
Conversely, Protestants place a high value on individual thought and expression, and 
they define their own ideas about morality. Protestants (except for Episcopalians, 
Congregationalists, and Presbyterians) see the world as “sinful and Godforsaken,” 
causing individuals to stand against society rather than immerse themselves within it 
(Greeley 1989). In general, previous studies of the relations between religious 
denominational differences and the tolerance levels show that Catholics are more likely 
to have a high level of political tolerance than Protestants. 
 I expect the same patterns in the case of Korea. In fact, in addition to the 
difference between Catholic and Protestant doctrines, the unique historical experience 
Nonbelievers ≥ (Jews or Episcopalians, Congretationalists, Presbyterian)  > 
Catholics > Protestants (10 other Protestant denominations)
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of the two religious groups has also influenced each group’s level of political tolerance. 
Since the late 17th century, Catholicism has not opposed Korean cultural tradition. For 
instance, the Catholic church in Korea still allows its members to perform ancestral 
sacrifices and to smoke and drink alcohol. Catholicism has tried to acknowledge the 
traditions of Korean culture rather than try to transform them. 
 In contrast, Protestantism in Korea never allowed its members to perform such 
rituals and to drink or smoke. In fact, most Protestant missionaries in the early 19th 
century regarded such bad habits as drinking/smoking as the primary reason for 
Koreans living in the poverty. Thus, once a person becomes a member of the Protestant 
church and accepts such teachings, he/she is generally intolerant of other peoples’ bad 
habits. Thus, in terms of cultural diversity, Catholics are close to cultural pluralism, while 
Protestants are not compatible with cultural pluralism in Korea. 
 However, the second (after Protestantism) largest religious group in Korea is 
Buddhism.2 According to Buddhist doctrine, nothing is absolutely wrong or right 
because everything is connected in the form of predestination (or acts of providence3). 
Because nobody can know what he/she was or did in his/her former existence (a former 
                                            
2 Because there is a very small number of Jews and Muslims, less than 0.1% of total population, 
these two religious denominations were not included in this research. 
3 “acts of providence” means some plan or guideline that Buddha (or any god in Buddhism) 
made for the world and people. 
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life), nobody has the freedom to blame other people in the present life.  
 In addition to such a general Buddhist doctrine, there is a unique doctrinal 
feature of Korean Buddhism: pursuit of harmonization and unification. The pursuit of 
harmony and unification is a constant focal point of Korean Buddhism, originating from 
Shilla Master Wonhyo’s Buddhist thought. His whole philosophy was centered on the 
idea of reconciliation. Through his creative theory, he harmonized the two different 
Buddhist values of reality and ordinary categories. Also, he brought together the concept 
of the “void” (of Madhyamika philosophy) and that of “existence” (of Vijnanamatravad 
philosophy) – a subject of argument in Indian and Chinese studies – in the structure of 
his concept of the “One Mind” (Dae 2002:56-57). Because Korean Buddhism 
emphasizes harmonization between individuals’ reality (outside) and mind (inside), 
Korean Buddhism is characterized as an individualistic (not communal) form of religion. 
Thus, Korean Buddhists tend to focus not on other people’s opinion or behavior but on 
individual meditation and study (for unification of outside-reality and inside-mind). These 
doctrinal features of Korean Buddhism may help Korean Buddhists be more tolerant 
people than those who belong to other religious denominations. 
 In addition to such doctrinal characteristics, historically, Buddhists have been 
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excluded from the governing class since the establishment of the Chosun dynasty (from 
the late 16th century to the early 19th century in the Korean peninsular). Because the 
ideological foundation of the Chosun dynasty was Confucianism, all other religious or 
cultural groups were shunned or persecuted by the dynasty (Joe 2000:497-512). Thus, 
many Buddhists, including monks themselves, have been politically passive, avoiding 
active participation in political campaigns or expression of their dislike of certain social 
or political groups. In short, Buddhists in Korea tend to be more tolerant than other 
religious groups because of their unique historical experiences and doctrinal 
characteristics. 
 In this research, I will put Buddhists in the place of Jews (or three 
denominations of Protestantism) in Figure 4-1. Because of the lack of sufficient previous 
studies about Buddhism and tolerance levels in Korea, it is not easy to make a plausible 
expectation about the tolerance levels between Buddhists and nonbelievers. However, 
because most previous studies (with the case of the United States) show that 
nonbelievers express the highest level of tolerance, Figure 4-2 shows the expectations 





Figure 4-2. Denominational Differences on the Tolerance Levels in Korea. 
 
 However, research has found that the patterns of tolerance and intolerance 
often transcend traditional denominational boundaries. Jelen and Wilcox argue that, 
when controlling for the effects of education, there is an interdenominational consensus 
among Christians on the circumstances in which tolerance is justified (1990). Gay and 
Ellison focused on the heterogeneity of attitudes within denominations and suggested 
that “religious families” (liberal, moderate, and fundamentalist) rather than 
denominations is a more useful concept for explaining political tolerance (1993:312-314). 
The trans-denominational evangelical movement in the United States was linked to 
multiple manifestations of intolerance. In particular, Wilcox and Jelen found evangelicals 
less tolerant than other Americans, even after multivariate controls (1990:42). These 
studies show the possibility of intradenominational (not interdenominational) differences 
on political tolerance levels. In this context, the culture wars model focuses on the 
differences within (not between) denominations based on believers’ religious 
commitment (behaving aspect) and belief system (believing aspect). 
Nonbelievers ≥ Buddhists > Catholics > Protestants 
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 In terms of the culture wars model, some previous studies show that various 
aspects of religiosity (in particular, believing and behaving aspects) have differential 
effects on political tolerance. Since Stouffer (1955), research has described church 
attendance as a strong predictor of intolerance (demonstrating the negative impact of 
behaving aspect on tolerance levels). Fislinger found that both church attendance and 
religious preference (the level of religious preference-believing aspect) were related to 
tolerance (1976). According to Steiber (1980), personal piety has a negative impact on 
tolerance (negative impact of believing aspect on tolerance levels). Smidt and Penning 
(1982) say that religious commitment may be negatively related to political tolerance, 
but this relation varies by political issues and is mediated by political attitudes. Ellison 
and Musick (1993) found that, controlling for contextual variables, religious attendance 
does not significantly influence tolerance, while theological conservatism does (in other 
words, believing aspect only [negative impact of strong belief in conservatism theology 
on tolerance levels]). In a similar context, Wilcox and Jelen (1990) showed that strong 
links exist between political intolerance and adherence to evangelical doctrinal 
orthodoxy.  
 In summary, previous studies about the links between religious commitment 
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(behaving) and tolerance levels, and between religious orthodoxy (believing) and 
tolerance levels show that there are negative relations between them. Therefore, in this 
research, I expect that there are negative relations between believing, behaving and 
tolerance levels in Korea. Moreover, by generating a new variable via the combination of 
believing and behaving aspects, I can test the culture wars thesis, which claims that 
there is intradenominational difference between religious traditionalists and modernists 
in terms of their political tolerance levels.  
 
 
Operational Definition of Political Tolerance as a Dependent Variable. 
 Sullivan, et al. (1979:785) define political tolerance as “a willingness to ‘put up 
with’ those things that one rejects.” In adopting this definition of the concept, we also 
agree that “one is tolerant to the extent one is prepared to extend freedoms to those 
whose ideas one rejects, whatever these might be” (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 
1979:784). Also, recent conceptual discussions distinguish carefully between tolerance, 
or the willingness to extend civil liberties to groups with which one disagrees, and 
liberalism (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982). It is important to note that this is not a 
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definition of liberalism and conservatism. 
 How can we measure individuals’ political tolerance levels? There are two ways 
of measuring tolerance levels that are widely used in recent studies: including target 
groups that respondents can pick up as dislike groups, or asking general questions 
about political rights to express any opinions. In terms of the first method, including 
target groups, survey respondents should be presented with a variety of different types 
of groups toward which they can express intolerance; their choices should not be limited 
to a few left-leaning groups. For instance, a recent research (Bobo and Licari 1989) 
includes a total of fifteen items gauging the willingness of respondents to extend civil 
liberties to five target groups: homosexuals, atheists, communists, people believing that 
blacks are inferior, and people who think the military should run the country. For each 
target group, respondents are asked (1) whether they would support the removal of a 
book authored by such a person from the public library in their community, (2) whether 
they would permit such a person to give a public speech in their community, and (3) 
whether they would allow such a person to be employed as a college instructor. 
However, this method has two critical problems of measurement. First, 
respondents have limitations of choosing their own dislike groups. Because researchers 
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present a list of target groups (related to their research topics), respondents whose 
dislike group is not on the list cannot reveal their tolerance levels correctly (Sullivan and 
Marcus 1988). Second, researchers assume that all respondents have similar tolerance 
levels on the other four target groups (in the example above) except for the most 
disliked group. Without this assumption, any statistical combinations for measuring 
tolerance levels may have a reliability problem. In other words, respondents’ political 
tolerance levels may be flexible depending on the researchers’ selection of sample 
frames and the timing of survey conducting. 
 Therefore, I use, in this research, the second method of measuring political 
tolerance – asking general questions about political rights to express any opinions. In 
the survey, respondents were asked to express their opinions about the following two 
statements: (1) Regardless of one’s views, people should have the right to express 
themselves, and (2) We should not tolerate minority opinions in Korean society. 
Respondents chose one number out of six-scale numbers (from “1” for Strongly 
Disagree to “6” for Strongly Agree). Thus, if a person chose “6” for the first question and 




 According to Principle Component Factor Analysis (factor analysis, hereafter), 
the two questions have almost equal explanatory power to express respondents’ 
tolerance levels. Table 4-1 shows the result of factor analysis and scoring after the 
analysis. 
 When we simply compare the mean values (based on the newly generated 
dependent variable above) of each religious group, we may know that different religious 
groups have different tolerance levels. Figure 4-3 shows the variations of mean values 
among different religious groups. 
 
Table 4-1. Factor Analysis for Measuring Political Tolerance Levels. 
Factor Eigenvalue Proportion Variable (in Factor1) Factor Loading 
1 1.05817 0.5291 Question 1 0.72738 
2 0.94183 0.4709 Question 2 0.72738 
Note: Because Eigenvalue is less than 1.0, Factor 2 is not retained in this analysis. After the 
factor analysis, a new variable (indicating individual tolerance levels) is generated by scoring 
after the factor analysis: minimum value of the variable is -3.432367 and maximum value 
1.395996 with 1 as standard deviation. 
 
                                            
4 The answer for the second question will be reversed before the actual analysis is proceeded in 































catholics1 buddhists1 protestants1 seculars
Religious Groups
Mean Comparison of Political Tolerance Level
 
Note: Horizontal line represents of the mean value of total respondents (it is close to 0 because 
of scoring after factor analysis). “•” represents the mean value of each group. The length of each 
line is the size of mean difference between two groups. 
“catholics1”: “1” for Catholic, and “0” for non-Catholic 
“buddhists1”: “1” for Buddhist, and “0” for non-Buddhist 
“protestants1”: “1” for Protestants, and “0” for non-Protestant 
“seculars”: “1” for non-believers, and “0” for whom has a religion. 








Figure 4-3 shows that theoretical expectations from previous studies are not quite wrong. 
It shows that non-believers have the highest level of political tolerance, Buddhists the 
second, Catholics the third, and Protestants the fourth in Korea.  
 
 
Measuring Religiosity as Independent Variable. 
 Two groups of independent variables are used to test both the ethnoreligious 
model and the culture wars model: respondents’ religious affiliations (belonging aspect) 
for testing the ethnoreligious model, and respondents’ (those with religious affiliation) 
doctrinal orthodoxy (believing) and religious commitment (behaving) for the culture wars 
model. In terms of religious tradition, respondents were asked to answer the following 
question: Which religious denominations are you affiliated with now? Please circle one 
from the following – Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Islam, Chun-Do-Kyo, United 
Church, Others, No Religion, and Refuse to Answer/Don’t Know. Figure 4-4 shows the 











































































Figure 4-4. The Distribution of Religious Tradition in Seoul, Korea. 
 
Within respondents of Protestantism, Presbyterian is 22.4%, Baptist 2.3%, Methodist 
4.7%, Pentecostal 1.3%, Unity Church 0.2%, Jehovah’s Witness 0.3%, and Not a 
Protestant 68.7%.  
 Based on the survey data, I construct four dummy variables: Catholic (“0” for 
non-Catholics, “1” for Catholics), Protestant (“0” for non-Protestants, “1” for Protestants), 
Buddhist (“0” for non-Buddhists, “1” for Buddhists), and Secular (“0” for believers of any 
religion, “1” for Non-believers).5 Also, in order to conduct mean difference test that is 
designed to check the variance differences among different religious groups (preliminary 
test), one multi-nominal variable is generated (“0” for seculars, “1” for Catholics, “2” for 
                                            
5 Two items (believers of either United Church or Chun-Do-Kyo) were dropped from the analysis 
due to the low percentage of believers. 
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Protestants, “3” for Buddhists).  
Table 4-2 shows the results of mean difference tests (based on political 
tolerance levels)6 for each religious tradition. According to Table 4-2, the mean 
differences of two religious groups (Catholics and Buddhists) are not different from that 
of total respondents. In other words, Catholics and Buddhists do not have different 
political tolerance levels from other groups. However, 
 
Table 4-2. t-Test for Mean Difference Among Different Religious Groups. 
Null Hypothesis (Ho) : Group Mean of Political Tolerance = 0 
Religious Group Ha : Mean < 0 Ha : Mean =0 Ha : Mean >0 
Catholics 
(N=119) 
T = -0.5798 
P>t = 0.2816 
t = -0.5798 
P>t = 0.5631 
t = -0.5798 
P>t = 0.7184 
Buddhists 
(N=178) 
t = 1.1054 
P>t = 0.8647 
t = 1.1054 
P>t = 0.2705 
t = 1.1054 
P>t = 0.1353 
Protestants 
(N=306) 
T = -1.8770 
P>t = 0.0307 
t = -1.8770 
P>t = 0.0615 
t = -1.8770 
P>t = 0.9693 
Seculars 
(N=120) 
t = 1.7424 
P>t = 0.9580 
t = 1.7424 
P>t = 0.0840 
t = 1.7424 
P>t = 0.0420 
Missing (Refuse to 
Answer) (N=212) 
t = 0.5395 
P>t = 0.7049 
t = 0.5395 
P>t = 0.5901 
t = 0.5395 
P>t = 0.2951 
Note: N represents the actual observations (the number of respondents). Ha represents for 
Alternative Hypothesis. If P>t value is greater than 0.1, Ha cannot be rejected. 
 
                                            
6 Because the mean value of political tolerance is close to 0 (Factor Analysis generated a new 
variable as a dependent variable, its mean value is -0.000000007), the hypothesized mean value 
for the t test is 0. 
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the mean value of Protestants is lower than those of other groups: the probability of 
accepting Ha (Mean value of Protestants’ political tolerance ≤ 0) is high. Thus, people 
who belong to Protestantism tend to show lower level of political tolerance, as compared 
to religious groups. In terms of seculars who don’t have any religious affiliation, their 
political tolerance level tends to be higher than other groups: the probability of accepting 
Ha (Mean value of seculars’ political tolerance ≥ 0). In short, as independent variables 
(belonging aspect), the differences of variations based on people’s political tolerance 
exist at a statistical significant level (P>0.1). Thus, it is reasonable to use religious 
belonging as an independent variable to analyze people’s political tolerance. 
 In order to test the culture wars model, it is necessary to measure the two 
aspects of religion (religious commitment as behaving aspect and orthodoxy as 
believing aspect). First, in terms of the believing aspect, people’s level of religious 
orthodoxy is measured by asking their extent of agreement with the following 
statements: (1) “God controls world affairs, including my personal life” (a dummy 
variable, “1” for “Agree”, “2” for “Disagree”)7; (2) “The Bible (or your religious book) is the 
word of God” (four scales of agreement, “1” for “Strongly Agree” through “4” for “Strongly 
                                            
7 Unlike Catholicism’s and Protestantism’s monotheistic feature, Buddhism is based on 
polytheism. Thus, it is not appropriate to make the answers in continuous scale. 
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Disagree”).8 Thus, I generate religious orthodoxy as an independent variable by 
combining these two variables. In order to give more weighted proportion to people who 
believe that God controls world affairs, I used the following function to generate a 
religious orthodoxy variable. 
 
Religious Orthodoxy = The level of beliefs in the religious book of the first group (who don’t 
believe that God controls world affairs) + 2*[The level of beliefs of the second group (who do 
believe that God controls world affairs)] 
 
Based on the functional calculation, a high level of religious orthodoxy represents that 
the individual has strong beliefs in God’s world and book.  
 For measuring people’s behaving aspect of religion, I used the religious 
participation as religious commitment because religious behaving refers to actual 
practice of religious faith (Karpov 2002). Religious commitment was measured by the 
frequency of attendance of religious services. Respondents were asked to answer the 
question: How often do you participate in religious activities, beyond funerals or wedding 
ceremonies? Thus, a high religious commitment variable represents that the individual 
actively participates in religious services. 
                                            
8 Because of strong Confucian cultural influence on Korean society, most Koreans have a 
tendency to choose the middle point for any kind of opinion questions. Thus, I dropped the 
middle point from the questionnaire scale. 
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 According to the culture wars model, religious orthodoxy (believing) and 
religious commitment (behaving) cut across the lines of traditions to create the same 
kinds of distinctive values among adherents in all religious traditions (Layman 2001:66). 
By combining these two variables, I generate an ordinal continuous variable (high 
number refers to religious traditionalist or conservativist and low number refers to 
religious modernist or liberal) as an independent variable. Based on the expectations of 
the culture wars model, those who are close to religious traditionalism have different 
levels of political tolerance from those who are close to religious modernism. 
 In summary, I use two independent variables that represent people’s religiosity: 
their religious affiliation (believing aspect for testing the ethnoreligious model) and 





 To avoid the misspecification problem of statistical models, it is necessary to 
include all potential variables (as control variables) that may impact people’s political 
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tolerance level. Previous studies about the relations between political tolerance and 
people’s social and demographic status indicate four important factors that impinge on 
tolerance level: education level, age, gender, and income level. By using these four 
factors as control variables, we can extract the levels of impact of religiosity on 
tolerance. 
 How do these four factors relate to political tolerance levels? First, education 
level should have a positive relationship with political tolerance (Nunn, Crockett, and 
Williams 1978:chapter4), for three reasons. First, the greater the schooling, the greater 
the likelihood of gaining specific knowledge about civil liberties (fundamental freedoms 
of democratic citizens) and the democratic process (Bobo and Licari 1989). A second 
reason is that with increased education comes increased awareness of the varieties of 
human experience that legitimize wide variation in beliefs, values, and behavior (Borhek 
1965:91). Finally, the greater the schooling, the more likely that one’s cognitive 
development will be characterized by the flexible, rational strategies of thinking which 
encourage democratic restraint. Based on these three reasons, Lippmann argues: “And 
so, if we truly wish to understand why freedom is necessary in a civilized society, we 
must begin by realizing that, because freedom of discussion improves our own opinions, 
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the liberties of other men are our own vital necessity” (Lippmann 1951:401). In short, 
people can understand other peoples’ fundamental freedom in a democratic society by 
increasing their knowledge of the democratic process and civil liberties with the help of 
schooling. 
 In terms of the age factor, younger people are more likely to have a higher level 
of political tolerance than older people (Borhek 1965:chapter 5; Wilson 1994). When we 
consider age as a control variable, we must acknowledge that age is not the simple 
variable it appears to be. Age may be a measure of “lifecycle” or “aging” as such. It may 
also be a measure of the “generation” in which an individual came to political maturity 
and acquired his or her political values (McClosky and Brill 1983:398). Age may also 
reflect the historical period or Zeitgeist through which an individual has lived, the events 
of which have presumably affected and perhaps significantly altered his or her attitudes 
toward various social issues (McClosky and Brill 1983:399). Despite these vexing 
considerations, it is appropriate to believe that all three influences – aging, generational, 
and Zeitgeist effects – help to account for the variations in attitudes toward political 
tolerance. 
 A persistent notion among scholars is that people become more dogmatic and 
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rigid in behavior and attitude as they grow older. The “fixation” model presented by 
Karlsson and Carlsson states the position directly: “With increasing age, people become 
less likely to change; in its later life, each birth cohort reflects, therefore, largely that 
conditions prevailing during its formative years” (1970:71). Similarly, Lambert reasoned 
that “as the cumulation of experience, passing of time, and deterioration of brain, aging 
produces an increasingly stratified consciousness (more layers, elaboration, and rigidity 
or hardening of categories) and decelerating rate of socialization” (1972:40).  
 In other words, these assertions proclaim that as an individual becomes older, 
he/she is not able to relinquish familiar, long-held values and to replace them with new, 
unfamiliar ones. In a similar context, McClosky and Brill argue that the norms acquired 
by individuals over the course of a lifetime tend to resist change and to persist 
(1983:chapter 8). It is obvious that as people grow older they become less willing to 
experiment and to try out new ideas and lifestyles. They have long become accustomed 
to seeing and comprehending the world in certain patterns, and they find it extremely 
difficult to embrace novel standards that depart radically from those with which they are 
intimately familiar; it is, at any rate, more difficult for them to do so than it is for younger 
adults, who have had less time or occasion to become habituated to, or dependent upon, 
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firmly settled patterns of thought and behavior. Therefore, political tolerance - the 
willingness to extend basic political rights to extreme groups holding ideologies and 
engaging in practices that the general public may oppose (Finkel, Singleman, and 
Humphries 1999) – diminishes as an individual becomes older.  
 In terms of gender, men are, in general, more tolerant than women (McClosky 
and Brill 1983:384-386). Despite the growing equality of men and women, men, on the 
average, continue to occupy more of the high-status positions in society, take more 
interest in public affairs, hold more positions of public leadership and influence, and, in 
general, are more involved in the formulation and dissemination of opinions affecting 
such matters as freedom and control. As is well known, more women than men are still 
confined to domestic roles (or to menial roles) and enter the public arena less frequently 
to engage in the community debate over the values and norms that govern, or should 
govern, the state. In short, the difference between men and women in relation to political 
tolerance levels results from the positions of men and women in society – for instance, 
men are more likely to be exposed to norms of toleration because of their higher status 
(McClosky and Brill 1983). 
 Finally, in terms of the impact of income level on political tolerance level, it is 
 92
expected that there is a positive relationship between them (Karpov 2002:275). 
According to McClosky and Brill, people’s socioeconomic status (measured by 
occupational prestige and income) is positively related to their political tolerance level 
(1983). If we expect a positive relationship between education level and tolerance level, 
and between men and tolerance level, it is logically true that the higher the income level, 
the higher the political tolerance level. Because there is a high probability for more 
educated men to earn more money in any society, people with a high income level are 
likely to be more tolerant than those with a low income level. Because women with a 
high income level tend to have professional jobs (for instance, lawyers, academics, 
doctors, scientists, journalists, intellectuals, leaders of citizen organizations, and CEOs 
in private companies), they have more chance to be close to the national mainstreams 
of articulate opinion and are more likely to exhibit an interest in public affairs than do the 
women of other jobs (for instance, farmers or housewives). In other words, women with 
high income levels are exposed to the intellectual exchanges and public debates about 
diverse opinions of society; thus, they are more likely to be tolerant than those with low 
income levels who are rather parochial in their interests and relatively insulated from 
such public debates. As the following figure shows, income and education levels have a  
 93
positive relationship with political tolerance, and age has a negative relationship. Figure 
4-5 shows that there are positive relationships between income/education and tolerance 
levels and a negative relationship between age and tolerance levels. 
 
 
Hypotheses for The Relationship between Individual’s Religiosity and Political 
Tolerance. 
 Based on previous studies and theoretical expectations (from both the 
ethnoreligious and culture wars theses), the following hypotheses will be tested in this 
research. 
 
Hypothesis I: Buddhists and Catholics, in Korea, are more likely to be tolerant than 
Protestants. 
Hypothesis II: Seculars (who have no religious affiliation) are more likely to be tolerant 
than people who have a religious affiliation. 
Hypothesis III: People who have strong beliefs (doctrinal orthodoxy) in their religious 
tradition are less likely to be tolerant than those who have weak beliefs. 
Hypothesis IV: People who are active participants in religious services (religious 
commitment) are less likely to be tolerant than those who are inactive. 
Hypothesis V: Believers who are close to religious traditionalism/fundamentalism are 






















Political Tolerance by Sociodemographic Variables
 










Hypotheses I and II are designed to test the ethnoreligious model, and the others are 
designed to test the culture wars model. Moreover, we can examine which model has 
more explanatory power in analyzing the relationship between religion and politics in 




 In terms of political tolerance as the first dependent variable in this research, the 
respondents of the survey were asked to express their opinions about the following two 
statements: (1) Regardless of one’s views, people should have the right to express 
themselves, and (2) We should not tolerate minority opinions in Korean society. The first 
dependent variable is generated by scoring after factor analysis of these two variables. 
In order to test two theses (the ethnoreligious and the culture wars theses), two groups 
of independent variables are used to measure respondents’ religious traditions 
(belonging aspect) for testing the ethnoreligious thesis, and respondents’ doctrinal 
orthodoxy (believing) and religious commitment (behaving) for the culture wars thesis. 
 Based on previous studies and theoretical expectations, five hypotheses are 
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formulated in this chapter: (1) Buddhists and Catholics in Korea are more likely to be 
tolerant than Protestants, (2) Seculars are more likely to be tolerant than people who 
have a religious affiliation, (3) People who have strong beliefs (doctrinal orthodoxy) in 
their religious tradition are less likely to be tolerant than those who have weak beliefs, 
(4) People who are active participants in religious services are less likely to be tolerant 
than those who are inactive, and (5) Believers who are close to religious traditionalism 











Chapter V: Data Analysis of Political Tolerance 
 
Variances of the Parameters (Variables). 
 In order to test the hypotheses (generated based on ethnoreligious and the 
culture wars thesis), thirteen variables are measured and used. Table 5-1 shows the 
summary of the variables. 
 The first four variables (age, income, gender, and education) are control 
(demographic) variables and the next three (Catholic, Buddhist, and Protestant) are 
variables of religious belonging. The religious commitment variable represents religious 
behaving, and orthodoxy refers to religious believing. Religious culture represents 
people’s religious values (traditional or modern), which are calculated using two 
religious variables (behaving and believing). 
 In order to generate the last three variables (CRT, BRT, and PRT), each 
religious tradition (dummy variables for each group) was multiplied by the “Religious 
culture” variable. Therefore, CRT refers to the variations of religious culture within 
people who belong to Catholicism. A simple comparison of these three mean values 
shows that PRT has the largest mean value, which means that Protestants are more 
likely to be religious traditionalists than members of the other two groups. Also, even  
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Label of the variable 
Tolerance 935 0 1 Level of political tolerance 
Age 992 36.39 13.11 Age of respondents (19 to 88) 
Gender 990 0.5 0.5 “1” for female, “2” for male 
Income 860 5.74 2.8 Category 1 to 11 (high income level) 
Education 985 3.54 0.79 Category 1 to 5 (high education level) 
Catholic 762 1.16 0.37 “1” for non-Catholic, “2” for Catholic 
Buddhist 762 1.25 0.43 “1” for non-Buddhist, “2” for Buddhist 
Protestant 762 1.42 0.49 “1” for non-Protestant, “2” for Protestant 
Secular 762 1.63 0.37 “0” for whom has religion, “1” for secular 
(Religious) 
Commitment 
649 3.29 1.44 The number of participation in religious 
services. Category 1 to 5. 
Orthodoxy 879 3.51 2.37 Respondents’ levels of religious orthodoxy. 
Category 0 to 5. 
(Religious) 
Culture 
994 3.17 0.11 Combining commitment and orthodoxy. 
Religious Modernist (“2”) to Religious 
Traditionalist (“13”). 
CRT 607 1.39 3.14 Religious traditionalist within Catholics 
BRT 607 1.31 1.31 Religious traditionalist within Buddhists 







though two groups (CRT and BRT) have similar mean values, the standard deviation 
value of CRT is larger than that of BRT, which indicates that all Catholics are not 
religious modernists (some Catholics may have more traditional/fundamental religious 
values than Protestants). 
 However, these variables cannot be used for OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) 
regression to test hypotheses until it is guaranteed that the variances of each parameter 
do not violate any statistical assumptions (e.g., Gauss-Markov assumptions for 
obtaining Best Linear Unbiased Estimates).  
 
 
Gauss-Markov Theory Tests and Data Transformation. 
 In order to avoid all possible biases that may invalidate the results of data 
analysis, it is necessary to look into the variances of each parameter and the results of 
some tests after the initial OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression. According to the 
well-known Gauss-Markov theory, three key assumptions must not be violated to get the 
best linear unbiased estimate of the regression parameters: (1) the error term in the 
model has a probability distribution that is the same for each observation and does not 
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depend on the predictor variables (i.e., independence and homoscedasticity); (2) the 
predictor variables are observed without error; and (3) the error term has a finite 
variance (Chernick 1999:70-71; Gauss 1995).  
 Under these three assumptions, the strongest case for least squares estimation 
can be made when the error term has a Gaussian or approximately Gaussian 
distribution. Only after achieving Gaussian distribution of the error term can hypothesis 
tests for the parameters be applied. When the error distribution is non-Gaussian, 
regardless of what estimation procedure is used, it is difficult to determine confidence 
intervals for the parameters or to obtain prediction intervals for the response variable (in 
this case, hypothesis tests cannot be used). This is where the Generalized-least-
estimators can help (Chernick 1999; Efron and Tibshirani 1985, 1993).  
 Four residuals (errors) for each model in Figure 2-2 are obtained to check the 
error distribution. Three basic tests are performed for the residuals: Independence (the 
errors associated with one observation are not correlated with the errors of any other 
observation), Homoscedasticity (the error variance should be constant), and Normality 
(the errors should be normally distributed). 
 First, in order to look into the normality assumption of the errors, normal  
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probability plots are described. Figure 5-1 shows that there is no significant violation of 
normality assumptions for each model’s error term (the errors of each OLS estimator 
have constant normal variance). 
 Second, the assumption of homoscedasticity is tested by drawing one of the 
most useful diagnostic graphs (Leverage-versus-Residual squared plot), a graph of 
leverage against the (normalized) residuals squared. According to Figure 5-2, four OLS 
models have heteroskedasticity problem and may not provide unbiased estimates of 
coefficients (Baum, Cox, and Wiggins 2000; Bollen and Jackman 1990; Breusch and 
Pagan 1979; White 1980). Therefore, instead of testing the hypotheses with the results 
of OLS regression, I conduct the Generalized-Least Squares (GLS) estimates as an 
alternative estimate (McCullagh and Nelder 1989; Wooldridge 2000:261-263).  
 Finally, in terms of the assumption of Independence (multicollinearity problem in 
general), VIF (Variation Inflation Factors) is calculated after OLS regression of each 
model. Table 5-2 shows the results of VIF calculation. According to Table 5-2, there is a 
serious multicollinearity problem in Model III (in general, any observation with over 10 of 
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Leverage vs. Squared residual plot of Model III
Note: The lines on the chart show the average values of leverage and the (normalized) residuals 
squared. Points above the horizontal line have higher-than average leverage; points to the right 
of the vertical line have larger-than-average residuals. 





Table 5-2. VIFs After OLS Regressions. 
Model I Model II Model II-1 Model III  
Variables VIFs VIFs VIFs VIFs 
Age 1.22(1.22) 1.20 1.19 1.24(1.24) 
Gender 1.05(1.05) 1.04 1.03 1.07(1.06) 
Income 1.09(1.09) 1.08 1.06 1.09(1.08) 
Education 1.29(1.29) 1.26 1.26 1.29(1.30) 
Catholic 43.40(1.02)   44.09(7.43) 
Buddhist 58.41(1.02)   59.54(7.28) 
Protestant 78.04(1.04)   79.04(3.73) 
Secular 45.59(1.01)   46.38(1.01) 
(Religious) 
Commitment 
 1.32   
Orthodoxy  1.34   
(Religious) 
Culture 
  1,01  
CRT    150.38(6.42) 
BRT    46.15(5.53) 
PRT    55.84(6.52) 














OLS estimators) (Wooldridge 2000:95-96). In order to correct multicollinearity problems 
in all models, Orthogonalization Transformation was conducted (Abramowitz and Stegun 
1968; Golub and Loan 1996; Sribney 1995), and new sets of orthogonalized variables 
for the three variables (CRT, BRT, and PRT) were generated. 
 
 
Hypotheses Testing: Ethnoreligious Thesis. 
 For the ethnoreligious thesis, two hypotheses were formulated and tested: (1) 
Buddhists and Catholics are more likely to be tolerant than Protestants in Korea, and (2) 
Seculars are more likely to be tolerant than people who have a religious affiliation. Table 
5-3 shows the summary of data analysis for testing the ethnoreligious thesis.  
In terms of the effects of control variables on political tolerance, three variables (age, 
gender, income) have statistically significant coefficients. As expected based on 
previous studies, the old and men have lower level of political tolerance than the young 
and women. Moreover, people with high income level have higher level of political 




Table 5-3. Effects of Religious Denominational Differences on Political Tolerance (Model I). 
Ordinary Least Squares Genaralized Least Estimators Explanatory Variables 
Expectation Coefficient Expectation Coefficient 
Age(↑) - -0.01(0.01)*  - -0.01(0.01)***  
Gender(“1” for man, “0” 
for womam) 
- -0.15(0.08)*  - -0.16(0.05)**  
Income(↑) + 0.02(0.01) + 0.02(0.01)*  
Education(↑) + 0.01(0.06) + 0.01(0.06) 
Catholic + -0.03(0.04) + -0.03(0.04) 
Buddhist + 0.09(0.04)*  + 0.09(0.02)***  
Protestant - -0.08(0.04)*  - -0.08(0.03)*  
Secular + 0.04(0.04) + 0.04(0.03) 
Constant. 0.24(0.28) 0.24(0.18) 
Observations 631 631 
F 2.76**  
Log pseudolikelihood  -888.09 
AIC  2.84 










However, the results of data analysis in Table 5-3 partially confirm the 
ethnoreligious thesis in terms of the effects of differences in religious traditions 
(denominations) on people’s level of political tolerance. The initial hypotheses expected 
negative coefficients of Protestants and positive coefficients of the other groups 
(Buddhists, Catholics, and Seculars).  
 According to the results of GLS in Table 5-3, there is a negative relationship 
between Protestants and political tolerance. Also, there is positive relationship between 
Buddhists and political tolerance. This result confirms the first hypothesis, – i.e., 
Buddhists are more likely to be tolerant than Protestants in Korea. However, there is no 
statistically significant relationship between Catholics and political tolerance. Even 
though Catholics were expected to have a high level of political tolerance due to their 
emphasis on social equality and adaptation of local culture, Catholics in Korea do not 
have a high level of political tolerance (moreover, they seem to have a lower level of 
tolerance than other religious groups – the coefficient in GLS is a negative value).  
 One reason for Catholics’ low level of political tolerance is probably the 
characteristic of the Catholic ethic – a community-centered pattern of values (Tropman 
2002). According to Tropman, based on Catholic’s community-centered ethic, the 
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community of individuals is at least as important as – and perhaps more important than 
– any one individual (2002:15). Thus, the Catholic ethic emphasizes connectivity (with 
others in a community), loyalty (toward authority/leaders of a community), and 
involvement (in the collective works of a community) (Tropman 2002).  
 The effect of Catholicism’s community-centered ethic on political tolerance is 
Catholics’ exclusiveness of other communities or groups in a society based on clear 
distinctive lines between communities. In other words, while Catholics may have a high 
level of tolerance within a community (in general, social groups with in Catholicism), 
they have a low level of tolerance toward people/groups outside their own communities 
(e.g., homosexuals, Moon Sun-Myoung’s United Church and Buddhists in Korea).  
This tendency of Catholic exclusiveness of other communities in a society is 
well represented in the Catholic ecumenism. In August 1964, Pope Paul VI issued the 
encyclical Ecclesiam suam in which he distinguished three different domains: (1) 
humanity, (2) people who believe in any religion, and (3) the Christian world (Catholics 
and their ‘separated brethren’) (Flis 2000:46). According to Ecclesiam suam, the main 
dividing line is between those who believe in the existence of God and those who deny 
such existence. While sanctioning the co-operation of Catholics with all other people, 
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the encyclical differentiates the scope of such co-operation according to the attitudes of 
specific groups to Catholicism (Flis 2000:46-47). In short, Catholics’ community-
centered ethic is one reason for the lower level of political tolerance in Catholics than 
other religious groups. 
 Protestants, as expected, have a low level of political tolerance. One reason for 
Protestants’ low level of tolerance is the Puritan pietist ethic that was brought by 
missionaries in the late nineteenth century (Park 2003). Following the theology of their 
home church, they viewed the Bible as the word of God revealed to man, an immutable 
law by which to steer one’s faith and life. Faith was an exclusively personal experience, 
and life with faith was to be achieved through direct communion with God. Typical 
American fundamentalists at the time looked inward toward personal salvation and were 
quite unconcerned about making the world over or building the kingdom of heaven on 
earth (Park 2003:54).  
 The early Protestant church’s doctrine and theology made Korean Protestants 
more hostile toward Confucian ethics and practices. The Protestant missionaries made 
no attempt to compromise with the Confucian tradition. Unlike Catholic missionaries, 
who allowed their members to keep Confucian traditions and activities, rather, the 
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Protestant missionaries aggressively denounced Confucianism as a form of paganism 
(Jones 1989). Thus, they insisted on the abolition of ancestor worship and Korean 
Protestants followed the missionaries’ teachings. Such uncompromising Puritan pietist 
demands, whether or not they contained a Western bias, had a singular appeal for those 
who were eager to change. To be a Protestant meant to reject Confucian values and 
practices. The minimum requirement for church membership was abandonment of 
everything Confucian. Therefore, every action by the pietist Protestant community was a 
direct challenge to the Confucian establishment in Korea, in a way that it could never be 
in the United States and most other Western countries (Park 2003:55-57). 
 The uncompromising Puritan pietist ethic of early Korean Protestants became 
an unchangeable tradition in Korean Protestant churches. The effect of such a rigid 
tradition on political tolerance is the negative relationship between members of 
Protestant churches and their levels of political tolerance. However, there is no 
statistically significant relationship between seculars and their political tolerance levels.  
 In order to test the ethnoreligious thesis, I conducted the F-test (Wald test) for 
the statistical significance of joint coefficients (Wooldridge 2000147-150). The null 
hypothesis of F-test is coefficients of four variables (Catholic, Buddhist, Protestant, and 
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Secular) = 0. The chi-squared value of the test is 96.79 (probability>chi-squared = 
0.0000). Thus, the result of F-test supports the assumption of the ethnoreligious thesis, 
that differences of religious affiliation have a statistically significant impact on levels of 
political tolerance. In short, denominational differences matter in determining people’s 
level of political tolerance in Korea. 
 
 
Hypotheses Testing: The Culture Wars Thesis. 
 In order to test the culture wars thesis, two hypotheses were formulated: (1) 
people who have strong beliefs (Orthodoxy) in their religious tradition are less likely to 
be tolerant than those who have weak beliefs, and (2) people who are active 
participants in religious services (Religious Commitment) are less likely to be tolerant 
than those who are inactive. Table 5-4 shows the results of data analysis for testing 
these hypotheses (Model II in Figure 2-2). 
As previous studies suggested (Ellison and Musick 1993; Smidt and Penning 
1982; Steiber 1980; Stouffer 1955), people’s religious commitment (participation in 
religious services) has a negative impact on their level of political tolerance. However, 
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Table 5-4. Effects of Differences in Orthodoxy and Religious Commitment on the Political 
Tolerance (Model II). 
Ordinary Least Squares Genaralized Least Estimators Explanatory Variables 
Expectation Coefficient Expectation Coefficient 
Age(↑) - -0.01(0.01)** - -0.01(0.01)** 
Gender(“1” for man,”0” 
for woman) 
- -0.07(0.0.07) - -0.07(0.03)** 
Income(↑) + 0.02(0.13) + 0.02(0.01) 
Education(↑) + 0.01(0.05) + 0.01(0.05) 
Orthodoxy - -0.03(0.02) - -0.03(0.02) 
Religious 
Commitment 
- -0.06(0.03)* - -0.06(0.02)* 
Constant.  0.39(0.26)  0.39(0.18)* 
Observations 803 803 
F 2.93**  
Log pseudolikelihood  -1124.49 
AIC  2.82 










the believing aspect of religion (the intensity of belief in one’s own religious doctrine) 
does not have any impact on political tolerance, even though previous studies 
suggested a negative relationship between them (Jelen, Smidt, and Wilcox 1993; 
Kellstedt and Smidt 1993; Wilcox and Jelen 1990). Why do these two religious aspects 
(behaving and believing) have different impacts on political tolerance? The answer to 
this question is located in the specificity of the Korean case (the existence of two 
competitive and different religions – Christianity and Buddhism). Because much 
previous research about religion and politics has focused on Western countries – with 
one dominant religion in the society (Christianity, whether focused on Protestantism, 
Catholicism, or both),- they examine the differences between two simple distinctive 
groups (one with a high level of religious participation and strong belief; the other with a 
low level of participation and weak belief). Yet this is not an appropriate way of 
approaching the Korean case. In other words, because Buddhism has different historical 
and organizational characteristics than Christianity in terms of political tolerance, a 
variable based on such a simple distinction between two religious groups does not 
seem to have strong explanatory power in the case of Korea.  
At first, historically, Korean Buddhism followed one of the two major schools of 
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Buddhism (Mahayana Buddhism and Theravada Buddhism) (Mitchell 2002). Since 
Buddhism had been established in the Northeastern area of India, Mahayana (“Great 
Vehicle”, or literally “The Greater Ox-Cart” in the Indian language) Buddhism was 
introduced to the Korean peninsula via China (later, it was introduced to Japan from 
Korea) in the 4th century.1  
 In Mahayana Buddhism, there are four theological doctrines: (1) Universalism – 
everyone will become a Buddha, (2) Enlightened wisdom, as the main focus of 
realization, (3) Compassion through the transferal of merit, and (4) Liberation (as 
opposed to Salvation) supported by a rich cosmography, including celestial realms and 
powers, with a spectrum of Bodhisattvas, both human and seemingly godlike, who can 
assist followers (Mitchell 2002:chap.4; Schopen 1990; Williams 1989).2 According to 
the second doctrine (enlightened wisdom), traditional Buddhism tends to focus on an 
ascetic, individual approach to attaining Nirvana – suppression of desire, removal from 
the world, and solitariness (Mitchell 2002:chap.3). On the contrary, the primary focus of 
Mahayana is Bodhicitta – a mind of great compassion conjoined with wisdom (Prajna) 
                                            
1 The other school of Buddhism (Theravada Buddhism) had been introduced to Southeastern 
countries (Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia) from the 3rd to 6th century. The 
Mahayana school of Buddhism was also transmitted to Tibet area and became the origin of 
Tibetan Buddhism. 
2 The way of the Mahayana, in contrast to the more conservative and austere Theravada school 
of Buddhism, can be described as liberal, with an autonomic discipline style. 
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realizing emptiness. With this mind, the practitioner will realize the final goal of full 
enlightenment, or Buddhahood – an omniscient mind completely free from suffering and 
its causes, able to work tirelessly for the benefit of all living, becoming a Bodhisattva. 
Six virtues or perfections (Paramitas) are listed for the Bodhisattva: generosity, patience, 
meditation, morality, energy, and wisdom (Mitchell 2002:112-125). 
 The implication of this doctrine of enlightened wisdom on believers’ political 
tolerance is two-fold: (1) the theological doctrine of Mahayana Buddhism tends to make 
its believers more tolerant than other religious groups (this was confirmed by the 
ethnoreligious thesis in Model I), and (2) because Mahayana Buddhism emphasizes the 
practitioner’s self-realization for the final goal of full enlightenment (Buddhahood) by 
fulfillment of six virtues, there are no regularly organized religious services that all 
practitioners must participate in. 
 Because of these two characteristics of Korean Buddhism (following the 
tradition of Mahayana Buddhism), the results of data analysis of the two variables 
(religious commitment and orthodoxy) show some variation between them – while 
religious commitment has a statistically significant impact on political tolerance, 
orthodoxy does not. Even though Korean Buddhists do not go to religious services 
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regularly, the peculiar tendency of active commitment by Christians (both Protestants 
and Catholics) makes religious commitment more important than orthodoxy. In addition, 
the contradiction between the two religious groups’ theological doctrines – one for 
Korean Buddhism (more tolerant toward other religious groups) and the other for 
Christianity (less tolerant) – makes the second variable (orthodoxy) unimportant. 
 Thus, given such a contradiction between these two large religious groups’ 
theological doctrines and organizational features, it is necessary to generate a new 
variable (Religious culture) to test the culture wars thesis by combining the religious 
commitment and orthodoxy variables. By examining the impact of religious culture on 
political tolerance, we can investigate the existence of a clear line between religious 
traditionalists and modernists – the main argument of the culture wars thesis (Layman 
2001).  
 The variable of religious culture indicates the extent of people’s religiosity based 
on religious behaving (religious commitment) and believing (orthodoxy). Therefore, a 
high value of religious culture represents a person who participates in religious services 
frequently and has strongly believes in religious doctrine (a religious traditionalist). In 
contrast, a low value of religious culture represents a religious modernist.  
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Table 5-5 shows the results of data analysis for Model II-1, which tests whether 
or not there are intradenominational differences between religious traditionalists and 
modernists in terms of their political tolerance levels. According to Table 5-5, there is a 
clear line (intradenominational difference) between religious traditionalists and 
modernists in terms of political tolerance. Also, the coefficient of the religious culture 
variable is a negative value, which confirms the initial hypothesis – believers who are 
close to religious traditionalism are less likely to be tolerant than those who are close to 
religious modernism.  
 The result of the F-test for coefficient significance shows that the religious 
culture variable has a statistically significant impact on political tolerance ( 88.102 =χ  
and ρ > 001.02 =χ ). This result implies an interesting fact about religious people in 
Korea. Even though there are huge differences between the two dominant religious 
groups (Christianity and Buddhism) based on religious commitment and orthodoxy, 
there are intradenominational differences between religious traditionalists and 
modernists in relation to political tolerance. And so, because both theses (ethnoreligious 
and culture wars) have some explanatory power in determining Korean people’s political 
tolerance, it is necessary to compare them for deciding which one is better in analyzing 
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Table 5-5. Effects of Differences in Religious Culture (Traditionalist/Modernist) on the 
Political Tolerance (Model II-1). 
Ordinary Least Squares Genaralized Least Estimators Explanatory Variables 
Expectation Coefficient Expectation Coefficient 
Age(↑) - -0.01(0.01)* - -0.01(0.01)* 
Gender(“1” for man,”0” 
for woman) 
- -0.05(0.07) - -0.05(0.03)* 
Income(↑) + 0.02(0.01) + 0.02(0.01) 
Education(↑) + 0.01(0.05) + 0.01(0.05) 
Religious Culture - -0.62(0.30)* - -0.62(0.19)** 
Constant.  2.08(0.99)*  2.08(0.70)** 
Observations 803 803 
F 2.24*  
Log pseudolikelihood  -1127.66 
AIC  2.82 


















the relationship between religion and politics in Korea.  
 
 
Comparison of Two Theses and a Better Way of Investigation. 
In order to compare the two models (the ethnoreligious and culture wars theses), 
it is necessary to generate three new variables based on the extent of religious values 
(religious traditionalism/modernism in religious culture) among three dominant religious 
groups. Because there is variation between Christianity and Buddhism in terms of 
religious behaving and believing, we cannot assume that Christian traditionalists have 
similar religious values (religiosity) as Buddhist traditionalists. By generating three 
variables based on the extent of religious culture among three religious traditions (i.e., 
traditionalism/modernism in Catholicism, Protestantism, and Buddhism), we can avoid 
the oversimplification problem of the culture wars thesis and shed some light on the 
dynamic relationship between religion and political tolerance in Korea. In addition, 
Model III in Figure 2-2 allows us to compare the two theses directly by conducting F-test 
for the statistical significance of group coefficients.  
 Three variables - Catholic Religious Tradition (CRT), Protestant Religious 
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Tradition (PRT), and Buddhist Religious Tradition (BRT) - were generated by multiplying 
dummy variables of religious tradition and religious culture. Thus, CRT represents the 
variation of religious culture only within Catholics. However, when we use these three 
variables in analyzing OLS regression with religious tradition variables, it is 
unquestionable that there is a multicollinearity problem between religious tradition and 
these three variables (CRT, BRT, and PRT). In order to correct the multicollinearity 
problem, the original form of the religious tradition variables are transformed into 
orthogonalized variables by using the Gram-Schmidt process (Arfken 1985; Cohen 
1993; Golub and Loan 1996; Sribney 1995). Table 5-6 shows the results of data analysis 
for testing the ethnoreligious and the culture wars theses simultaneously.  
According to the result of the F-test of group coefficients,3 the first null 
hypothesis of the F-test (the ethnoreligious thesis) is that the three coefficients of 
religious tradition variables are equal to zero ( 47.132 =χ  and ρ > 0037.02 =χ ). And 
the second null hypothesis of the F-test (the culture wars thesis) is that the three 
coefficients of CRT, BRT, and PRT are equal to zero ( 15.82 =χ  and ρ > 0430.02 =χ ). 
The result of these F-tests implies that the ethnoreligious thesis has almost same 
                                            
3 F-tests are conducted based on GLE analysis because OLS regression has both 
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity problems. 
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Table 5-6. Effects of Religious Tradition and Religious Culture on the Political Tolerance 
(Model III). 
Ordinary Least Squares Genaralized Least Estimators Explanatory Variables 
Expectation Coefficient Expectation Coefficient 
Age(↑) - -0.01(0.01)** - -0.01(0.01)*** 
Gender(“1” for man,”0” 
for woman) 
- 0.06(0.42) - -0.06(0.03)* 
Income(↑) + 0.02(0.14) + 0.02(0.01)* 
Education(↑) + 0.02(0.05) + 0.02(0.04) 
Catholic + -0.07(0.10) + -0.07(0.15) 
Buddhist + 0.17(0.11) + 0.17(0.09)* 
Protestant - -0.05(0.07) - -0.05(0.08) 
Secular + 0.04(0.04) + 0.04(0.03) 
CRT - -0.01(0.03) - -0.01(0.04) 
BRT - -0.07(0.04)* - -0.07(0.03)* 
PRT - -0.01(0.28) - -0.01(0.17) 
Constant.  0.25(0.28)  0.25(0.17) 
Observations 716 716 
F 2.13*  
Log pseudolikelihood  -1006.45 
AIC  2.84 







explanatory power as the culture wars thesis in analyzing people’s religiosity and 
political tolerance in Korea (even though 2χ of the fist null hypothesis is bigger than 
that of the second, the difference between them is small). In other words, in terms of the 
relations between religiosity and political tolerance in Korea, both interdenominational 
and intradenominational differences affect peoples’ political tolerance levels. 
 Interestingly, this data analysis reveals that while people who believe in 
Buddhism have a high level of political tolerance, people who have traditional religious 
values among Buddhists have a low level of political tolerance. In other words, while 
most Buddhists in Korea have a high level of political tolerance because of their 
religious doctrines (the tradition of Mahayana Buddhism), Buddhists with active 
participation in religious services (only religious commitment has a significant impact on 
tolerance in Model II) tend to have a low level of political tolerance. This implies that the 
majority of Korean Buddhists have a high level of political tolerance, but the small 
number of religious traditionalists within Buddhism has a low level of political tolerance. 
 Thus, Model III analysis shows the possibility of developing a better way to 
investigate the relationship between religiosity and political tolerance by focusing on 
simultaneous effects of interdenominational and intradenominational differences on 
 123
political tolerance. Because religion itself impacts on people’s political tolerance from 
two-sides (both inside and outside of believers), it is necessary to investigate religion as 
a stimulus (an independent variable) for peoples’ political attitudes by using both the 
ethnoreligious (outside effect of believers) and the culture wars (inside effect of 
believers) theses.  
 According to Tropman, in looking at the world around us, two perspectives have 
been popular (Tropman 2002). One is the “social structuralist” perspective, which uses 
the nature of the concrete reality in which we live as the primary vehicle of cause and 
explanation. In other words, the structrualist perspective looks at the “hard side” of 
reality – the places we work, the tools we use, the climate we experience – as life’s 
great shapers (Tropman 2002:3).4 Historically, this tradition is Aristotelian and 
materialist (for instance, Marx used this perspective; he looked at the position one had 
in the division of labor). 
 On the other hand, there are the Platonic and “pen” traditions (Tropman 2002:3-
4). Max Weber fits here; he argued that a set of ideas (for instance, the Protestant ethic) 
caused/explains the development of capitalism (Weber 1930). On the individual level, 
                                            
4 In this perspective, Skinner believed that our behavior was a product of reinforcing and 
extinguishing conditions, more or less in the here-and-now (Skinner 1971). 
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Freud was such a thinker, believing that feelings in our psyche  direct our actions. 
According to Freud once those feelings are righted or released, better behavior follows 
(Adler 1937). These perspectives are espoused by “social values” theorists. Social 
values thinkers argue that ideas, values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes are the driving 
forces for people, communities, and societies (Tropman 2002:3-5). 
 In relation to the two theses of religion, the culture wars thesis is closest to the 
social value perspective (focusing on the inside of believers), and the ethnoreligious 
thesis is closest to the social structuralist perspective (focusing on the outside of 
believers). Thus, Model III in this research represents a new way of investigating 
people’s religiosity by focusing on both inter- and intradenominational effects on political 
tolerance. In particular, when we look at the role of people’s religiosity on their political 
attitude (for instance, political tolerance) in a society with religious diversity, we need to 
explain both inter and intradenominational effects on political attitude. Because we can 
not assume that all Buddhists have a coherent pattern of a certain political attitude (or 
that all religious traditionalists would have a coherent pattern) in a society with various 
religions, it is necessary to investigate people’s religiosity by focusing on believers’ 
outside effects (the ethnoreligious thesis) and inside effects (the culture wars thesis) at 
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 This chapter shows the results of data analysis for the relationship between 
individuals’ religiosity and their political tolerance levels. First, the results of data 
analysis partially confirms the ethnoreligious thesis: for instance,(1) there is a negative 
relationship between Protestants and political tolerance, (2) there is positive relationship 
between Buddhists and political tolerance, and (3) there is no statistically significant 
relationship between Catholics and political tolerance.  
Second, in terms of the culture wars thesis, according to the results of data 
analysis, there is a clear line (intradenominational difference) between religious 
traditionalists and modernists in Korea. In particular, believers who are close to religious 
traditionalism are less likely to be tolerant than those who are close to religious 
modernism, which confirms the culture wars thesis.  
Finally, in order to compare the explanatory powers of the two theses, this 
research generates three new variables based on the extent of religious values 
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(religious traditionalism/modernism in religious culture) among three dominant religious 
groups (Buddhism, Protestantism, and Catholicism) in Korea. According to the F-test of 
group coefficients, the ethnoreligious thesis has almost same explanatory power as the 
culture wars thesis. In other words, in terms of the relationship between religiosity and 
political tolerance in Korea, both interdenominational and intradenominational difference 












Chapter VI: Hypotheses for Political Ideology and Religiosity 
 
Political Ideology in South Korea. 
 Like air and water, politics is something in which everybody has self-interest. 
Limits of supply also characterize individuals’ concerns; decisions must be made about 
them (Sheldon 1960:9-11). Individuals’ everyday decisions are viewed as their political 
actions in a broad definition of politics. In order to make a decision, individuals must 
have a certain type of standards that give them a clue for what is good or bad for their 
lives. 
 For instance, people have a desire for public policy that is good by their 
standards. Public policies give expression to the public’s general notion of the kind of 
society in which they want to live, what things are right and wrong, and what values the 
government should nurture and protect – whether these values are generosity, self-
reliance, or courage. Racism and sexism in employment practices do not rise from 
market system; rather, they reflect what the employer values, as well as what he or she 
wants to protect. Ideas of property influence how goods are distributed in the market. 
Conceptions about what is a fair wage and what rights exist for free education, free 
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health care, or employment have a similar economic and political influence (Kelman 
1988:31,53). Based on these ideas about the way society should be, people either strive 
to maintain the status quo, or they struggle for change. In this context, ideologies consist 
of a particularly powerful arrangement of ideas about society. 
 Ideology is the picture of how society should be and how such a society is 
justified. It is an interconnected set of ideas and beliefs that articulates how the basic 
values of a group of people apply to the distribution of power in society (Mott 1993:3). 
An ideology is the vision that gives cohesive shape to social values and the dream of 
how the social order is to be organized by those values. An ideology is possessed by a 
group, which uses it in relating to other groups and in dealing with internal conflicts 
(Adams 1955:72). Values are both determinants of behavior and weapons used by 
contestants (Lloyd 1971:76). An ideology is not held with disinterestedly. It requires a 
commitment, even partisanship (Mott 1993:3-4). In short, ideology, when defined as 
people’s ideas about the way society should be, plays an important role in shaping 
people’s political actions.  
 In South Korea, which has been moving toward democratic consolidation since 
the late 1980s, Koreans begin to face many social problems arising from the diversity of 
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political ideology. According to Shin and Jhee’s analysis of the Korean democratization 
process, the democratization of the country’s right-wing dictatorship (authoritarian 
military regimes from the 1960s to the late 1980s) has resulted in the movement of 
many South Koreans from the right to the left on the ideological spectrum (2005). Shin 
and Jhee also found that many of the Koreans who have shifted their ideological 
position on the spectrum have done so without changing their thinking about what “the 
left” and “the right” represent (2005). The current problem in Korean democratization is 
rooted in such a rapid change in Koreans’ ideology without thinking about what “the left” 
and “the right” represent. Yet, the rapid change of Koreans’ ideological spectrum 
contributes to expanding the diversity of political ideology in Korea from extreme right 
wing to extreme left wing. 
 However, many Koreans don’t know clearly about what “the left” and “the right” 
represent, yet they tend to speak clearly out about where they are in the ideological 
spectrum (Shin and Jhee 2005). One important factor that impacts on the establishment 
of Koreans’ self-identification of political ideology is religion (Benson and Williams 1982; 
Dyck 2000; Guth and Green 1986; Layman and Carmines 1997; Leege and Kellstedt 
1993; Mott 1993; Walsh 2000).  
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Political Culture as an Adhesive Combining Ideology and Religion. 
 How do ideology and religion connect to each other in the political realm? The 
answer to this question is located in a common factor possessed by both ideology and 
religion. This common factor is a key element in the foundational definitions of ideology 
and religion: “oughtness.” Because Ideology is the picture of how society should be and 
how such a society is justified (Mott 1993:3), people with a certain ideology (for instance, 
cultural conservatism, economic conservatism, liberalism, Marxism, etc.) proclaim that a 
society ought to be the certain form that their ideology prescribes. Thus, the meaning of 
ideology obviously has the element of “oughtness.” 
 In the case of religion, because religion is built through stories of origin and 
destiny and offers both proclamations and explanations of freedom and order, judgment, 
meaning, and hope (Leege and Kellstedt 1993:216), every religion has the element of 
“oughtness.” Religion is often the source for founding myths that collect a people into a 
political community and give them purpose. Religion holds up transcendent standards of 
justice by which a people can measure its collective actions. In prescribing a path to 
salvation, religion, as Max Weber noted (Gerth and Mills 1946), tells a people not only 
what it is saved from but what it is saved for. In short, religion offers models of and for 
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personal and collective reality (a society). 
 In a similar context, according to Thomas Aquinas’ classic political treatise on 
government morality, government action involves responsibility and a choice of means, 
and the means depend on the ends that are moral (Beiner 1984; D'Entreves 1948). The 
people engaged in politics are moral agents, attracted to both good and evil. They are 
confronted with challenges that go beyond the categories of technical efficiency. 
Because people are moral beings and need to integrate their worlds, they will defend 
their actions with reference to a broader and more abstract conception of reality and will 
be confronted with an image of what is right (“oughtness”). Such an image is reflected 
politically as ideology (Mott 1993:5-6) and religiously as worldview.  
 How exactly does this common factor (“oughtness toward a society”) of ideology 
and religion (in particular, religious world view) play a role in the political realm? In other 
words, how can ideology and religious worldview be bound together to influence 
politics? The answer is culture (Leege 1993). The adhesive that binds together religious 
worldviews and ideology (political ideology hereafter) is culture. Geertz argues that 
culture is not simply a complex of “concrete behavior patterns – customs, usages, 
traditions, habit clusters – but … a set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, 
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instructions – for the governing of behavior” (Geertz 1966, 1973:44). In other words, 
culture has a regulating function (Geertz 1966). At the heart of culture is a system of 
sacred symbols that seem “to mediate genuine knowledge, knowledge of the essential 
condition in which life must, of necessity, be lived…. What a people prizes and what it 
fears and hates are depicted in its world view, symbolized in its religion, and in turn 
expressed in the whole quality of life” (Geertz 1966:129-131). Through its religious 
beliefs, rituals, and worldviews, culture can function as a controller of society.  
 In the field of such culture, religion becomes collective memory and politics 
becomes collective action (Leege and Kellstedt 1993:216-217). Religion gives cultural 
expression to the primary problems of existence perceived by a people. It not only 
addresses the fundamental problems of human existence, but also prescribes the 
process of their solution and envisions the outcome. Because politics involves the 
legitimate use of the means of coercion to achieve societal goals, it can have a peculiar 
binding way of “enforcing salvation” (Mott 1993:217). Most religious worldviews allow for 
the possibility of nonconformity through free will; religion offers identity and norms for 
behavior, but any individual is free to cope with the consequences of a personal 
decision not to conform. The political order, by its very definition as collective action and 
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its capacity to use coercion, has the potential to impose swift and often devastating 
sanctions on nonconformity. In short, due to the cultural function of regulating a society, 
religious worldviews and ideology together influence both individuals’ political choices 
and governmental public policy – for instance, the political impact of Isamic culture in 
Middle Eastern countries, Buddhistic culture in Southeast Asian countries, Liberation 
Catholic culture in Latin America, and religious Orthodox culture in Eastern Europe 
(including Russia). 
 Therefore, if we know what kind of relationship exists between religion and 
ideology, we may infer the religious influence on politics. With regard to South Korean 
politics, because people do not know exactly what “the right” and “the left” represent 
(Shin and Jhee 2005), a self-identified ideological spectrum cannot predict individuals’ 
political behavior in the long term. In this case, by examining the impact of religion on 
peoples’ ideological spectrum, we can gain a clear picture of the relationship between 
religion and politics. As mentioned in earlier chapters, two theoretical arguments (the 
ethnoreligious thesis and the culture wars thesis) will be used to examine the 
relationship between individual religiosity and political ideology. 
 
 134
Measuring Political Ideology as a Dependent Variable in South Korea. 
 In order to measure Koreans’ ideological spectrum, it is necessary to uncover 
the meaning of “liberal” and “conservative” labels for Korean people. In this regard, 
there are two assumptions: (1) that the meaning of ideological labels is structured in 
dimensional terms; and (2) that the content of such meaning is largely issue oriented 
(Conover and Feldman 1981:618-619).  
First, in terms of the structure of meaning, it is assumed that the liberal 
perspective is simply the opposite of the conservative one. In effect, liberals and 
conservatives are depicted as sharing the same perceptual framework(s); the only 
difference is that their view is from opposite sides of the field (Conover and Feldman 
1981:619). In other words, based on individuals’ own perceptions of the meaning of 
conservatism, conservatives simply think of liberals as people who have the opposite 
ideology of conservatism. Thus, voters in any election ought to be able to compare 
candidates, issues, and parties, and subsequently evaluate such objects using their own 
identification as an anchoring point. 
 Second, in terms of the content of meaning, the meaning of ideological labels is 
largely issue oriented (Levitin and Miller 1979). For instance, in regard to social and 
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economic issues, cultural conservatives are concerned with maintaining discipline in 
people’s lives, especially within the family (e.g., by making divorce difficult and by 
tightening controls over abortion and euthanasia), and are in favor of a strict upbringing 
and traditional sex-roles (Witte and Scheepers 1999). Economic conservatives are 
concerned with the desirable level of economic equality among people as well as the 
desirability of trade unions and governmental intervention in economics. In general, 
economic conservatives oppose economic equality, trade unions and governmental 
intervention in the economic sphere (Witte and Scheepers 1999).1 People tend to 
identify their ideologies based on such clear issue-oriented distinction.  
 However, neither meaning of ideological labels (the structured or issue-oriented) 
is entirely correct and useful when we try to measure peoples’ ideological spectrum in a 
society. For instance, recent works reveal that many voters are unable to make accurate 
comparisons of candidates and issues in liberal/conservative terms (Erikson, Luttbeg, 
and Tedin 1980; Levitin and Miller 1979). This means that people cannot clear identify 
candidates as either on their own side or the opposite. This tendency is especially 
pronounced in the case of issues, where, based on traditional conceptualizations, one 
                                            
1 The distinction between social and economic conservatism is similar to the distinction between 
cultural and economic conservatism (Lipset 1981) and between social traditionalism and 
economic conservatism (Johnson and Tamney 2001). 
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might logically expect to find the clearest liberal/conservative distinctions. For example, 
Erikson et al. note a Harris poll which revealed that only 50 percent of the electorate 
was able to “correctly identify the liberal and conservative sides of major political issues” 
(1980:57). Similarly, Levitin and Miller found that on some issues even so-called 
ideologues had difficulty distinguishing the liberal position from the conservative one 
(1979).  
 One interpretation of such findings is that researchers may have incorrect data 
when they measure peoples’ ideological labels based on peoples’ issue-oriented 
perceptions. In other words, even a person who shows very conservative ideas in 
economic issues (e.g., supporting a limited government and opposing economic equality 
based on free market principles) may hold some liberal ideas on social issues (e.g., 
abortion or divorce cases). More generally, several studies have found that people 
organize their beliefs in a multidimensional fashion (for instance, cultural, social, 
economic, or religious dimensions), with the nature and number of dimensions often 
varying from individual to individual (Conover and Feldman 1981; Herzon 1980; Jackson 
and Marcus 1975). 
 This tendency is readily apparent in current Korean politics due to the peoples’ 
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lack of clear understanding of what “the right” or “left” represents in public policy issues 
(Shin and Jhee 2005). According to the survey data, people in Korea do not have a 
clear understanding about how conservatives and liberals differ in terms of their policy 
orientations. The survey respondents were asked to answer 17 policy-oriented 
questions and to point to their political ideological position (self-identification ideology 
spectrum). According to economic conservatives’ policy preferences, they tend to 
oppose economic equality, trade unions and governmental intervention in economics 
(Johnson and Tamney 2001). According to Cronbach’s alpha test for those three 
questions,2 the alpha value is less than 0.16 (16%). Most statistical researchers argue 
that only alpha values greater than 70% can be acceptable in terms of the consistency 
of questionnaires and answers for them (Cronbach 1951; Hatcher 1994; Nunnaly 1978). 
In other words, the Cronbach’s test result shows that there is no pattern or correlation 
among the three answers. Thus, the survey data shows that even though some people 
identified themselves as conservatives, their policy preferences about economic issues 
were not exactly correspondent with what true economic conservatives stands for. In 
                                            
2 The respondents were asked to answer how strongly they agree/disagree the following 
statements: (1) The federal government should not interfere in operating private companies, and 
(2) The federal government should provide sufficient social welfare benefits even though it raises 
individual taxes. The Cronbach’s alpha was calculated by comparing answers of these two 
questions and respondents’ self-identification of ideological spectrum (extremely liberal to 
extremely conservative). 
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order to increase the reliability of this test, the same test was conducted with different 
survey data - a survey data collected by Inglehart and his collegues in 2002 (Inglehart et 
al. 2004). According to the test of Inglehart’s data set, the Cronbach’s alpha is 0.0221 
(less than 3%).3 This test strongly supports the claim that Koreans do not have a clear 
understanding of what “right” or “left” mean in terms of policy orientation. 
 However, if policy or issue-oriented measurement is not reliable for measuring 
Koreans’ ideological positions, what alternatives are possible? Many researchers argue 
that individuals’ party identification is more stable than other political attitudes and can 
be used to measure their ideological spectrum (Abramson and Ostrom 1991; Converse 
and Markus 1979; Fiorina 1981; Jennings and Niemi 1981). Both Levitin and Miller 
(1979) and Holm and Robinson (1978) note a substantial relationship between partisan 
and ideological self-identifications; as the former explains, “when people describe 
themselves as having an ideological position, they also seem to be saying something 
about their positions on the parties, quite apart from their issue or policy stands” (Levitin 
and Miller 1979:768).  
 In addition, because party identification is far more stable than attitudes toward 
                                            
3 The questionnaires asked how strongly they agree/disagree the following statements: (1) The 
state should give more freedom to firms, and (2) Incomes should be made more equal (Inglehart 
et al. 2004:465). 
 139
issues and candidates in any elections (Campbell et al. 1960), it exerts a strong 
influence on individual voting decisions both directly and indirectly, through its influence 
on attitudes toward candidates and issues (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). Given 
such a stable tendency of individuals’ party identification, it is possible to measure 
Koreans’ ideological spectrum based on their party identification. According to Lee and 
Glasure, Koreans tend to identify their party preferences based on parties’ policy-
orientations (1995). For instance, during the 1990s, the DLP (Democratic Liberty Party, 
now Han Na Ra Party since 1997) supporters blamed workers for economic recession 
while their DP (Democratic Party, now Yul Lin Woo Ri Party) counterparts accused the 
government; 29% of DLP identifiers named workers’ laziness and 46% of DP identifiers 
named government policy as the reason for the 1990s economic downturn (Lee and 
Glasure 1995:375). 
 Since the establishment of an extremely liberal party (the Democratic Labor 
Party) in 1999 the National Congress has been divided by three dominant parties: the 
Yul Lin Woo Ri Party (Woori Party hereafter, 37.8% in the 2004 election), the Han Na Ra 
Party (35.2%), and the Democratic Labor Party (their total vote in National 
Congressional election in 2004 was 12.9% of the total electorate) (Park 2004). The 
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ideological spectrum of the three parties varies from conservative (Han Na Ra Party), to 
liberal (Woori Party), to extreme liberal (Democratic Labor Party).4  
 Many scholars argue that the distribution of party identification remains a key 
influence on the outcomes of elections, particularly in the United States (Fiorina 1981; 
Green and Palmquist 1994; Jennings and Niemi 1981). Contemporary Korean politics 
has the same tendency (a supporter of a certain party tends to vote for the same party 
in general elections). According to preference tests for the survey data, the probability of 
accordance between peoples’ preference of party and their actual voting behavior is 
over 72%.5 
 Thus, in this research, people’s ideological positions are measured by using 
individuals’ party identification and their voting behavior in the 2002 presidential election. 
According to Lanoue and Bowler, voters’ voting behavior is strongly influenced by their 
party identification, and this impact is stable regardless whether of their party has a 
chance of winning the seat (1992). Moreover, party identification is more closely 
                                            
4 The Democratic Labor Party is not a socialist party even though they pursue economic equality 
in Korean society as its party’s long-term objective. DLP does not support or prefer any socialist 
revolution, yet they try to make Korean society as like a welfare state of Western Europe. Its 
policy orientation is the following: Increase employment rate, Increase taxes from the rich and 
large conglomerits, Free medical service with government’s expenses, and Free education for all 
ages including college levels (see election pledges of DLP, Party 2005: website, www.kdlp.org). 
5 For people who support Han Na Ra Party, 73.3% and for people who support Woori Party, 
71.8%. The preference tests are calculated via sensitivity tests of two questionnaires: (1) Which 
party do you support? And (2) Which political party did you vote for in the 2004 general election? 
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connected to voting behavior than any other variables, such as mass media and political 
campaigns (Bryunin and Newton 2003). In short, because of strong and stable linkage 
among the three variables (political ideology, party identification, and voting choice), we 
can measure Koreans’ ideological spectrum based on their party identification and 
voting choice in the 2002 presidential election.6 By doing so, the probability of systemic 
error arising from Koreans’ inaccurate understanding of political ideology can be 
avoided.  
 In order to measure political ideology, factor analysis is used, based on two 
variables - party identification and voting choice in the presidential election. The 
eigenvalue of the first factor is 1.22 (usually over 1.0 is acceptable), and factor loadings 
of the two variables are 0.783. After conducting factor analysis, a new variable (people’s 
political ideology) is generated by scoring for the estimates of the factors produced by 
the analysis (Gorsuch 1983). The new variable (political ideology) has -1.023 for its 
minimum value, indicating extreme conservatism, and 1.742 for its maximum value, 
indication extreme liberalism, with 0.846 as its standard deviation.  
 
                                            
6 In the 2002 presidential election, the winning votes of each candidate were the following: Lee 
Heo-chang (a candidate of Han Na Ra party) got 46.6%, Noh Moo-hyun (Woori Party) 48.9%, 
and Kyun Young-gil (Democratic Labor Party) 3.9% (Dong A Ilbo, Newspaper, 12/19/2002). 
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Traditional Conservatism vs. Modern Liberalism in Contemporary Korea. 
 Before getting into the details of the relationship between religiosity and political 
ideology, it is necessary to define the meaning of “conservatism” and “liberalism” in 
Korea in order to avoid oversimplification problem in conceptualization. In general, the 
Korean understanding of conservatism amounts to the so called “traditional 
conservatism.”7 This type of conservatism is committed to the preservation of the 
ancient moral traditions of humanity. The stress is on traditions, not moral values in 
themselves, for traditional conservatism sees values as embedded in the traditional 
patterns of life. Thus, traditional conservatism has a great respect for the variety and 
mysteries of traditional life (Kirk 1960:7).  
 For traditional conservatism, civilized society needs orders and classes. People 
are unequal in most qualities of mind, body, and spirit. If people destroy natural 
distinctions, despair will result. Democracy is given only grudging acceptance (Rossiter 
1962:61-62). Change must be worked out in slow and careful stages because society is 
a living organism. Society must alter, but the change must be in tune with the order that 
is already in things rather than an order imposed upon them (Rossiter 1962:27). 
                                            
7 Edmund Burke is considered the father of traditional conservatism (Mannheim 1936:120; 
Rossiter 1962:17) 
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Conservatism at its best is not opposed to change; rather, it seeks continuity or identity 
within development (Wills 1979:64). Careful consideration must be given to the long-
term consequences of proposed changes. Conservatism is cautious not to fall into 
worse forms of injustice in the effort to eliminate old ones (Guroian 1981:191-192).  
 In addition to the emphasis of old traditions, traditional conservatism in Korea 
also strongly rejects Marxian communism because Korean conservatives regard the 
North Korean regime as a core form of the communist state (even though the North 
Korean regime has its own characteristics that are far from the origins of Marxism – for 
instance, Ju-Cheism and transmission of political power by heredity) (Prey 2005). 
Traditional conservatives in South Korea view the North Korean regime as a 
government of unitary totalitarianism and flagrant denial of human rights. In contrast, 
they regard the South Korean regime as a democratic regime with emphasis on 
freedom, human rights, and pluralism. Thus, conservatives in South Korea tend to be 
opposed to Marxian communism. Survey data in South Korea supports the tendency of 
conservatives’ anti-communism. The probability for conservatives to choose military 
attack for solving the problems rooted in North Korea is over 0.73; the value of the 
specificity test for the two variables (self-identification of political ideology and opinions 
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about military attack to solve the North Korean problem) is 73.4%, with 2.0% as the 
standard error. 
 In short, conservatives in Korea employ traditional conservatism as their 
political ideology, which emphasizes tradition and anti-communism. This is a unique 
feature of Korean conservatives that is different from most western countries 
(conservatism in most western countries, especially in the United States, includes both 
traditional and lasses-faire conservatism).8 
 In terms of liberalism, liberals in Korea have “modern liberalism – not classical 
liberalism”9 as their own political ideology. In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
modern liberalism emerged from the critics of classical liberalism. The mainstream of 
liberal thinking began to shift in the direction of abandoning the minimal state in favor of 
justifying state intervention (Adams 2001:29). Modern liberals advocate more and more 
state intervention with collectivist social policies to make up for the deficiencies of the 
capitalist system (Mill 1910).  
                                            
8 Laissez-faire conservatism is a theory of government adopted for capitalism, which is an 
economic theory. For the laissez-faire political philosophy, the self-regulating interplay of price 
values in the market solely determines the allocation of prices and productive resources as well 
as the distribution of social goods for the needs of people and the environment. This proceeds 
without governmental assistance – limited role of government in economy (Demant 1952:179-
180) 
9 Classical liberalism is close to what laissez-faire conservatism represents. For instance, 
classical liberalism is based on Adam Smith’s laissez-faire economic policy (the government 
policy of non-intervention in economy) and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism (the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number) (Adams 2001:20-23). 
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 After the Second World War, the comprehensive welfare state was designed by 
two modern liberals – John M. Keynes (1883-1946) and William Beveridge (1879-1963) 
– based on the new concept of freedom (“positive freedom”) (Adams 2001:29-30). 
People may appear to be free, with a whole array of civil liberties, but if they are 
uneducated, live in squalor and are overworked for starvation wages, in what real sense 
are they free? People can only truly be said to be free when they have a genuine 
opportunity to participate fully in the life of their society. Therefore, collectivist 
intervention is justified in liberal terms if it enables people to so participate; or to put it 
another way, if it removes obstacles to people’s freedom to fully develop their 
individuality. In practical terms, the argument points towards a program of welfare 
legislation, providing such things as education, decent housing and a system of social 
security (Adams 2001:29).  
 The survey data supports that liberals in Korea are close in thought to modern 
liberals. According to the sensitivity test for the two variables (self-identification of 
political ideology and opinions about welfare policy), the probability for liberals in Korea 
to support the government’s welfare policies is over 0.68, with 0.02 as standard error. In 
addition to approving collectivist intervention, liberals in Korea tend to be less opposed 
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to communist regimes, in particular, the North Korean regime - than their opponents, 
conservatives. Because modern liberals seek communitarian features of social life, 
preferring community happiness to private happiness (Mott 1993:145-146), they are 
likely to support foreign assistance (Benson and Williams 1982:154-156). Due to this 
pro-foreign assistance stance, liberals in Korea are less antagonistic to North Korea 
than conservatives. In short, liberals in Korea hold modern liberalism as their political 
ideology, which emphasizes collective intervention (welfare state policy) and 
sympathetic to communist regimes, in particular, the North Korean regime. 
 
 
The Relations between Individuals’ Religiosity and Political Ideology: 
Ethnoreligious vs. Culture Wars Thesis. 
 According to the ethnoreligious thesis, religion is thought of primarily as a social 
group phenomenon, with membership in a religious tradition being closely linked to 
other aspects of culture, such as ethnicity, race, and region. So the focus of the 
ethnoreligious thesis is on political differences between, not within, religious traditions, 
and most analyses of political behavior (including attitudes and ideology) based on it 
focus on the effects of religious tradition and not on the effects of beliefs or behaviors 
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(Layman 2001:64). In other words, we can expect that a person in a certain religious 
tradition is more conservative (or liberal) than one in a different religious tradition. 
Because there are three dominant religions in Korea (over 99% of religious people are 
Catholic, Protestantism, and Buddhism), this research focuses on the implications of 
these three religions on their adherents’ ideological spectrums.  
 What relationship can we expect between these three religious traditions and 
their adherents’ political ideology in Korea? First, in terms of the relationship between 
Catholicism and its members’ political ideology, Catholics are more likely to be 
conservative than people who belong to other religious traditions (including seculars) in 
Korea. Because of the hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church, members of 
Catholic churches tend to emphasize established traditions and prefer to keep them 
rather than change. 
 In terms of the historical background of the Roman Catholic Church, this Church 
is literally the oldest institution in the world; it is a truly global church with a distinct 
hierarchical structure headquartered at the Vatican in Rome. The structure of the 
Church hierarchy is rooted in two millennia of history. Priests belong to a diocese or 
archdiocese (a geographic area) headed by a bishop or archbishop, who receives his 
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appointment from the pope. A few of these archdiocese leaders around the world 
become cardinals, the top elites of the Church responsible for electing a new pope each 
time the “Bishop of Rome” dies (Fowler, Hertzke, and Olson 1999:44-45). At the heart of 
Church structure is the doctrine of apostolic succession, the idea that the pope is 
literally the successor of the Apostle Peter.  
 Because of this hierarchical structure and deeply rooted tradition, the Roman 
Catholic Church has a unique feature of organizational rigidity (the members of the 
Catholic churches have extreme difficulty in changing or reforming the Church). 
Moreover, the members of Catholic churches get used to such traditions and don’t have 
any strong incentive to change. Their preference of old tradition makes them oppose 
any rapid changes in the society that they live in. Thus, Catholics in Korea tend to 
exhibit traditional conservatism in the political arena. In addition to the Catholic 
churches’ stress on tradition, anti-communism (arising from Maxim’s atheism) by all 
Christianity, including Catholicism, pushes Korean Catholics to move to the right 
(traditional conservatism). 
 Second, with regard to Protestants and their political ideology, Protestants are 
more likely to be conservatives than people with other religious traditions in Korea. 
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Unlike the diversity of Protestantism in western countries - for instance, the division 
between mainline Protestants and evangelical Protestants in the United States (Fowler, 
Hertzke, and Olson 1999; Guth 1996; Guth and Green 1991; Smidt 1989; Wilcox 1990; 
Wilcox 2000) - most Protestants in Korea are very close to evangelical Protestantism 
(Clark 2002; Freston 2004; Kim 2001a). 
 Many scholars argue that there is strong linkage between evangelical 
Protestants (Protestants hereafter) and political conservatism (Green et al. 1996; 
Kellstedt et al. 1996; Oldfield 1996; Wilcox 2000). Unlike the structural conservatism of 
Catholics, it is the theological backgrounds of Protestants, that push the laity closer to 
conservatism than liberalism. In other words, Protestants generally adhere to particular 
beliefs that move them toward conservatism as their political ideology.  
 For instance, Hunter (1984; 1996) and Marsden (1980), in their analyses of 
religious conservatives, emphasize orthodox belief in the death, burial, and resurrection 
of Jesus Christ, Christ’s sinless perfection and deity, the substitutionary atonement 
accomplished by his death, and the inerrancy or authority of the Bible. Evangelical 
Protestants view scripture as the authoritative word of God, place an emphasis on 
evangelism/missions, believe that Jesus is the only way to salvation, and have had a 
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conversion/”born-again” experience (Kellstedt et al. 1996). Fundamentalists (Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in Korea) generally hold very similar beliefs, but they are more likely to 
adhere to biblical literalism and are generally more independent of their surrounding 
culture (Hood and Smith 2002; Marsden 1980). Charismatic Christians (Pentecostal 
churches in Korea), on the other hand, also embrace proselytism and biblical authority, 
but they emphasize the third member of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, and they are more 
likely to engage in “spirit-filled” activities such as healing and speaking in tongues (Hood 
and Smith 2002:700). Even though fundamentalists and charismatic Christians have 
some differences from evangelical Protestants, all three Christians have one thing in 
common – emphasis on evangelical missionary works in society and the authority of the 
Bible and God’s word (Hong 2001; Kim 2004d).  
 How does this Protestant theological basis connect with political conservatism 
(traditional conservatism in Korea)? Although this assumption has not been tested with 
empirical data, there is a solid theoretical reason for Protestants to be ideologically 
conservative. The religiously orthodox (Protestants’ emphasis on the Bible and God’s 
word as literal) are often described as “otherworldly” (Green et al. 1998). They often see 
policy problems as spiritual rather than political. According to Protestantism, teen 
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pregnancy, poverty, and crime cannot be solved through policy intervention alone, for 
spiritual transformation must precede any personal or societal solutions (Belcher, 
Fandetti, and Cole 2004; Hood and Smith 2002).  
Although governments and social groups attempt to correct social problems, 
those attempts would not be successful without individuals’ (for instance, criminals or 
people in extreme poverty) spiritual transformation. In short, all problems of society are, 
for Protestants, individually made and solved. Therefore, Protestants tend to focus on 
individual lives, not on societal traditions or customs. They generally try to change 
individuals’ lifestyles in the boundary of old traditions, which is a feature of traditional 
conservatives. 
 Furthermore, when we compare the two Christian groups (Catholics and 
Protestants), Protestants are more conservative than Catholics in Korea. Because of the 
influence of Liberation Theology in Latin American Catholicism (see the detail of 
Liberation Theology in Levine 1988), Catholicism in Korea is linked with a liberal 
theology of Korea, called Minjung theology (Clark 1997). Minjung Theology sought roots 
in the Korean Minjung, or “masses,” and the Korean history of tribulation expressed in 
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the emotion of han.10  
According to Minjung theology, Christians should be the instruments of God’s 
own will to see justice done in the world. This was a call to activism and involvement in 
changing the political system that greatly offended the South Korean state and invited 
trouble for its prophets and catcalls from the sidelines of conventional, conservative 
Protestantism (Clark 2002:200). It was a potent criticism of the pietistic Christianity 
(mostly conservative Protestantism) that avoids tangling with the brutal realities of 
Korean life in the twentieth century and simply awaits a better world in the next life. The 
impact of Minjung theology on traditional Roman Catholicism in Korea pushed Catholics 
to move toward the center of the ideological spectrum (less conservative than 
Protestants). 
 Finally, Buddhists are more likely than seculars to be conservatives in Korea. 
Even though Buddhists are more tolerant than other religious peoples (see Chapter V), 
such a high level of political tolerance is not directly linked to political liberalism. 
Because Buddhism has emphasized the rule of law since the era of Budda, some 
scholars tend to regard Buddhism as compatible with liberal democracy (based on 
                                            
10 “Han” is an elusive term but is often translated as “bitter resentment,” something that smolders 
after generations of oppression by unjust systems and masters. (Suh 1981:16-17). 
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modern liberalism) (Changkwanyoon 1993; Promta 1993).  
For instance, the Buddha told Ananda, a principal disciple, that if he passed 
away, the Dhamma-Vinaya (teaching-precepts) would be their teacher (King 1964:188-
201). The Buddha did not appoint anyone to be the leader of the Sangha; The Dhamma, 
or law, would rule instead. Thus, Buddha emphasized the Law rather than the person. 
He once said, “He who sees Dhamma sees me” (King 1964:200-201) The Sangha, the 
community of monks, is to be ruled by law, not by personal decree of its leader. There is 
in fact no leader in Buddhism. The law is its leader. A society ruled by law is in complete 
accord with the spirit of Buddhism. 
 However, although the Buddha emphasized the rule of law in a society, the ideal 
form of political system for the Buddha was kingly rule by a Buddhist ruler. A number of 
texts outline an ideal for a Buddhist ruler to follow so as to ensure a peaceful and 
harmonious society, free of poverty (Saddhatissa 1970:149-164). Nothing is said on the 
duty of subjects towards their ruler, but Buddhism has generally not encouraged 
rebellions, on account of its emphasis on non-violence (Harvey 2000:113).  
 In particular, the Buddha admired some of the tribal republics of his day. At one 
time, he said that the Vajjian republic would flourish if the people continued to:  
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i) ‘hold regular and frequent assemblies’ 
ii) ‘meet in harmony, break up in harmony, and carry out business in harmony’ 
iii) ‘not authorize what has not been authorized, but proceed according to what 
has been authorized by their ancient tradition’ 
iv) ‘honour, respect, revere and salute the elders among them, and consider them 
worth listening to’ 
v) ‘not forcibly abduct others’ wives and daughters and compel them to live with them’ 
vi) ‘honour, respect, revere and salute the Vajjian shrines at home and abroad, not 
withdrawing the proper support made and given before’ 
vii) ‘make proper provision for the safety of Arahats, so that such Arahats may come in 
future to live there, and those already there may dwell in comfort’ (Nikaya 1987:74-
75) 
One can see these as the principles of respecting collective decision-making, concord, 
tradition, elders, women, religion, and holy men and women (Arahats). This emphasis 
on tradition is directly linked with Koreans’ traditional conservatism.  
 In addition to the emphasis of the old tradition by Buddhists, Buddhists in Korea 
are strongly influenced by traditional shamanistic rites, which meet the need for a 
longevity cult and ancestor worship, guaranteeing and securing secular desires. This 
type of Buddhism is called Kibok Pulgyo, Buddhism which deals with wordly fortune 
(Shim 2000:542).11 In other words, for Korean Buddhists, keeping a traditional way of 
                                            
11 Korean Buddhist monastic compounds have two subsidiary shrines near the main worship 
hall: one dedicated to the tutelary mountain spirit on whose land the temple stands, and the other 
to the Taoist god of the Seven Stars (Ursa Major). Underlying this syncretism is the fact that the 
other-worldly, transcendent elements of Buddhism have often been compromised to 
accommodate themselves to worldly elements, affirming Shamanism, Taoism and Confucianism 
(Shim 2000:548). 
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life is an essential element for a peaceful and happy life in the mundane world. Thus, 
based on the Buddha’s ideal type of politics and a unique characteristic of Korean 
Buddhism, Buddhists in Korea are more likely be conservative than seculars. 
 However, in terms of the culture wars thesis, many academics argue that 
people in a society are divided along the cultural line between religious traditionalists 
and modernists (Benson and Williams 1982; Green et al. 1996; Jelen and Chandler 
2000; Layman 2001; Layman and Carmines 1997; Miller and Shanks 1996; Shafer and 
Claggett 1995; Sobnosky 1993; Wald 2003). First, in relation to religious traditionalists, 
traditionalism means “a deliberate effort to regenerate tradition and make it socially 
significant again… [It] is a form of engagement with the modern world” (Lechner 
1993:23). In the process, religious traditionalists may support important social changes. 
What religious traditionalists seek to preserve is valuing the group more than the 
individual (Tamney 2002:8). In addition, religious traditionalism means not only the 
superiority of the religious group over the individual, but also the dominance of the 
religious group over all the other institutions of society. Therefore, in the traditionalist 
worldview, there is no separation of church and state, and traditionalist religious values 
are hegemonic (Tamney 2002:9-10). 
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 In contrast, religious modernists accept individuals’ freedom and values based 
on cultural pluralism, but also advocate sovereignty based on the separation of church 
(religious authority) and state (Tamney 2002:18-20). For instance, religious modernists 
imply their acceptance of a pluralist society with their sympathetic comments about 
Islam. Moreover, the religious modernist’s commitment to individualism is at least to 
some extent applied within the religious group – religious leaders who accept religious 
modernism did not demand acceptance of their judgments, but simply presented 
arguments for them. 
 However, in terms of the relationship between people’s religious identity 
(traditionalist/modernist) and their political ideology (conservative/liberal), religious 
traditionalists are more likely to be politically conservative than religious modernists. 
Many scholars have elucidated the link between religious traditionalism and 
conservatism, as well as between religious modernism and liberalism (Ammerman 
1987; Flake 1984; Hunter 1991; Klatch 1992; Wuthnow 1988). Robert Wuthnow argues 
that the symbolic boundaries of American religion have changed since World War II, as 
rising levels of higher education have split the major religious denominations along 
educational lines into conservative (traditionalist) and liberal (modernist) camps 
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(1988:71-99, 155-168). In Wuthnow’s view, the “symbolic warfare” (1988:138) between 
religious conservatives and liberals has supplanted earlier denominational antagonisms 
between Protestants and Catholics, Christians and Jews. According to Wuthnow, 
religious liberals (modernists) take politically liberal positions on a wide array of 
contemporary issues, including abortion, homosexuality, prayer in school, gender roles, 
racial equality, and economic justice, while religious conservatives (traditionalists) take 
politically conservative stances (1988: 132, 219-223).  
 James Hunter, in an argument with metaphors of war (e.g., “battles,” 
“skirmishes,” “stories from the front,” “trenches”) (1991:50, 64, 288, 319), maintains that 
the “culture war” over contemporary social and economic issues is intractable because it 
is ultimately based in “fundamentally different conceptions of moral order” (1991:49). On 
one side are the religiously orthodox (traditionalists), who believe that God is the 
ultimate moral arbiter of right and wrong, that the revealed word of God as recorded in 
sacred texts is inerrant and of timeless relevance, and that God is a real and active 
presence in people’s daily lives. 
 On the other side are progressives, who include religious modernists as well as 
atheists and agnostics. They assert that humans are the ultimate judge of what 
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constitutes moral action, that morality is an evolving, open quest that must be judged in 
its cultural context, and that humans are responsible for their own fates (Hunter 
1991:44-45). These battling moral camps, Hunter writes, cross-cut faith communities 
and have replaced traditional antagonisms along denominational lines (the 
ethnoreligious thesis) (1991:67-106).  
 In terms of theoretical reasons for the religious traditionalist to be politically 
conservative, the religiously orthodox (traditionalists) are often described as 
“otherworldly” (Green et al. 1998). They often see policy problems as spiritual rather 
than political. According to the orthodox (traditionalist), teen pregnancy, poverty, and 
crime cannot be solved through policy intervention alone, for spiritual transformation 
must precede any personal or societal solutions. While government should be used to 
protect people, it will fail if it attempts to solve what are spiritual, as opposed to physical, 
crises (placing higher authority on religious communities than government). Then, the 
tendency is for religious traditionalists to see these problems as individually made and 
solved. Emerson and Smith found this tendency (in the United States) when they 
examined evangelicals’ attitudes toward race relations (2000). Evangelicals (who are 
categorized as religious orthodox) (Jelen, Smidt, and Wilcox 1993) see racism as an  
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individual sin and not as a systematic or institutional problem, so they are lukewarm 
toward public policies that address race relations on an institutional scale. These 
findings suggest that religious traditionalists (orthodox) are positively related to politically 
conservatives.  
 In the context of the culture war thesis, it is expected that religious traditionalists 
are more likely to be politically conservative than religious modernists in Korea. In 
summary, peoples’ ideological spectrums based on their religious traditions and cultural 
characteristics can be represented in Figure 6-1. 
 
 
Protestants  Catholics  Buddhists               Seculars (No Religion) 
   Religious Traditionalists                        Religious Modernists 
 ←----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------→ 
     Extreme Conservatism             Middle            Extreme Liberalism 






Control Variables (Sociodemographic Variables). 
 In order to avoid the misspecification problem of statistical models, I include four 
demographic factors as control variables: gender, income, age, and education. First, in 
terms of gender, women are more likely to be liberal (left-wing). According to Edlund and 
Pande, since the early 1970s, US women have favored the Democrats over the 
Republicans (2001). Conversely, in most European countries, men were more left-wing 
than women from the 1970s until the mid-1990s. However, Edlund and Pande identify a 
common trend on both sides of the Atlantic: since the 1970s, US and European women 
have steadily become more left-wing (liberal) (2001). Thus, it is expected that Korean 
women are more likely to be liberals than men. 
 Second, in terms of income, there is a positive relationship between income and 
political conservatism (Jackman 2003). Because most left-wing or liberal parties in the 
United States and the Europe have pro-poor policy orientations, the poor are more likely 
to support liberal parties and become liberals than the rich (Stonecash and Mariani 
2000). Therefore, it is expected that the rich in Korea are more likely to be conservatives 
than the poor. 
 In terms of age and education, due to the strong impact of students’ movements 
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on Korean democratization, educated (usually with college education experience) 
younger people tended to support opposition parties (liberal parties) until the 1997 
presidential election. However, after Noh Moo-hyun (who was nominated as a candidate 
from the Democratic Party, a liberal party) was elected as president in the 2002 election, 
less-educated and older people (usually over 40) became strong supporters of the 
opposition party (the Han Na Ra Party, a conservative party) (Lee and Glasure 1995). It 
is expected that younger people with a high level of education are more likely to be 
political liberals than older people with low level of education in Korea. 
 
 
Hypotheses for the Relationship Between Individual’s Religiosity and Political 
Ideology. 
 Based on previous studies and theoretical expectations (from both the 
ethnoreligious and culture wars theses), the following hypotheses will be tested in this 
research. 
 
Hypothesis I. Catholics are more likely to be conservatives than people who belong to 
Buddhists or seculars in Korea. 
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Hypothesis II. Protestants are more likely to be conservatives than people who belong 
to Catholics, Buddhists, or seculars in Korea. 
Hypothesis III. Protestants are more conservative than Catholics in Korea. 
Hypothesis IV. Buddhists are more likely to be conservatives than seculars in Korea. 
Hypothesis V. People who have strong beliefs (Orthodoxy) in their religious tradition 
are more likely to be conservatives than those who have weak beliefs. 
Hypothesis VI. People who are active participants in religious services (Religious 
Commitment) are more likely to be conservative than those who are inactive. 
Hypothesis VII. religious traditionalists are more likely to be politically conservative than 
religious modernists. 
 
Hypotheses I to IV are designed to test the ethnoreligious thesis, and Hypotheis V to VII 
are designed to test the culture wars thesis. In addition, we can examine which model 
has more explanatory power in analyzing the relationship between religion and politics 
in Korea by comparing the results of two groups (one group based on the ethnoreligious 
thesis and another groups based on the culture wars thesis) of hypotheses-tests (F test 
for the significance of group coefficients) in model III.  
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Summary. 
 This chapter examines political culture as an adhesive that combines 
individuals’ religiosity and their political ideology. In terms of the second dependent 
variable in this research, people’s ideological positions are measured by using 
individuals’ party identification and their voting behavior in the 2002 Korean presidential 
election. The variable of political ideology is generated by scoring after factor analysis of 
these two variables.  
 However, in relations to the meanings of two concepts (conservatism and 
liberalism), conservatives in Korea employ traditional conservatism as their political 
ideology, which emphasizes tradition and anti-communism. For the concept of liberalism, 
liberals in Korea hold modern liberalism as their political ideology, which emphasizes 
collective intervention (welfare state policy) and sympathetic to communist regimes, in 
particular, the North Korean regime. 
 In terms of the relationship between individuals’ religiosity and political ideology, 
this research formulates 7 hypotheses: Hypotheses 1 to 4 are designed to test the 
ethnoreligious thesis, and Hypotheses 5 to 7 are designed to test the culture wars thesis. 
The hypotheses are: (1) Catholics are more likely to be conservatives than Buddhists 
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and seculars in Korea, (2) Protestants are more likely to be conservatives than Catholics, 
Buddhists, and seculars in Korea, (3) Protestants are more conservatives than Catholics, 
(4) Buddhists are more likely to be conservatives than seculars, (5) People who have 
strong beliefs (orthodoxy) in their religious affiliation are more likely to be conservatives 
than those who have weak beliefs, (6) People who are active participants in religious 
services (religious commitment) are more likely to be conservative than those who are 
inactive, and (7) Religious traditionalists are more likely to be politically conservative 










Chapter VII: Data Analysis of Political Ideology 
 
Measuring and Imputation of Dependent Variable (Political Ideology). 
 In order to obtain a systematically unbiased dependent variable (in this case, 
the political ideology of Koreans), two methods are used, scoring after factor analysis 
and imputation of missing values. For the first method, because of the Korean peoples’ 
lack of clear understanding of what “the right (or conservatism)” or “left (or liberalism)” 
represents in public policy issues (Shin and Jhee 2005:89), this research generated a 
dependent variable by scoring after factor analysis with two variables (Party 
Identification and Voting Choice in the 2002 presidential election in Korea). Based onthe 
result of factor analysis, one factor was retained (Eigenvalue of the first factor is 1.23), 
and the factor loadings of the two variables are equal to 0.78.  
These two variables have a high level of concurrent validity (The Average 
Interitem Covariance = 0.32, and Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82). This high level of concurrent 
validity implies that Koreans show very consistent patterns in identifying their political 
party support and voting behavior in the presidential election (e.g., people who support 
a conservative party are more likely to vote for a candidate from the conservative party  
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Pearson 2χ  447.6369*** 
Note: *** Significant, P>0.001. 
 
in the presidential election). Table 7-1 shows the result of the Pearson 2χ  test and the 
percentage of column frequency. 
Based on these two variables, a dependent variable (which indicates people’s 
political ideology; the high value of the variable = extreme liberalism) was generated by 
scoring after the factor analysis. However, the dependent variable has 462 missing 
values (47% of total respondents) with 1.74 as the maximum value (extreme liberals) 
and -1.02 as the minimum value (extreme conservatives).1 Some problems arise from a 
large number of missing values in the analysis of data. For instance, the sample size is 
reduced, the representativeness of the sample decreases, and the information offered 
                                            
1 Another dependent variable used in Chapter V and VI (Political tolerance) has 59 missing 
values (5.9% of total respondents), which does not influence the representativeness of the 
sample. 
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by the respondents by answering other items is lost2 (Rubin 1976).  
 In order to avoid those problems of missing data, the missing values within the 
dependent variable were imputed by using the Univariate Imputation Sampling (UVIS) 
method, which is one of multiple imputation methods (Buuren, Boshuizen, and Knook 
1999; Gelman, King, and Liu 1998; Rubin 1976, 1987, 1996; Schafer and Olsen 1998). 
UVIS imputes missing values in the single variable y-variable based on multiple 
regression on the x-variable list.3 Because Model III in Figure 2-2 includes both the 
ethnoreligious and the culture wars theses, the independent variables in Model III 
(including control variables) were used as the x-variable list of the UVIS. Thus, the x-
variable list of the UVIS is Age, Gender, Income, Education, Catholic, Buddhist, 
Protestant, Secular, Religious Traditionalist/Modernist within Catholic (CRT), Religious 
                                            
2 For any statistical analysis that contains a variable for which there are missing data, the cases 
with missing data have to be excluded from analysis if the data are not imputed. 
3 UVIS imputes yvar from xvarlist according to the following algorithm.  
1. Estimate the vector of coefficients (
∧
β ) and the residual variance by regressing the 
nonmissing values of yvar on xvarlist. 
2. Draw at random a value ( *σ ) from the posterior distribution of the residual standard 
deviation. 
3. Draw at random a value ( *β ) from the posterior distribution of
∧
β , allowing, through *σ , 
for uncertainty in 
∧
β . 
4. Use *β  to predict the fitted values etamis at the missing observations of yvar. 
5. (Prediction matching) For each missing observation of yvar with prediction etamis, find the 
nonmissing observation of yvar whose prediction (etaobs) on observed data is closest to 
etamis. This closest nonmissing observation is used to impute the missing value of yvar. 
(see the detail of the UVIS in Buuren, Boshuizen, and Knook 1999:689-690). 
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Traditionalist/Modernist within Buddhist (BRT), and Religious Traditionalist/Modernist 
within Protestant (PRT). Figure 7-1 shows the patterns of missing values within the 
original data and imputed data (y-variable = Political Ideology). 192 missing values were 
imputed based on 322 complete cases. Thus, the actual observation numbers in OLS 
(Ordinary Least Square) regression increased from 322 to 518. 
 Because the variance and measurement for each independent variable are 
described in Table 5-1, this chapter does not include the details of the independent 
variables (the same independent variables are used for analyzing political ideology). 
After the initial estimation of political ideology by OLS regression, three post-estimation 
tests were conducted (multicollinearity among independent variables, normality test of 
residuals, and hetrescadasticity test). The reason for performing three tests is to obtain 
the best linear unbiased estimates of the regression parameters based on the Gauss-
Markov assumptions.4 Under the Gauss-Markov assumptions, the strongest case for 
OLS estimation can be made when the error term (residuals) has a Gaussian 
distribution. Only after achieving Gaussian distribution of the error term can hypotheses 
tests for the parameters be applied. 
                                            
4 Three key assumptions must not be violated to get the unbiased estimations: (1) the error term 
in the model has a probability distribution that is the same for each observation and does not 
depend on the predictor variables; (2) the predictor variables are observed without error; and (3) 
the error term has a finite variance (Chernick 1999:70-71) 
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Political Ideology (Scoring after Factor Analysis) Political Ideology (Univariate Imputation 
Sampling Method) 


































































































































Note: MVs=Missing Values; + = nonmissing; / = missing values. The sequence of variables is 
political ideology, age, gender, income, education, Catholic, Buddhist, Protestant, seculars, CRT, 
BRT, and PRT. 
Figure 7-1. Patterns of Missing Values in the Sequence of Variables. 
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 When the error distribution is non-Gaussian, regardless of what estimation 
procedure is used, it is difficult to determine confidence intervals for the parameters or to 
obtain prediction intervals for the response variable. This is where the Generalized-
Least-Estimators (GLM) can help (Chernick 1999; Efron and Tibshirani 1993).  
 In order to check the error distribution (whether or not it is close to Gaussian 
distribution), four residuals for each model in Figure 2-2 are obtained. In relation to the 
normality assumption of the error terms, normal probability plots are described. 
According to Figure 7-2, there are some violations of normality assumptions for each 
model’s error term (most significantly, the error term of Model III is especially deviated 
from the normal distribution line). 
 In relation to the assumption of homoscedasticity for the error term, Leverage-
versus-Residual Squared plots for each estimation are described. According to Figure 7-
3, four OLS estimations have heteroskedasticity problem and cannot provide unbiased 
estimates of coefficients (which makes it difficult to test hypotheses of the theoretical 
models) (Baum, Cox, and Wiggins 2000; Bollen and Jackman 1990; Breusch and 
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0 .005 .01 .015
Normalized residual squared














0 .005 .01 .015
Normalized residual squared














0 .005 .01 .015 .02
Normalized residual squared














0 .005 .01 .015
Normalized residual squared
Leverage vs.Squared Residual Plot of Model III
Note: The lines on the chart show the average values of leverage and the (normailized) residuals 
squared. Points above the horizontal line have higher-than average leverage; points to the right 
of the vertical line have larger-than average residuals. Both points indicate the existence of 
outliers in the data. 









 The problems are rooted in the violations of normal distribution and 
heteroskedasticity in OLS estimation can be reduced by conducting Generalized-Least 
Squares (GLS) estimates as an alternative method (McCullagh and Nelder 1989; 
Wooldridge 2000:261-263). GLS can reduce such problems by implying robust standard 
errors (instead of standard errors for the model). (Stock and Watson 2003; Street, 
Carroll, and Ruppert 1988). Figure 7-4 shows the proper selection of robust standard 
error transformation among various methods. According to Figure 7-4, “identity” 




































































imputing factoride by model 3
Histograms by transformation
Histograms Ladder of Powers for Ideology
 
Figure 7-4. Histograms Ladder of Powers for Political Ideology. 
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 Finally, in relation to the assumption of Independence (multicollinearity problem), 
VIFs (Variation Inflation Factors) are calculated after OLS estimation of each model. 
Table 7-2 shows the results of VIF calculation. 
 According to Table 7-2, there are serious multicollinearity problems in Model I 
and III (in general, any observation with a VIF over 10 is supposed to have a collinearity 
problem in OLS estimation) (Wooldridge 2000:95-96). In order to correct the 
multicollinearity problems in the models, Orthogonalization Transformation was 
conducted (Abramowitz and Stegun 1968; Golub and Loan 1996; Sribney 1995), and 
new sets of orthogonalized variables for the six variables (Catholic, Buddhist, Protestant, 
Secular, CRT, BRT, and PRT) were generated and used for the estimations. 
 In particular, even though the VIFs of Model III were reduced after the first 
orthogonalization (CRT, BRT, and PRT), moderate collinearity problems existed 
between these three orthogonalized variables and other independent variables (Catholic, 
Buddhist, and Protestant: VIFs ranges from 5 to 11). Thus, the second orthogonalization 





Table 7-2. VIFs After OLS Regressions. 
Model I Model II Model II-1 Model III Variables 
VIFs VIFs VIFs VIFs 
Age 1.24(1.24) 1.26 1.22 1.26 (1.26) (1.26) 
Gender 1.06(1.06) 1.06 1.06 1.03 (1.07) (1.07) 
Income 1.14(1.14) 1.13 1.09 1.38 (1.10) (1.10) 
Education 1.39(1.39) 1.34 1.34 1.38 (1.38) (1.38) 
Catholic 56.72(1.02)   58.59 (8.57) (1.03) 
Buddhist 72.11(1.02)   69.33 (10.71) (1.03) 
Protestant 97.46(1.06)   85.80 (7.92) (1.95) 
Secular 53.59(1.01)   2.02 (1.96) (1.96) 
Religious 
Commitment 
 1.65   
Orthodoxy  1.64   
Religious Culture   1.04  
CRT    5.80 (5.80) (1.02) 
BRT    5.25 (5.25) (1.00) 
PRT    5.04 (5.04) (1.04) 
Note: The values in parentheses are VIFs after Orthogonalization Transformation of the original 









 In Table 7-2, the first four variables (Age, Gender, Income, and Education) are 
control variables (demographic variables), and the next four (Catholic, Buddhist, 
Protestant, and Secular) are variables of respondents’ religious belonging (or religious 
affiliation). The religious commitment variable represents respondents’ level of religious 
behaving (a high number of the variable = frequently participation in religious activities), 
and orthodoxy refers to religious believing (a high number of the variable = possession 
of strong belief in religion). Religious culture represents respondents’ religious values 
(religious traditionalist/modernist), which are calculated by combining two religious 
variables (behaving and believing).  
 In order to generate the last three variables (CRT, BRT, and PRT), each 
religious affiliation (dummy variable for each religious group) was multiplied by the 
“Religious Culture” variable. Thus, CRT (Catholic Religious Culture) refers to the 
variations of religious culture within people who belong to Catholicism (a high number of 
CRT = religious traditionalists among Catholics). These three variables (CRT, BRT, and 
PRT) allow us to look into the possibility of the third way of investigation (combining the 
ethnoreligious and the culture wars theses).  
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Hypotheses Testing: Ethnoreligious Thesis. 
 For the ethnoreligious thesis, four hypotheses were formulated and tested: (1) 
Catholics are more likely to be conservatives than Buddhists and seculars in Korea, (2) 
Protestants are more likely to be conservatives than Catholics, Buddhists, and seculars 
in Korea, (3) Protestants are more conservative than Catholics in Korea, and (4) 
Buddhists are more likely to be conservative than seculars in Korea. Table 7-3 shows 
the summary of data analysis for testing hypotheses based on the ethnoreligious thesis. 
 In terms of the four control variables, the coefficients of two variables (Age and 
Gender) are negative values for the age variable and positive values for the gender 
variable. In other words, women and young people are more likely to be liberal than 
men and old people in Korea. These findings are not different from those of Western 
countries, particularly the United States and western European countries (Edlund and 
Pande 2001).  
 For the income variable, the result of data analysis shows that there is a 
positive relationship between income and political conservatism. According to 
Stonecash and Mariani, because most left-wing or liberal parties in the U.S. and the 
Europe have pro-poor policy orientations, the poor are more likely to support liberal  
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Table 7-3. Effects of Religious Denominational Differences on Political Ideology (Model I). 
Ordinary Least Squares Generalized Least Estimation Explanatory Variables 
Expectation Coefficient Expectation Coefficient 
Age (↑) - -1.19(0.11)*** - -1.19(0.07)*** 
Gender (“1” for 
man,”0” for woman) 
- 0.13(0.07)* - 0.13(0.04)** 
Income (↑) - -0.01(0.01) - -0.01(0.01) 
Education (↑) + -0.14(0.05)** + -0.14(0.03)*** 
Catholic - 0.08(0.04)* - 0.08(0.03)* 
Buddhist - -0.14(0.06)* - -0.14(0.04)*** 
Protestant - -0.25(0.15)* - -0.25(0.11)* 
Secular + 0.08(0.47)* + 0.08(0.01)*** 
Constant 4.85(0.47)*** 4.85(0.31)*** 
Observations 518 518 
F 19.91***  
Log Pseudolikelihood  -574.86 
BIC  -2902.12 
Note: * significance, p<0.05; ** significance, p<0.01; *** significance, p<0.001. The numbers in 









parties and become liberals than the rich (2000). As in Western countries, Korea now 
enters into the process of social division based on economic cleavage between the poor 
and the rich. According to Lee, since early 2000, the income gap between the poor and 
the rich has been dramatically increased in Korea, and the competition between the rich 
and the poor in policy-making process has intensified (2005). In short, the poor in Korea 
became a strong support group for the liberal party (the Democratic Labor Party). 
 For the education variable, unlike the Western countries’ cases (in which people 
with high levels of education are more likely to be liberals) (Feldman and Huddy 2004; 
Leo 2005; Perry 2003), the result of data analysis shows that there is a negative 
relationship between people’s education level and political ideology (people with high 
levels of education are less likely to be liberal in Korea). However, according to Figure 
7-5, the relationship between political ideology and education is not a linear relationship, 
but rather a curve linear relationship. This implies that a certain point of education level 
indicates the highest level of liberalism (optimal point of the curve line). After passing the 
optimal point, the level of education has a negative relationship with liberalism. This 
implies that education level is not a solid variable in influencing people’s political 
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Figure 7-5. Fractional Polynominal Graph for Education. 
 
 
high level of education compared to other countries), people’s level of education does 
not influence their ideological position in a solid and predictable way. 
 In terms of the ethnoreligious thesis, the first hypothesis expected that Catholics 
are more likely to be conservative than Buddhists or seculars.5 However, the coefficient 
of the dummy variable (“1” for Catholic) is a positive value (0.08), which implies that 
Catholics are more likely to be liberals than other religious groups in Korea.  
 Historically, the Roman Catholic Church saw liberalism as a potential threat, if 
not indeed a direct challenge, to its authority in temporal affairs. Because it supported a 
                                            
5 The main reason for the hypothesis was the hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic 
Church and its emphasis on established traditions. 
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secular (or lay) state and the free market, liberalism was thought to support a new 
political and economic order free of ecclesiastical oversight or intervention (Baxter 
1998:743-744). With the structural rigidity of the Roman Catholic Church, such hostility 
toward liberalism made Catholics politically conservative. 
 However, since the second Vatican council, the Church’s attitude toward 
political liberalism has changed. The promulgation of Gaudium et Spes (the Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World) and Dignitatis Humanae (the 
Declaration on Religious Freedom) at Vatican II is widely seen as an official 
endorsement of Western political liberalism, and the publication of Centesimus Annus 
by John Paul II in 1991 is interpreted by many as an endorsement of economic 
liberalism (Baxter 1998).  
 In terms of GS (Gaudium et Spes), the novelty of this document consists in its 
not being a discussion of the general theme, “Church and World,” but of the Church in 
the modern world, the world of today. This explains its methodology of “reading the 
signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel” (Council 
1965:GS4). The GS identified “the world of today” as: the rapidity and depth of social 
and cultural transformations; the impact of the natural and social sciences and 
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technology; modernization, industrialization, urbanization, mass media; a dynamic 
sense of nature; calls for greater freedom of self-realization and human rights; the 
spread of democracy; and the changed relationship between church and state (Council 
1965:GS54).  
 In opposition to anti-modern Catholicism,6 the Council had a positive 
appreciation of the driving principles of modernity. The distinctive forces and principles 
of the modern achievement could be acknowledged, not simply as an unfortunate 
present condition, but as ways in which the human race has begun to more effectively 
assume its God-given self-responsibility: “Far from considering the conquests of man’s 
genius and courage to be opposed to God’s power as if he set himself up as a rival to 
the Creator God, Christians ought to be convinced that the achievements of the human 
race are a sign of God’s greatness and the fulfillment of his mysterious design” (Council 
1965:GS34). This changed appreciation of the modern world resulted from the Council’s 
clear declaration about the relationship between church and state, calling as the 
separation of church and state. In this regard, the GS announced: “The political 
community and the Church are autonomous and independent of each other in their own 
                                            
6 Anti-modern Catholicism was expressed in Feuerbach’s famous cry, “To enrich man, one must 
impoverish God” (Komonchak 1994:82). For the anti-modern Catholicism, “Enlightenment” was 
considered by some to require emancipation from religion and modernity was thought by other to 
be nothing but “apostasy” (Komonchak 1994). 
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fields” (Council 1965:GS76).  
 Based on this separation of church and state, the Roman Catholic Church 
acknowledged that one could enjoy the political freedom and autonomy (based on 
responsibility) of citizens in the political community. To cooperate with the political 
community to make “perfect societies,” the Church must “preach the truth of the Gospel 
and clarify all the spheres of human activity through its teaching and the witness of the 
faithful” (Regan 1967:24-26). To enhance the possibility of cooperation between the 
Church and the political community, the Roman Catholic Church began to embrace the 
political liberalism. 
 Liberals in Korea have “modern liberalism – not classical liberalism.” Modern 
liberals advocate more and more state intervention with collectivist social policies to 
make up for the deficiencies of the capitalist system (Mill 1910). In this regard, the 
Church’s promulgation of Dignitatis Humnane (DH) indicated that the Roman Catholic 
Church supported modern liberal ideas. The DH formally committed the Catholic church 
to the principle of religious freedom in modern society. It defined this freedom negatively 
as “freedom from coercion in civil society” (Council 1965:DH1). Civil rights were then 
said to rest on the dignity of human persons who, if they are obliged to pursue truth 
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(especially religious truth), cannot do so if they do not enjoy both “psychological 
freedom and immunity from external coercion” (Council 1965:DH2). The truth can only 
be discovered by free inquiry and only acknowledged by free acts of faith. 
 Thus, the search for human dignity drew the Roman Catholic Church closer to 
modern liberalism (which argues that people can only truly be said to be free when they 
have a genuine opportunity to participate fully in the life of their society) (Adams 2001). 
For the Roman Catholic Church, the state’s intervention with collectivist social policies 
(to solve social and economic problems) can be justified only when such intervention is 
performed to preserve human dignity and to expand religious freedom. 
 In terms of Korean democratic development, the declaration of GS and DH by 
the Roman Catholic Church helped Korean Catholics play an important role in the 
democratic transition period (under the authoritative military regimes) and made them 
embrace modern liberalism as their political ideology in the democratic consolidation 
period (from the late 1980s to the present).  
 In terms of Korean Protestantism, the second and third hypotheses expected 
that Protestants in Korea are more likely to be conservatives than other religious groups. 
According to the data analysis, the coefficient of the dummy variable (“1” for Protestant) 
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is a negative value (-0.25) and is statistically significant, with P<0.01 level. This means 
that Protestants in Korea are more likely to be conservative than other religious groups. 
 The most important reason for Korean Protestants’ conservatism is their 
theological background – evangelicalism. As Clark and other scholars argue, most 
Protestantism in Korea is very close to evangelical Protestantism (Clark 2002; Freston 
2004; Kim 2001a). Theological Inerrancy is the key linkage between evangelical 
Protestantism and political conservatism. In terms of inerrancy, evangelical Protestants 
claim that the only sure path to salvation is through a faith in Jesus Christ that is 
grounded in unwavering faith in an inerrant Bible. For evangelical Protestants, if one 
error of fact or principle is admitted in Scripture, nothing – not even the redemptive work 
of Christ – is certain. They insist that true Christians must believe the whole Bible, the 
parts they like along with the parts they dislike, the hard parts and the easy ones. The 
Bible can be trusted to provide an accurate description of science and history, as well as 
morality and religion.  
 Due to this theological inerrancy (strong belief in the Bible as the Word of God), 
evangelical Protestants in Korea are suspicious about the rapid modernization (or 
industrialization) and are hostile toward the Communist regime in North Korea (even 
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though they have provided many relief supplies for North Koreans since the 1990s). 
Because evangelical Protestants believe that the rapid industrialization of Korea has 
contributed to the secularization of the Korean people since the 1960s, Korean 
Protestants try to maintain the Biblical tradition in their daily lives in order to hold in mind 
their faith in Jesus Christ and in an inerrant Bible. For instance, many Protestants 
regularly fast for a couple of days and go to daybreak service every day.  
 These characteristics of Korean Protestantism are compatible with Koreans’ 
traditional conservatism (preferring to keep the old traditions rather than change them 
and being strongly against Communism).  
 With regard to Korean Buddhism, the fourth hypothesis assumed that Korean 
Buddhists are more likely to be conservatives than other religious groups because of 
their emphasis on the old tradition (keeping a traditional way of life is an essential 
element for a peaceful and happy life in the mundane world) (Nikaya 1987) and the 
unique feature of Korean Buddhism (Kibok Pulgyo, which deals with worldy fortune) 
(Shim 2000).  
 According to the findings, the coefficient of the dummy variable (“1” for 
Buddhist) is a negative value (-0.14), with p<0.001 significance level. Given the result, 
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Korean Buddhists are indeed more likely to be conservatives than other religious groups. 
However, in addition to the aforementioned characteristics of Korean Buddhism 
(emphasis on tradition and Kibok Bulgyo), there is an unique feature of modern Korean 
Buddhism – the establishment and expanding of Won Buddhism.  
 Like that of Japan and China, Korean Buddhism is mainly of the Mahayana 
school, emphasizing attainment of eternity through faith (MacDonald and Clark 1996). 
Some scholars argue that believers of Mahayana Buddhism are more likely to be 
liberals than believers of Theravada Buddhism (Keyes 1978; McCargo 2004; Miyamoto 
1952; Queen and King 1996). However, even though Eastern Asian countries (Tibet, 
China, Korea, and Japan) were initiated into Mahayana Buddhism, these countries 
developed their own Buddhism -, Pure Land Buddhism in Tibet, Chan Buddhism in 
China, Won Buddhism in Korea, and Zen Buddhism in Japan (Robinson, Johnson, and 
Bhikkhu 2005).  
 Because Won Buddhism in Korea is viewed as “clearly an orthodox Buddhist 
movement” (Grayson 1989:254), Won Buddhism seems to have contributed to making 
Korean Buddhists politically more conservative than they were before the early 19th 
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century.7 In Won Buddhism, Won means “circle” in Korean language, a symbol of 
Buddha’s cosmic body (Dharmakaya), the enlightened nature of all sentient beings, and 
the noumenal nature of all beings in the universe. Buddhism is a religion of 
enlightenment. Won Buddhism defines enlightenment as awakening to the truth that the 
whole universe is none other than the manifestation of Buddha’s cosmic body, the 
enlightened nature of all sentient beings and the noumenal nature of all beings in the 
universe (Kim 1997c:89-90).  
 Among the four fundamental principles of Won Buddhism – Correct 
enlightenment and right practice, Awareness and requital of beneficence, Practical 
application of Buddha-dharma, and Selfless service for the public - Practical application 
of Buddha-dharma means that the follower of Buddha-dharma should not be shackled 
to or disabled from managing worldly affairs as in the past, but be able to manage 
worldly affairs better by being a Buddhist (Chung 2003:117-118). In other words, one 
should not become useless to the world by being a Buddhist; to make a lively 
application of Buddha-dharma, one should be a valuable person to oneself, one’s family, 
                                            
7 Won Buddhism was established by Sotaesan. Pak, Chungbin is his full name and Sotaesan is 
his Dharma name. He was born on May 5, 1891, accomplished the great awakening at the age 
of twenty-six after twenty years’ incessant search for Truth, founded the Won Buddhist order in 
order to deliver people of the contemporary world enslaved by materialism due to the loss of 
spiritual power, and passed away at the age of fifty-three on June 1, 1943, after a twenty-eight 
year mission (Kim 1997c:89). 
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one’s society, and one’s country. 
 This emphasis on self-training for being a better Buddhist in managing worldly 
affairs pushes its devotees to be acetic believers. Thus, Won Buddhists in Korea 
became Buddhists who are likely to keep the old tradition and follow what Won Buddhist 
Dharma taught. This unique feature of Won Buddhism in Korea has an important role to 
play in making Korean Buddhists more conservatives. Even though Won Buddhism is 
just one of eighteen Buddhist sects in Korea (MacDonald and Clark 1996:99), its 
influence on Korean Buddhism has been quite impressive and consistent since the early 
20th century (Pye 2002).  
 To compare the different religious groups’ ideological scores (which group has 
more liberal ideas than others?), the ANOVA test for the mean values was performed. 
According to the result of the  ANOVA test, the mean differences between groups are 
statistically significant (F=6.18, prob.>F=0.0004). Table 7-4 shows the mean values (a 
high number indicates closeness to liberalism) of each religious groups and standard 
errors. According to t-tests for pairwise comparison among four religious groups (secular, 
Catholic, Protestant, and Buddhist), the differences of mean values are statistically 
significant, with a 95% confidence level. 
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Table 7-4. Mean Difference Tests for Political Ideology. 
Religious Group Mean Score of Ideology Standard Errors 
Seculars 0.71 0.52 
Catholics 0.19 0.09 
Protestants -0.02 0.05 
Buddhists -0.24 0.07 
F-test (Between groups) F = 6.18, Prob.>F = 0.0004 
t-test for Mean Difference 
(Pairwise groups) 
Catholics – Seculars = (-0.52) 
Protestants – Catholics = (-0.21)* 
Buddhists – Seculars = (-0.95)* 
Buddhists – Catholics = (-0.43)* 
Buddhists – Protestants = (-0.22)* 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are mean difference. * = Statistically Significant in 95% 
Confidence Level. 
 
 According to Table 7-4, seculars (people with no religion) have the highest 
mean value (closest to extreme liberalism), and Buddhists have the lowest mean value 
(closest to extreme conservatism). Based on the comparison between Catholics and 
Protestants, Catholics are closer to liberalism than Protestants (which confirms the third 
hypothesis), and Buddhists are closer to conservatism than seculars (which confirms 
the fourth hypothesis). However, the first hypothesis is disconfirmed because Catholics 
are closer to liberalism than Protestants and Buddhists. Figure 7-6 shows the difference 
























 (A group of intervals pairs its level with each level above it)
 
Note: in X axis, 1=Seculars, 2=Catholics, 3=Protestants, 4=Buddhist. o=Mean value. Y 
axis=Ideology score (High value=Extreme liberalism). “o” represents the mean value of the 
category. 
Figure 7-6. Mean Comparison Graph between Different Religious Groups. 
 
 
comparison of mean values between religious groups. 
 
 
Hypothesis Testing: The Culture Wars Thesis. 
 For the culture wars thesis, three hypotheses were formulated: (1) People who 
have strong beliefs (Orthodoxy) in their religious tradition are more likely to be 
conservatives than those who have weak beliefs, (2) People who are active participants 
in religious services (Religious Commitment) are more likely to be conservative than 
those who are inactive, and (3) Religious traditionalists are more likely to be politically  
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conservative than religious modernists. Table 7-5 shows the results of data analysis for 
testing these hypotheses (Model II in Figure 2-2). In terms of the Orthodoxy variable 
(the level of belief in religious doctrine), the coefficient value is a negative one and 
statistically significant. This confirms the initial hypothesis. However, in terms of the 
Religious Commitment variable (the level of participation in religious services), its 
coefficient value is not statistically significant. In other words, only the Orthodoxy 
variable has a negative relationship with political liberalism.  
 Why do these two religious aspects – Orthodoxy (believing aspect) and 
Commitment (behaving aspect) – have different impacts on political ideology? The 
answer to this question is located in the psychological feature of believers’ intrinsic 
religiousness. In his classic book, The Individual and His Religion, Gordon Allport 
illustrates how people may use religion in different ways (1950). He makes a distinction 
between “Mature religion” and “Immature religion.” Mature religious sentiment is how 
Allport characterizes the person whose approach to religion is dynamic, open-minded, 
and able to maintain links between inconsistencies. In contrast, immature religion is self-
serving and generally represents the negative stereotypes that people have about 
religion (Allport 1950). More recently, this distinction has been encapsulated in the 
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Table 7-5. Effects of Differences in Orthodoxy and Religious Commitment on the Political 
Tolerance (Model II). 
Ordinary Least Squares Generalized Least Estimators Explanatory Variables 
Expectation Coefficient Expectation Coefficient 
Age (↑) - -1.19(0.11)*** - -0.19(0.11)*** 
Gender (“1”for 
man,”0”for woman) 
- 0.10(0.07) - 0.10(0.07) 
Income (↑) - -0.11(0.01) - -0.01(0.01) 
Education (↑) + -0.12(0.05)* + -0.12(0.05)* 
Orthodoxy - -0.03(0.02)* - -0.03(0.02)* 
Religious Commitment - 0.01(0.03) - 0.02(0.03) 
Constant  4.77(0.50)***  4.77(0.50)*** 
Observations 518 518 
F 22.02***  
Log Pseudolikelihood   -585.82 
AIC  2.29 
Note: * significance, p<0.05; ** significance, p<0.01; *** significance, p<0.001. The numbers in 










terms “intrinsic religion,” referring to a genuine, heartfelt devout faith, and “extrinsic 
religions,” referring to a more utilitarian use of religion as a means to an end, such as 
church attendance to gain social status (Allport and Ross 1967). In short, while intrinsic 
(or mature) believers tend to consider their religion as the end of life, extrinsic (or 
immature) believers tend to consider their religion as the means of life. 
 With regard to religious orthodoxy, intrinsic believers are positively related with 
high level of orthodoxy, and extrinsic believers are negatively related with it (Kirkpatrick 
1993). The closeness between religious orthodoxy and intrinsic believers implies that 
religiously orthodox believers tend to consider their religion as the end of their lives. 
Thus, they are more willing to follow their religious doctrine and teachings than extrinsic 
believers (less orthodox believers).  
However, the common factor of political ideology and religion is that both 
emphasize “oughtness toward a society” (Leege 1993). Given the common factor, 
intrinsic (or mature) believers seem to have a clearer and more fortified vision of society 
than extrinsic (or immature) believers. Based on logical inference (the psychological 
similarity between people with a fortified ideological position and intrinsic believers), it 
seems that the orthodoxy variable (a key measurement in differentiating intrinsic and 
 195
extrinsic believers) (Batson and Ventis 1982; Donahue 1985; Fullerton and Hunsberger 
1982; Putney and Middleton 1961) has more power to influence people’s political 
ideology than the religious commitment variable. Moreover, some scholars argue that 
intrinsic believers are considered as religious conservatives or traditionalists 
(Hunsberger 1989; Kahoe 1975, 1977; Meadow and Kahoe 1984), and the results of 
data analysis are not incompatible with the previous studies – more orthodox believers 
(intrinsic or mature believers) are likely to be more politically conservative. 
 In terms of the last hypothesis, the result of data analysis (Model II-1 in Figure 
2-2) confirms the initial expectation of the hypothesis – religious traditionalists are more 
likely to be politically conservative than religious modernists. As illustrated in Chapter IV, 
the Religious Culture variable was developed by combining two variables – Religious 
Orthodoxy and Religious Commitment; thus, a high value of Religious Culture indicates 
people with a high level of religious orthodoxy and active participation in religious 
service. Based on this calculation, the Religious Culture variable indicates people’s 
religious identity (religious traditionalists or modernists). This variable has 2 as its 
minimum value (extreme modernist) and 13 as its maximum value (extreme 
traditionalist). Table 7-6 shows the results of data analysis for Model II-1, which tests  
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Table 7-6. Effects of Differences in Religious Culture on the Political Ideology (Model II-1). 
Ordinary Least Squares Generalized Least Estimators Explanatory Variables 
Expectation Coefficient Expectation Coefficient 
Age (↑) - -1.17(0.11)*** - -0.17(0.11)*** 
Gender (“1” for man,”0” 
for woman)  
- 0.10(0.07) - 0.10(0.07)* 
Income (↑) - -0.01(0.01) - -0.01(0.01) 
Education (↑) + -0.12(0.05)* + -0.12(0.03)*** 
Religious Culture - -0.01(0.01) - -0.01(0.01)* 
Constant  4.77(0.50)***  4.77(0.50)*** 
Observations 518 518   
F 26.08***  
Log Pseudolikelihood   -586.61 
AIC  2.29 
Note: * significance, p<0.05; ** significance, p<0.01; *** significance, p<0.001. The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors (OLS) and robust standard errors (GLE).. 
 
whether or not there are intradenominational differences between religious traditionalists 
and modernists in terms of their political tolerance levels. According to Table 7-6, the 
Religious Culture variable has a negative relationship with political liberalism. In other 
words, there is an intradenominational difference between religious traditionalists and 
religious modernists, as the initial hypothesis expected (while religious traditionalists are 
close to conservatives, religious modernists are close to liberals). This result implies an 
interesting truth about religious people in Korea: Even though there are huge 
differences between the two dominant religious groups (Christianity and Buddhism) 
based on religious commitment and orthodoxy, there are intradenominational 
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differences (regardless of whether a believer is a Christian or Buddhist) between 
religious traditionalists and modernists in relation to political ideology. 
 Figure 7-7 visualizes the point that distinguishes between religious 
traditionalists and modernists based on their ideological positions. According to Figure 
7-7, there is a dividing point (about 7.1 in religious culture variable) that discerns the two 
groups. Based on the data analysis for testing the ethnoreligious thesis, Catholics in 
Korea are more likely to be liberals than other religious groups (the coefficient = 0.08 
and p<0.01). However, the graph in Figure 7-7 shows that any Catholics who are 
located between 7.1 and 13 (the maximum value of Religious Culture variable) are likely 
to be conservative. About 45% of total Catholics are located in this range. Because both 






















-1 0 1 2
i-factorideology
 
Figure 7-7. Fractional Polynominal Graph of Religious Culture and Ideology. 
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explanatory power in determining Korean people’s political ideology, it is necessary to 
compare them to decide which one is better in analyzing the relationship between 
religion and politics in Korea. 
 
 
Comparison of Two Theses and a Better Way of Investigation. 
 In order to compare the two models (the ethnoreligious and culture wars theses), 
it is necessary to generate three new variables based on the extent of religious values 
(religious traditionalism/modernism in religious culture) among the three dominant 
religious groups. Three variables – Catholic Religious Tradition (CRT), Protestant 
Religious Tradition (PRT), and Buddhist Religious Tradition (BRT) – were generated by 
multiplying the dummy variables of religious tradition and religious culture. Therefore, 
CRT represents the variation of religious culture only within Catholics. 
 By including these three variables in Model I in Figure 2-2 (which is Model III), 
we can directly compare the two theses (the ethnoreligious thesis in Model I and the 
culture wars thesis in Model II) by performing the F-test for the statistical significance of 
group coefficients. However, when we use these three variables in regression estimation 
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with religious tradition variables, there is unquestionable a multicollinerarity problem 
among the independent variables. In order to correct the multicollinearity problem, the 
original form of the religious tradition variables are transformed into orthogonalized 
variables by using the Gram-Schmidt process (Arfken 1985; Golub and Loan 1996; 
Sribney 1995).  
 Before getting into the details of data analysis, Figure 7-8 shows that there are 
variations among the three new variables (CRT, BRT, and PRT) in terms of political 
ideology. According to Figure 7-8, both CRT and BRT have a consistent negative effect 
on liberalism, yet PRT has an optimal point of political liberalism. 
 Table 7-7 shows the results of data analysis for comparing the explanatory  
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Figure 7-8. Fractional Polynominal Graph for CRT, BRT, and PRT based on Ideology. 
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Table 7-7. Effects of Religious Tradition and Religious Culture on the Political Ideology 
(Model III). 
Ordinary Least Squares Generalized Least Estimators Explanatory Variables 
Expectation Coefficient Expectation Coefficient 
Age (↑) - -1.16(0.11)*** - -0.16(0.01)*** 
Gender (“1” for man,”0” 
for woman) 
- 0.11(0.07) - 0.11(0.03)** 
Income (↑) - -0.01(0.01) - -0.01(0.01) 
Education (↑) + -0.14(0.05)** + -0.14(0.03)*** 
Catholic - 0.14(0.03)*** - 0.14(0.03)*** 
Buddhist - -0.07(0.03)* - -0.10(0.02)** 
Protestant - -0.07(0.04)* - -0.10(0.03)* 
Secular + 0.08(0.04)* + 0.10(0.02)*** 
CRT - 0.03(0.03) - 0.03(0.02) 
BRT - -0.02(0.03) - -0.02(0.02) 
PRT - -0.11(0.03)** - -0.11(0.04)** 
Constant  4.66(0.50)***  4.66(0.27)*** 
Observations 518 518   
F 15.92***  
Log Pseudolikelihood   -568.40 
AIC  2.24 
Note: * significance, p<0.05; ** significance, p<0.01; *** significance, p<0.001. The numbers in 








power of the two theses (the ethnoreligious and the culture wars theses). 
 According to Table 7-8, while the three religious tradition variables (the 
ethnoreligious thesis) all have statistically significant coefficients on ideology, only one of 
the three religious culture variables – PRT – (the culture wars thesis) has a statistically 
significant coefficient. However, the F-test of group coefficients8 for the ethnoreligious 
thesis results in 2χ = 29.46 and 2χρ > =0.0000. And the F-test of group coefficients 
for the culture wars thesis results in 2χ =11.36 and 2χρ > =0.0100. These results 
demonstrate that the ethnoreligious thesis has more explanatory power in analyzing 
Korean people’s political ideology than the culture wars thesis. In other words, the 
effects of interdenominational differences on political ideology are stronger than those of 
intradenominational differences in Korea.  
 In order to find out which religious tradition has a cultural conflict line inside the 
tradition, F-tests for equal coefficients were conducted. Table 7-8 shows the results of F-
tests for equal coefficents. According to Table 7-8, only the first group of coefficient 
(coefficients of Catholic and 
 
                                            
8 F-tests are conducted based on GLE estimation because OLS regression model has 
heteroskedasticity problem. The null hypothesis of the F-tests is that the all three coefficients for 
each group are equal to zero. 
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Table 7-8. F-tests for Equal Coefficients for Two Models. 
Null Hypothesis -Catholic+CRT=0 -Buddhist+BRT=0 -Protestant+PRT=0 
2χ  14.96 2.40 0.56 
2χρ >  0.0001 0.1216 0.4524 
 
 
CRT) are different from each other. In other words, there is a clear cultural divided line 
between religious traditionalists and modernists only in Catholicism. In contrast, 
Buddhists and Protestants do not have any clear division in terms of religious cultural 
conflict in Korea. It seems that Buddhists and Protestants have a higher probability of 




 This chapter shows the results of data analysis for the relationship between 
individuals’ religiosity and political ideology based on testing 7 hypotheses formulated in 
the previous chapter. The first hypothesis expected that Catholics are more likely to be 
conservative than Buddhists or seculars. The result of data analysis suggests that 
Catholics are more likely to be liberals than other religious groups in Korea. This 
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research suggests that the declaration of GS and DH by the Roman Catholic Church 
helped Korean Catholics be liberals.  
With regard to Korean Protestantism, the second and third hypotheses 
expected that Protestants in Korea are more likely to be conservatives than other 
religious groups. The result of data analysis confirms the expectation of initial 
hypotheses. This research suggests theological backgrounds of Protestantism 
(evangelicalism and Biblical inerrancy) as the main reason for Korean Protestants’ 
conservatism.  
 With regard to Korean Buddhism, the fourth hypotheses assumed that Korean 
Buddhists are more likely to be conservatives than other religious groups because of 
their emphasis on the old tradition and the unique feature of Korean Buddhism (Kibok 
Pulgyo, which deals with worldy fortune). The results of data analysis confirms the initial 
hypothesis. However, in addition to the aforementioned characteristics of Korean 
Buddhism, this research examines the impact of Won Buddhism on Korean Buddhists’ 
conservatism. According to the mean difference tests (ANOVA) for political ideology, 
seculars have the highest mean value (closest to extreme liberalism), and Buddhists 
have the lowest mean value (closest to extreme conservatism).  
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 With regard to the culture wars thesis, the results of data analysis suggests that 
the religious culture variable has a negative relationship with political liberalism. In other 
words, there is an intradenominational difference between religious traditionalists and 
religious modernists, as the initial hypothesis expected (while religious traditionalists are 
close to conservatives, religious modernists are close to liberals).  
 By using three new variables (Catholic Religious Tradition, Protestant Religious 
Tradition, and Buddhist Religious Tradition), this research compares the explanatory 
powers of two theses (the ethnoreligious and the culture wars theses). According to the 
F-test of group coefficients, the ethnoreligious thesis has more explanatory power in 








Chapter VIII: Conclusions 
 
 Many scholars have pointed to the importance of the religious factor in 
developing democracy since WWII. For instance, Huntington gives primacy to 
Christianity as the distinctive positive influence in the making of Western civilization: 
“Western Christianity … is historically the single most important characteristic of 
Western civilization” (1996:70). For Huntington, Western culture’s key contribution has 
been the separation of church and state, something that he sees as foreign to the 
world’s other major religious systems. “In Islam, God is Caesar; in Confucianism, 
Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is Caesar’s junior partner” (Huntington 
1996:28,70,217,238). Across the board, religion has played an important role in world 
politics since the beginning of human history. 
 In Korean history, religion has played an important role since the early 19th 
Century, including support of independent movements in the Japanese occupation 
period, civil rights movements under authoritarian-military regimes, social movements 
for democratic transition, and reunification movements for North and South Korea 
(Grayson 1989, 2002). 
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 Since the late 1980s, South Korea has experienced a rapid democratization 
process. After the successful transition from an authoritarian-military regime to a 
democratic regime, Korea entered the next stage of democratization-democratic 
consolidation. One important factor that influences the process of consolidating 
democracy is religion (people’s religiosity) (Stepan 2000). In order to shed some light on 
how religion affects the consolidating Korean democracy, this research focuses on the 
relationship between individuals’ religiosity and their political attitudes, particularly: (1) 
political tolerance, which is considered as a prerequisite for the democratic 
consolidation, and (2) political ideology, which enables us to look at the impact of 
religion on people’s political behavior. 
 The hypotheses formulated and tested in this research are logically inferred 
from the two dominant theories about religion and politics – the ethnoreligious and the 
culture wars theses. In regards to the impact of individual religiosity on politics, the 
former theory focuses on interdenominational differences (the “belonging” aspect of 
religion), and the latter focuses on intradenominational differences (the “behaving and 
believing” aspects of religion). By comparing the explanatory power of these two theses, 
this research suggests a better way (combining both theses into a multivariate model) of 
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investigating the relationship between religion and politics. 
 First, given people’s level of political tolerance as a dependent variable, it is 
confirmed that Buddhists are more likely to be tolerant than Protestants in Korea, and 
Protestants have the lowest level of political tolerance among the three popular religious 
groups in Korea (Catholicism, Buddhism, and Protestantism). This finding implies that 
even though Protestantism has played a positive role in Korean democratization since 
1945 (for instance, Christian communities in Korea are outstanding examples of civil 
society) (Clark 2002), Protestants in Korea will not strongly promote Korean democratic 
consolidation in the near future due to their low levels of political tolerance. According to 
Sullivan and Transue, the expanding of political tolerance (“norms of reciprocity” in their 
terms) has a positive relationship with democratic development because of its 
contribution to enhancing civil liberty (1999). In short, because of Protestants’ low level 
of political tolerance, they won’t be a active group in consolidating Korean democracy. 
 In terms of the culture wars thesis, it is confirmed that religious traditionalists 
have lower levels of political tolerance than religious modernists. In particular, people 
with a high level of religious commitment (the behaving aspect of religion) have a lower 
level of political tolerance than people with a low level of religious commitment. In other 
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words, people who frequently participate in religious services or activities tend to have a 
low level of political tolerance regardless of which religious denomination they belong to. 
This finding highlights the difference between Korean religious people and religious 
people in Western countries. For instance, while believers in Western countries are 
divided by their levels of religious orthodoxy (the believing aspect of religion - the extent 
of belief in a religious doctrine) (Kellstedt and Smidt 1991, 1993), Korean believers are 
divided by their level of religious commitment (the extent of participation in religious 
services).  
 In Korean democracy, religious traditionalists have a negative impact on 
democratic consolidation due to their low levels of political tolerance. Because religious 
traditionalists (fundamentalists in general) have a negative relationship with democratic 
development in most countries (Bader 1999; Bufacchi 2001; Giroux 2005; Macedo 
2000; Tibi 2002), the finding of this research is not contradictory to other countries’ 
cases.  
 The second dependent variable in this research is Koreans’ political ideology 
(from conservatism to liberalism). In contrast to the analysis of religious impact on 
political tolerance, which gives us a look at the long term effects of religion in Korean 
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politics, the analysis of political ideology allows us to shed some light on the short-term 
effect of religion in Korean politics. According to Kim, one of the key factors in “civic 
society” (the development of which is a crucial factor in promoting further democratic 
development) is that “civil society groups respect pluralism and self-governance” 
(2002h:11-15). Examining the religious impact on ideological cleavage in Korean society, 
allows insight into political stability in the near future and the possibility of developing a 
civil society in Korea (based on the positive relationship between religious modernistm 
and the level of respecting pluralism) (Bader 1999, 2003; Woodberry and Smith 1998). 
 In terms of the ethnoreligious thesis, the data analysis suggests that Catholics 
are more likely to be liberal than other religious groups in Korea. The main reason for 
Korean Catholics’ politically liberal attitude is that they follow a new theological doctrine 
of the Roman Catholic Church – Vatican II’s promulgation of Gaudium et Spes (GS) and 
Dignitatis Humanae (DH). Based on these declarations, the Roman Catholic Church 
tends to acknowledge religious freedom and human rights. Thus, in Korean democratic 
development, the declaration of GS and DH helped Korean Catholics play an important 
role in the democratic transition period (under the authoritarian military regimes) and 
makes them embrace political liberalism as their ideology in the democratic 
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consolidation period (from the late 1980s to the present). 
 In regards to the Korean Protestantism, my findings confirm the initial 
hypothesis - Protestants in Korea are more likely to be conservative than other religious 
groups. The theological doctrines of Protestantism – evangelicalism and theological 
inerrancy – are the basis for Protestants’ general political conservatism. The findings 
also confirm that Korean Buddhists are more likely to be conservatives than other 
religious groups because of the development of Won Buddhism in Korea, (a unique 
feature of Korean Buddhism).  
 According to the F-test for mean difference of political ideology scores, seculars 
have the highest value of ideology (close to extreme liberalism), and Buddhists have the 
lowest value of ideology (close to extreme conservatism) in Korea. Such ideological 
polarization based on people’s religious background suggests that religious groups in 
Korea may represent their political interests and policy preferences in a direct and 
unitary way. This implies that there will be a high level of political participation by 
religious groups in a variety of political issues in Korean politics. Yet, negotiating 
between religious groups’ political interests or policy preferences will be difficult. 
Overcoming this difficulty will be a crucial factor in the process of Korean democratic 
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consolidation. However, the path of Korean democratic consolidation is not so 
pessimistic because religion is only one factor among many factors that influence 
Korean politics. 
 With regard to the culture wars thesis, the data analysis shows that there are 
intradenominational differences (a culturally dividing line) between religious 
traditionalists and modernists. As the initial hypothesis expects, religious traditionalists 
are more likely to be conservative than religious modernists in Korea. However, this 
dividing line is not as clear in Korea as in Western countries. This suggests that the 
ideological polarization process in Korea tends to be affected more by 
interdenominational differences than by intradenominational differences.  
 Finally, in terms of comparing the explanatory powers of the two theses (the 
ethnoreligious and the culture wars theses), while the two theses have similar 
explanatory power in analyzing the relationship between individual religiosity and 
political tolerance, the ethnoreligious thesis has more explanatory power than the 
culture wars thesis in analyzing the relationship between individual religiosity and 
political ideology in Korea. This suggests that when we look at the relationship between 
religion and politics, it is necessary to examine the relationship between all aspects of 
 212
religion (belonging, behaving, and believing) and politics. By doing so, we can avoid the 
problem of oversimplification in analyzing the relationship between religion and politics. 
For instance, since we cannot assume that all Buddhists have a coherent pattern in 
responding to a certain political events or in their political attitudes, it is necessary to 
investigate people’s religiosity by focusing on the outside effects of religion (the 
ethnoreligious thesis) and the inside effects of religion (the culture wars thesis) at the 
same time. Model III in Figure 2-2 shows the possibility of such an investigation method.  
 In order to find out a generalized pattern of the relationship between religion 
and politics, future research is necessary to investigate this relationship in many 
countries and to compare the findings to build a coherent model. If we find that the 
relationship between religion and politics conforms, we can shed some light on how 
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Part I. Political Attitudes 
Please circle one that best describes your 
thoughts 
Strongly          Strongly   Missing 
Disagree ………… Agree     (Don’t 





























Are you interested in political 
events/elections. 
 
The federal government should not 
interfere in operating private companies. 
 
The federal government should provide 
sufficient social welfare benefits even 
though it raises individual taxes. 
 
We should develop the national economy 
even though it causes environmental 
problems. 
 
We should provide economic aid to North 
Korea, even though the North Korean 
government keeps developing nuclear 
weapons. 
 
My electoral participation will have an 
impact on the federal government’s policy-
making process. 
 
Regionalism plays an important role in 
elections (both Presidential and 
Congressional elections). 
 
Democratization is more important than 
economic developments in South Korea. 
1   2   3   4   5   6       -9 
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Please circle one that best describes your 
thoughts 
 
Strongly          Strongly   Missing 
Disagree ………… Agree      (Don’t 




















The freedom of speech should be 
protected in every situation. 
 
Strong labor unions are necessary for 
political development in South Korea. 
 
It is necessary to use military force to 
change the North Korean government. 
 
Individual freedoms can be reduced for 
developing community life. 
 
Regardless of one’s views, people should 
have the right to express themselves. 
 
We should not tolerate minority’s opinions 
in Korean society. 
 
The federal government should increase 
the military budget for national defense. 
1   2   3   4   5   6       -9 
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P16. What is your ideological preference? Circle one. 
(1) Extremely Liberal 
(2) Moderate Liberal 
(3) Moderate Conservative 
(4) Extremely Conservative 






P17. Among the following political parties, which party do you support? Circle one 
 
(1) Democratic Labor Party (Min Joo Noh Dong Dang) 
(2) Yul-lin Woori Party 
(3) Han Na Ra Party 
(4) Others 
(5) Don’t Know (N/A) 
 
 
P18. Who did you vote for in the 16th Presidential election in 2002? Circle one 
 
(1) Kwon Young Gil from Democratic Labor Party 
(2) Noh Moo Hyun from Yul-lin Woori Party 
(3) Lee Heo Chang from Han Na Ra Party 
(4) Others 
(5) Don’t Know (N/A) 
 
 
P19. Which political party did you vote for in the 2004,17th Congressional election?  
 
(1) Democratic Labor Party 
(2) Yul-lin Woori Party 
(3) Han Na Ra Party 
(4) Others 




   
 Part II. Religious Orientations 
 
 
R1. Which religious denominations are you affiliated with now? Circle one 
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(6) Unified Church (Moon Sun Myung) 
(7) Others 
(8) No Religion 
(9) Refuse to answer (Don’t Know) 
 
 
R2. If you are a Christian (if not, go to the next question), which denomination are you  





(4) Unity Church 
(5) Witness of Jehovah 
(6) Others 
(7) Refuse to answer (Don’t Know) 
 
 
R3. How often do you participate in religious activities, beyond funerals or wedding 
    Ceremonies? Circle one 
 
(1) Never even though you have a religious affiliation 
(2) Several times a year 
(3) Once or twice a month 
(4) Once a weak 
(5) More than twice a week 




R4. Do you believe that God (any kind of god) exists?  
  







Do you agree the following? Circle one 
   
 R5. God controls world affairs, including my personally life. 
 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly Disagree 
(5) Don’t Know (N/A) 
 
 
R6. The Bible (or your religious book) is the word of God. 
 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) Don’t Know (N/A) 
 
 
R7. How often do your religious leaders/clergies talk about political/social issues in 
    Religious services? Circle one 
 
(1) Not at all 
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(2) A few (once a month) 
(3) Often (once a week) 
(4) Quite often (more than twice a week) 










 D1. Gender   










(1) Primary school 
(2) Middle/High school 
(3) College/University 
(4) Over graduate level 







D4. Income per month (total amount of your family) (10000won) 
 
(1) Under 100  
(2) 100 to 199 
(3) 200 to 299 
(4) 300 to 399 
(5) 400 to 499 
(6) 500 to 999 
(7) over 1000 
(8) Refuse to answer 
 
 




(3) Divorced (or death of spouse) 
(4) Refuse to answer (N/A) 
 
 
D6. Are you a member of labor union (in your factories or companies)? 
 




D7. Your original hometown. 
 
(1) Seoul 
(2) Kyung ki do 
(3) Kang won do 
(4) Choong chung do 
(5) Jul la do 
(6) Kyung sang do 
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(7) Je joo do 
(8) North Korea 
(9) Immigrants from other countries 
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